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Introduction
Clinton’s Plan for Health Care Reform in the 103rd Congress
In February 1993, President Bill Clinton announced in his first speech before a 
joint session of Congress that health care reform would be his administration’s 
top priority. Seven months later, in September, Clinton gave a speech before 
both chambers of Congress calling for a national health insurance program. In 
the wake of Clinton’s September speech, in which he offered a detailed proposal 
and its potent symbol, the Health Security Card, health care reform dominated 
the schedules of House legislators more than any single policy issue Congress 
had faced in more than a decade.
 Health care reform was not a new issue. Universal health care legislation had 
been introduced in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1970s. Michigan Representative John 
D. Dingell Sr. introduced a national health insurance bill in 1943, and his son, 
House Commerce Committee chair John D. Dingell Jr., continued to introduce a 
national health insurance bill in each Congress of his half-century tenure in the 
House. Despite these tireless efforts by “one of the most powerful and effective 
committee chairman ever” (Barone, Ujifusa, and Cohen 1997), universal health 
care legislation never found its way out of Dingell Jr.’s committee in the House, 
let alone to a floor vote in either chamber (Rovner 1995). Not until a national 
health care plan became the president’s main focus in 1993 did Congress seri-
ously consider it. Largely through his two televised addresses to Congress, 
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Clinton was able to raise the salience of the health care issue to the point where 
Congress was impelled to take action. A Los Angeles Times poll in June 1993 
found that only 9% of survey respondents believed that health care was the “most 
important problem” facing the country, well behind the percentage who believed 
that the most important problem was the economy (20%) and also trailing those 
who mentioned the budget deficit (12%) and unemployment (10%). However, 
on September 25, only three days after Clinton’s address, a similar Los Angeles 
Times poll showed that health care was considered the most important problem 
by a larger percentage (16%) of survey respondents than any other problem. 
Clinton had seemingly raised the health care issue to be understood by many as 
the most important issue facing the country, and Congress responded by schedul-
ing hearings and markups on the issue. Although no health care bill even reached 
a vote for final passage, Clinton succeeded in dominating the congressional 
agenda for several months.
Bush’s Proposal for Radio Frequency Auctions in the 102nd Congress
In 1991, President George H. W. Bush submitted draft legislation, H.R. 1407, 
to auction the use of a range of radio transmission frequencies that had been 
reserved for government use (CQ Almanac 1991, 157). Unlike the Clinton 
health care plan, Bush did not mention radio spectrum auctions in any of his 
State of the Union addresses. Interest in the auctions was confined largely to 
industry and economic specialists, and the issue remained unfamiliar to most 
voters. The House Democratic leadership and the powerful Commerce Commit-
tee chair, Dingell Jr., opposed the use of auctions instead of traditional lotteries 
because of a fear that competition would squeeze out minority-owned and other 
smaller broadcast companies.1 In spite of both Democratic opposition and pub-
lic unfamiliarity, the House Commerce Committee considered spectrum auc-
tions in hearings and the Senate Commerce Committee marked up and reported 
a bill to the Senate floor that included auctions after Bush submitted his draft 
legislation.2
 The argument for the economic efficiency of auctions is complex and would 
have proven more challenging than Clinton’s Health Security Card to explain to 
the broader public.3 Economists argued that some entrepreneurs had entered the 
traditional government lotteries with the sole intent of obtaining licenses and then 
later selling the licenses privately for a substantial profit, essentially pocketing as 
private profit what would otherwise have been collected as a public tax. Studies 
by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in 
the Department of Commerce showed that certain types of auctions could reduce 
the incentives for such profiteering, while delivering more efficient market-
like prices for the licenses (e.g., National Telecommunications and Information 
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Administration 1991). Although Reagan and Bush had recommended auction-
ing the radio spectrum in their budget proposals to previous Congresses, in the 
102nd Congress Bush submitted detailed draft legislation to implement the auc-
tions (Allard 1993).4 Because of the complex and technical nature of spectrum 
auctions and the lack of public interest in them, it is unlikely that many members 
of Congress would have come to a full understanding of the benefits of auctions 
without the expertise provided by the administration’s proposal. In fact, once 
they understood the anticipated effects of auctions, some Democrats began to see 
that they could be used to add significant revenue for other programs and threw 
their support behind them. In particular, Dingell Jr., who had actually placed a 
provision prohibiting spectrum auctions in H.R. 2965 in the 101st Congress, was 
noted to have “seen the light” and the budgetary advantages of auctions by the 
end of the 102nd Congress (Mills 1993).
 The president’s use of executive expertise in the form of draft legislation acts 
as an alternative mechanism to his major addresses for presidential influence on 
the congressional agenda and has received far less attention in political science 
research. Instead of raising public salience, the expertise in the president’s draft 
legislation can provide important new information to members of Congress that 
can alter their agenda decisions. This expertise is at the president’s disposal as 
the head of the enormous federal bureaucracy and its thousands of policy experts, 
like those of the NTIA. Through the legislative clearance process, the president 
has gained control over which departmental proposals are forwarded to Congress 
as draft legislation, and this has given presidents the opportunity to harness this 
expertise in order to influence the congressional agenda. In this book, I compare 
the president’s influence on the congressional agenda arising from the policy 
expertise in his draft legislation (i.e., the legislative clearance process) to the 
influence arising from the traditionally recognized presidential programming that 
takes place through his major addresses, and I show that the often-overlooked 
legislative clearance process frequently offers the president a more persistent and 
more effective influence on the congressional agenda.
The Puzzle of Presidential Agenda Setting
In the common textbook view, modern presidents are generally understood to be 
the chief agenda setter in Congress (e.g., Nelson 2002). The president, however, 
has no formal authority to compel Congress to consider his legislation. Although 
the Constitution requires the president to report to Congress on the state of the 
union and to recommend any legislation he finds “necessary and expedient,” the 
Constitution does not require Congress to consider the president’s recommenda-
tions. The president cannot even introduce a bill in Congress without getting a 
representative or senator to sponsor it. The only formal legislative power granted 
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to the president by the Constitution, the veto, is exercised at the end of the leg-
islative process, after bills have been passed by both the House and Senate. So 
how are presidents able to influence the issues that are taken up by Congress 
at the very beginning of the legislative process? Despite recent scholarly atten-
tion to these questions,5 there is still no convincing argument for why Congress 
puts aside its own agenda priorities in order to work on the issues considered 
“necessary and expedient” by the president—particularly when the president and 
majorities in Congress are from different parties. This book looks for the source 
of this influence in the modern presidential functions of legislative programming, 
the promotion of issues in the president’s major speeches, and in legislative clear-
ance, the submission of draft bills written by executive agencies to Capitol Hill.
 Part I explores the theoretical question of why Congress defers to the presi-
dent when the president has no formal power over its agenda. My research sug-
gests that the president’s agenda-setting influence can arise from two informal 
powers: (1) the provision of information to voters through public addresses, 
which influences the way voters evaluate the agenda choices of Congress; and 
(2) the provision of information to Congress in draft bills from executive agen-
cies regarding the policy consequences of different courses of legislative action. 
That is, the president is able to set the legislative agenda both because he has a 
more powerful ability than Congress to communicate information to voters and 
therefore to inform them of the optimal course of public policy for the nation, as 
Clinton did on health care policy, and because he has greater control than Con-
gress over the vast policy expertise of executive agencies, like the NTIA expertise 
Bush employed to promote radio spectrum auctions.
 Part II seeks to answer the empirical questions of how, to what extent, and in 
what stages of the legislative process does the president influence the congressio-
nal agenda? A sketch of the main results suggests that the president is able to use 
public appeals to influence a broad range of issues on the floor stage of agenda 
setting in the House, but only during the beginning of his term. However, the presi-
dent is able to use executive policy expertise to influence committee stages (e.g., 
hearings and markups) in both the House and the Senate agendas throughout his 
term(s), but only for issues that are technical or relatively noncontroversial.
Defining Agenda Setting
Before developing my informational theory of agenda setting, I must first dis-
tinguish the two common meanings for “agenda setting” in the political science 
literature. Traditionally scholars who claim that the president sets Congress’s leg-
islative agenda have meant that he decides the major legislative issues on which 
Congress works.6 More recently, formal theorists have defined agenda setting as 
the process of determining the specific voting order of alternative bills or amend-
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ments within a single issue area (Romer and Rosenthal 1978). Though I also 
take a formal theoretic approach, I return to the traditional definition of agenda 
control as control over the issues under consideration, rather than control over 
the voting order of alternative bills on a given issue. By under consideration I 
mean those issues that are marked up in subcommittee or committee and those 
that reach the floor. I will also be less concerned with whether the president has 
influence over what bills ultimately pass than with whether he has influence over 
which issues Congress considers at these critical stages of the legislative process. 
This approach represents a departure from studying the effects of an actor with 
a formal authority to determine the agenda (e.g., Romer and Rosenthal 1978) 
and toward studying how an actor who has no such formal power still comes to 
exercise this kind of influence in practice.
 Because the president has no specific formal powers over the congressional 
agenda, the problem of how he is nevertheless able to set the agenda has the 
potential for broad application to agenda-setting problems beyond those involv-
ing the president and Congress. In particular, it applies to situations where an 
agent has no formal control over an institution’s agenda and yet tries to use either 
outside pressure or expertise to influence the institution’s agenda. For example, 
this basic agenda-setting setup can also be used to model the efforts of interest 
groups and nongovernmental organizations to use both salience-raising activi-
ties and expert policy studies to influence the issues considered by policymaking 
bodies at the local, national, and international levels.
Theoretical Explanations for Presidential Agenda Setting
My informational theory of presidential agenda setting has been both informed 
by and developed in response to other influential models of agenda setting, 
including bounded rationality models and “going-public” models. I will discuss 
these briefly before presenting my own models.
Bounded Rationality Perspectives on Agenda Setting
The most influential model of congressional agenda setting has been the “gar-
bage can” model that John Kingdon (1984) adapted from the bounded rationality 
models of organizations of Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972). Kingdon offered 
the garbage can model as an alternative to the bottom-up models of agenda set-
ting, including rational choice approaches that suggested that agenda items rose 
to the congressional agenda after they had become salient in the general public. 
On the contrary, Kingdon finds that some issues, like deregulation, seemed to 
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rise on the agenda without broad public support and with plenty of entrenched 
opposition. He proposes instead that agenda setting is a mix of three separate 
processes: problem recognition, solution development, and political opportunity, 
and―most importantly―that each of these processes operates independently 
of the others. In other words, government bureaucrats developing policy solu-
tions do not always coordinate their agenda with congressional leaders trying 
to address policy problems. Moreover, there is also unpredictability in the way 
these actors come into contact with each other, though they can also be brought 
together by a policy entrepreneur, who has a unique ability to match solutions 
with problems. In spite of the actions of policy entrepreneurs, Kingdon argues 
the agenda-setting process can be disorganized and unpredictable even when all 
individual actors behave rationally.
 Although Kingdon employed the garbage can as an alternative to rational 
choice explanations, his political entrepreneurs behave similarly to strategic 
actors modeled by game theorists. These entrepreneurs anticipate conditions and 
the reactions of others in choosing their own actions to further their goals. It is 
not clear from Kingdon’s model, however, why policy experts and political deci-
sion makers in the model do not also behave strategically. In other words, why 
don’t the policy analysts look around for problems to solve, and why don’t they 
anticipate coming problems and try to develop expertise in advance? One could 
ask a similar question of the political decision makers. Why don’t they anticipate 
coming political conditions and figure out where to find the expertise needed to 
solve their pressing and future public policy problems? Both of these types of 
actors seem to behave unusually myopically, especially compared to the policy 
entrepreneurs.
 As an explanation for this myopia, analysts who use the garbage can model 
and its extensions, like Kingdon (1984), Feldman (1989), and Baumgartner 
and Jones (1993), point to Herbert Simon’s bounded rationality critique of the 
rational actor model as too demanding of the informational processing capaci-
ties of human decision makers (Simon 1982). According to Simon, humans 
cannot analyze all possible strategies and they cannot even observe all of the 
information typically modeled in rational choice models. From this perspective, 
the real difference between Kingdon’s entrepreneurs and his other policy actors 
may be their information-processing capacity. Entrepreneurs may be able to act 
more strategically because they see more of the “big picture” in a given politi-
cal situation than any other actor. Although Simon’s bounded rationality critique 
is compelling, it was developed before the advent of incomplete information 
models (Harsanyi 1973) in game theory, which offer a response to many of the 
important information limitations of human decision makers that Simon pointed 
out (Rubinstein 1998). Furthermore, a question remains about why policy entre-
preneurs are free from this kind of myopia if bounded rationality is a feature of 
all human decision makers.
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 Feldman, in her 1989 study of policy experts, offers another reason why 
policy experts might look myopic from the perspective of the larger political 
agenda process. Intentionally or not, Feldman’s analysis suggests that much of 
the seeming myopia of bureaucratic policy analysts may stem from the restric-
tions of bureaucratic rules and procedures rather than a limitation in the expert’s 
own rational capacity. Her interviews suggest that bureaucrats continue to view 
their role as solving problems even when that rarely is the end result of their 
policy reports (Feldman 1989, 114). The frustration that analysts themselves feel 
when impelled to work in ways that take them away from addressing problems 
suggests that Kingdon’s decoupling of the solution and problem processes may 
be as much a question of institutional design as of the inherent myopia in policy 
analysts.7 Such institutional constraints could also be modeled within a rational 
choice framework without resort to imposing different levels of bounded ratio-
nality on different actors.
 The garbage can model is further extended by Bryan D. Jones (1994), who 
claims that abrupt changes in the salience of issues in U.S. national politics occur 
because of changes in the issues to which voters give their attention rather than 
because of changes in voters’ actual preferences on those issues. In his model, 
political elites, like the president, are able to shift the focus of public attention 
from one issue to another, even if they are able to have little influence over 
public policy preferences on any given issue. Indeed, Jones shows that aggre-
gate policy preferences are remarkably stable over time, and therefore changing 
preferences cannot explain more volatile changes in issue salience among the 
general public.
 Jones also claims that voters face an overabundance, rather than a paucity, of 
information about policy. In his bounded rationality model of political change, a 
change in the agenda does not come about because of the provision of new infor-
mation about policy. Instead, political change comes from attention shifts that are 
not necessarily governed by the laws of rationality. The overabundance of avail-
able information results in voters’ inability to decide which of this information 
to use in making their decisions.
 Jones sets his model of agenda setting against rational choice models by 
claiming that attention shifts are governed by the laws of bounded rational-
ity. That is, human beings are limited information processors and are typically 
only able to process information serially, or one issue at a time. Jones’s work, 
however, mixes elements of rational choice models within a bounded rationality 
framework. For Jones, once voters are focused on one salient issue area they are 
able to make policy choices within that issue dimension by the dictates of the 
spatial models of rational choice. In chapter 3, I present an alternative model of 
presidential agenda setting which suggests that even shifts in public attentiveness 
can be understood as a process of rational, albeit imperfect, decision making, and 
that the president can indeed provide information that influences these shifts.
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 The chief difference between my approach to agenda setting and garbage 
can approaches lies in modeling all political actors and voters as potentially stra-
tegic agents (i.e., like Kingdon’s policy entrepreneurs), who receive messages, 
whether from the president or mass media, skeptically rather than uncritically. 
In Jones’s model, for instance, voters may care about unemployment simply 
because it appears repeatedly in the news. A skeptical, rational choice voter, 
however, would only be concerned about the economy if such messages came 
from a news program she trusts.
 The garbage can models fail to recognize that informational asymmetries 
can be a source of power if exploited by strategic agents. In the garbage can 
model, some actors acquire policy information that remains unobserved by oth-
ers because of built-in human limits on information processing. However, in this 
model actors do not intentionally acquire such informational asymmetries in 
order to gain strategic advantages. A rational choice model of the informational 
asymmetries between policy analysts and policy decision makers can be used to 
examine whether either side has an interest in acquiring private information in 
order to exploit the other side’s ignorance for its own political advantage.
 Gilligan and  Krehbiel (1987), for instance, explore how the policy exper-
tise gained by the specialization of congressional committees allows them to get 
final bills biased in their favor compared to the median voter on the House floor. 
There is a strategic trade-off whereby the floor gives up some policy concessions 
to the committee in return for the policy expertise provided by the committee. 
The part of this that is missed by bounded rationality approaches is that commit-
tees actively cultivate informational advantages by specializing in order to gain 
this influence over the policies that are passed. In chapter 4, I will show that 
presidents since FDR have strategically cultivated such informational advantages 
over Congress in order to gain more influence in the policymaking process.
“Going Public” and the Congressional Agenda
Kernell (1993), in a widely influential study, Going Public: New Strategies of 
Presidential Leadership, introduced an alternative model of agenda setting that 
is more directly aimed at understanding the president’s influence on Congress. 
Kernell argues that modern presidents have been forced to “go public” and 
lobby legislators indirectly through their constituents because they have lost 
the ability to bargain with congressional leaders “with promises of goods and 
services for their constituencies.” Instead of such bargaining, “if a large number 
of votes is needed, the most obvious and direct course is to go on prime-time 
television to solicit the public’s support” (Kernell 1993, 31). Miller (1993) 
and Canes-Wrone (2001) have brought the “going-public” argument within a 
more rigorous rational choice framework, arguing that the president’s ability 
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to “go public” can lead to his influence over legislative outcomes because the 
president’s speeches can shift the salience of issues and therefore alter the pol-
icy preferences of members of Congress. Canes-Wrone (2001) formalizes and 
enriches this argument in order to explain why the president does not therefore 
seek to go public on all issues.
 Kernell’s going-public thesis assumes that the president will be able to stimu-
late the electorate in the district of the targeted member of Congress (hereafter 
MC). This either means that he can bring out voters in the district who would not 
normally vote or that he will provide new information to ordinary voters who 
will use it to update their beliefs about the ideal policy. Reagan sometimes made 
such appeals to voters explicit in his televised addresses: “I urge you to contact 
your Senators and congressmen. Tell them of your support for this bipartisan pro-
posal” (quoted in Kernell 1993, 130). In the case where the president chooses to 
go public, then, an MC will presumably be forced to alter his legislative behavior 
to accord with the new ideal policy of the median voter in his district. If the MC 
does not alter his voting, he might be susceptible to defeat in the next election by 
a challenger who proposes a policy platform closer to the median constituent’s. 
Gronke, Koch, and Wilson (2003) have recently found evidence that voters’ atti-
tudes toward their representatives are indeed shaped by the representative’s sup-
port for the president. This electoral check provides the going-public thesis with 
an automatic enforcement mechanism. However, as an agenda-setting technique, 
going public may be too resource hungry to influence a large number of issues. 
Kernell (1993), for example, notes that Reagan was refused network television 
time in 1985 and 1986 after his addresses failed to attract enough viewers. Typi-
cally, the president will submit dozens of bills to Congress each session, but it 
is unlikely that the president can use the going-public strategy for more than a 
handful of these issues. Instead, Kernell claims, “The president finds the threat 
to go public frequently more attractive than the act” (Kernell 1993, 37).
 There is some internal inconsistency, however, in Kernell’s claim that a pres-
ident’s threat to go public is as effective as the act of going public. If the presi-
dential threat is a promise to go public in order to make unresponsive incumbents 
susceptible to challengers closer to the induced ideal policy, then an MC who 
goes along with the president thereby insulates himself from such a challenge. 
However, since the president only threatens to go public in this circumstance, 
he has not actually induced the threatened changes in the constituency’s ideal 
policy. An MC who responded to the threat by updating his policy is thereby 
left with a policy that deviates from the unchanged median voter in his district. 
He has thereby opened himself up for a challenge from a candidate who places 
himself closer to the median’s still-unchanged ideal policy. Because of this, it is 
never in the interest of an incumbent to respond to the mere threat to go public. 
Going public is therefore only likely to serve as an agenda-setting tool on a more 
limited scale, i.e., when the president actually carries out the threat.
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 Canes-Wrone (2001) produces a more rigorous formalization of Kernell’s 
going-public model and offers an explanation of how the threat to go public may 
still sometimes be credible. But this model restricts attention to the policy choice 
on a single issue and does not consider the president’s ability to influence which 
issue is chosen by Congress. Although the choice among policy alternatives on a 
single issue is the more common meaning of “agenda setting” within the rational 
choice tradition (Romer and Rosenthal 1978), I seek to explain the more conven-
tional and more fundamental type of agenda setting, the choice of which issues to 
address. 
 Like Kernell (1993), Miller (1993), and Canes-Wrone (2001), I adopt a ratio-
nal choice framework and argue that when the president introduces his agenda 
items in his public addresses, he is able to raise the salience of issues that hold 
more potential utility for voters. But I also argue that the president’s success in 
raising the salience of issues is not automatic but depends on his credibility with 
voters.
An Informational Theory of Agenda Setting
Both the bounded rationality studies and the “going-public” argument present 
incomplete pictures of the president’s agenda-setting influence. Bounded ratio-
nality studies fail, for instance, to explain why only policy entrepreneurs seem 
to act in a strategically rational manner, anticipating the actions and reactions 
of other actors. It is not clear, for instance, why voters would not be strategic in 
responding to agenda-setting attempts by the president or the media. The going-
public models fail to fully explain how the mere threat to go public can provide 
the president with influence over the choice of which issues Congress consid-
ers. I develop alternative models in which the president is able to influence the 
issues on the congressional agenda both by providing information to voters that 
is helpful in evaluating legislative behavior and by controlling information that 
is useful to Congress in its policymaking decisions. By providing information to 
voters through public addresses, the president is able to influence the way voters 
evaluate congressional behavior. By controlling the information of the federal 
bureaucracy through draft bills submitted to Congress, the president is able to 
provide expertise about policy consequences of different courses of legislative 
action and thus influence the issues Congress chooses to work on.
Avenues of Influence
Public addresses include those issues the president identifies as significant 
enough to include as a part of his legislative program (Cohen 1997; Rudalevige 
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2002). Issues in executive draft legislation, by contrast, commonly include the 
issues that must be dealt with as a matter of course in the functioning and adapt-
ing of government as well as technical policy innovations proposed by execu-
tive departments (Neustadt 1954; Wayne 1978). Issues in the president’s public 
addresses are handled differently from legislative clearance issues because they 
are more important to the president and are often more contentious.
 Public Addresses
When the president is referred to as the foremost agenda-setting influence in 
Congress, this is usually a claim about the issues raised by the president in his 
State of the Union addresses or in other key speeches, not by the many technical 
draft bills that are passed through the White House to Congress without public 
notice. Although elements of the president’s public program are also submit-
ted to Congress in the form of draft legislation, high profile presidential agenda 
items are primarily promoted through public addresses. Barbara Sinclair’s 
(1995) assessment of Congress’s ability to set its own agenda suggests what type 
of effect the president’s speeches might be intended to have: “Agenda setting 
can be pursued through in-house activities intended to influence the legislative 
process directly and through external activities aimed at favorably shaping the 
environment in which legislative decision making takes place” (274–75). If the 
congressional leadership exercises agenda influence through direct control over 
the legislative process, then the president, who has little direct control, might 
exercise agenda influence by favorably shaping the public environment, e.g., 
influencing the expectations of voters with regard to legislative action. There-
fore, the public nature of the president’s program is a key part of its influence, 
because by providing information to voters about the best course of legislative 
action, the president can influence the way voters evaluate the actions of their 
members of Congress.
 Kernell (1993, 25) claims that the president can use public addresses to ensure 
passage of his proposals by Congress. Although this claim may overestimate the 
president’s influence because it essentially assumes the voters are automatically 
responsive to the president’s message, it is quite likely that by going public the 
president can inform voters of the urgency of policy issues he is addressing. To 
the extent that the voters agree with the president about which policies are press-
ing concerns, MCs seeking reelection have a greater incentive to consider the 
president’s policy issues, if not his particular proposals on these issues.
 It is true that voters are sometimes ill-informed to make voting decisions dur-
ing congressional elections because they observe the consequences of legislative 
action only over time and are therefore unsure of whether or not their representa-
tives are making good policy decisions. It was difficult, for example, for voters 
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to determine whether the Medicare catastrophic illness coverage would improve 
health care at the time it was being considered in 1987 and 1988. It became very 
clear by 1989, however, that many voters regarded it as unnecessary or bad pol-
icy, and it was repealed before the 1990 midterm elections (Himelfarb 1995).
 Nonetheless, the president can play a role in informing the voter through 
his public addresses.8 Cohen (1997) and Iyengar and Kinder (1987) have shown 
that the president can have a significant effect on which issues voters consider 
important. Recent studies (Cover 1985; Simon, Ostrom, and Marra 1991; Atke-
son and Partin 1995; Gronke, Koch, and Wilson 2003) have also shown that the 
voters’ views of the president can affect their congressional vote. Attention to the 
president’s agenda thus arises naturally among MCs concerned with reelection.
 I develop a formal model in chapter 3 in which the president serves as an 
agent for voters by providing them information, e.g., issue priorities that voters 
can then use to evaluate legislative behavior. I argue that the information the 
president provides to voters can indeed affect the electoral fate of MCs. In chap-
ter 3, I will show that the president can influence the congressional agenda in this 
way even when he is able to convey only very coarse (i.e., imperfect) informa-
tion to the voters. Finally, the formal model in chapter 3 suggests that in equi-
librium with presidential agenda setting, Congress chooses legislative actions 
more in accord with national interests than it would choose in the absence of the 
president’s monitoring role. This occurs simply because the president’s issues are 
driven by his national constituency, whereas MCs would otherwise be inclined to 
turn to the more parochial interests of their individual constituencies.
 My proposed model of this presidential influence in the public addresses 
model can be broken down into five steps:
1.  The president observes private information about the most important 
policy issue for the nation.
2.  The president announces to the public and Congress a request for 
legislation on this issue.
3.  Congress hears the presidential message and decides whether to con-
tinue with its own priority issue or to work on the issue identified by 
the president.
4.  Voters observe the policy issues considered by Congress and decide 
whether to reelect their MCs in the midterm election.
5.  Voters observe their benefits (in hindsight) from policies proposed by 
the president and enacted by the first Congress and decide whether to 
reelect the president.
Again, my concern is with the president’s ability to influence the issues consid-
ered by Congress rather than the exact policy outcome on these issues. It turns 
out, however, that these concerns are intertwined. Both the choice of policy issue 
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by Congress and the message sent to voters by the president depend on the policy 
outcomes that can be passed on each issue. Nevertheless, the concern of the 
voters in this model is over which issue is made a legislative priority, because I 
assume that the voters cannot fully observe the benefits and problems of specific 
policies except in hindsight. The predictions of this model are tested on detailed, 
issue-level data on legislative activity in Congress in chapters 6 and 7.
Legislative Clearance
The president also exercises informal influence on the congressional agenda 
through a process called legislative clearance, whereby the White House sifts 
through legislative proposals of the federal agencies and departments, withholds 
those which are unimportant or objectionable to the president’s policy goals, and 
sends to Congress proposals that further White House objectives.
 Through the legislative clearance process, created by FDR, the White House 
reviews all of these agency-drafted bills in the White House before they are for-
warded to Congress to ensure that the proposals are consistent with White House 
goals. The clearance process thus allows the White House to control the policy 
expertise that is relayed from the executive agencies to congressional committees 
(Wayne 1978). Executive proposals that are approved by the legislative clearance 
process are sent on to Congress as draft legislation. These proposals incorporate 
the specialized information acquired by the agency or department. This infor-
mation is useful to Congress in making its agenda choices, i.e., in its choice of 
which issue to consider. In chapter 4, I model the process by which the president 
can use policy expertise he channels from the bureaucracy to influence the con-
gressional agenda.
 My model accounts for the fact that Congress understands that the president’s 
policy goals are often different from its own, and observes that the information 
presented in the draft legislation will be biased in the direction of the president’s 
or executive agency’s preferred policy ends. If the president and Congress have 
identical policy goals, the president’s draft legislation can perfectly reveal the 
executive’s policy expertise about the consequences of the bill (Crawford and 
Sobel 1982). With divergent policy preferences, however, Congress will not 
know how much of the bill is informative about the likely policy consequences 
of the legislation and how much is biased by the president’s preferences. In these 
cases, Congress will not be able to fully trust the administration bill as a reliable 
means of achieving Congress’s goals. In response, Congress may hold hearings 
and markup on bills submitted by executive agencies rather than reporting them 
directly to the floor, in order to acquire further information about the topics of 
these bills.
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 When Congress holds hearings and markup sessions for issues submitted by 
the president, it can research and amend the legislation it is considering to coun-
terbalance some of the bias in any executive-authored draft. In particular, it may 
call in executive branch officials and outside experts who are well informed on 
the issue. Despite these alternative sources of policy expertise, the president’s 
draft legislation may serve an informative role. For example, at the beginning of 
this chapter, I described how George H. W. Bush was able to use technical exper-
tise in draft bills from the NTIA to put radio spectrum auctions on the agenda of 
the 102nd Congress. Though there are alternative sources of information, Con-
gress has limited resources and cannot explore the consequences of all possible 
pieces of legislation. In choosing agenda items, Congress must estimate both the 
policy preferences of its constituents on an issue and the likely policy conse-
quences of enacting a bill on that issue. The president’s drafts will be informative 
of the likely policy consequences of legislation on an issue, since draft legislation 
incorporates the expertise of the executive agencies. In the 102nd Congress, MCs 
began to see the unanticipated benefits of radio spectrum auctions after the sub-
mission of Bush’s draft bills and the issue was given serious consideration on the 
congressional agenda, particularly in the Senate. Congress must weigh its more 
certain understanding of the consequences of the president’s issues against the 
uncertain consequences of working on another issue that is uninformed by such 
expertise. Since the information contained in the president’s draft legislation can 
be somewhat informative as long as presidential and congressional policy prefer-
ences are not too far apart (Crawford and Sobel 1982), the president’s submission 
of draft legislation may have a significant positive effect on the probability that 
an issue reaches the congressional agenda or beyond.
 Information the president provides to Congress can thus shape the value 
Congress places on different courses of legislative action, because it can reduce 
the risks involved in taking action on an issue on which Congress was not previ-
ously well informed. In chapter 4, I develop a formal model of legislative clear-
ance which generalizes the basic one-dimensional Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) 
model of congressional delegation to the multidimensional context of presiden-
tial agenda setting. I will show that the president can exercise agenda-setting 
influence through the legislative clearance process, but that this influence can 
only be effective on issues where the president either holds a large advantage in 
expertise, like spectrum auctions, or where the president’s preferences are simi-
lar to Congress’s. Legislative clearance is thus expected to be most influential 
either on issues that are noncontroversial, generating little disagreement between 
Congress and the president, or on highly technical issues where the amount of 
the federal bureaucracy’s private information or policy expertise might be quite 
extensive relative to the difference in policy preferences between the president 
and Congress.
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 Since the agenda setting that occurs through the expertise in executive draft 
legislation is expected to be most effective on noncontroversial or technical 
issues, it may have its greatest impact on that part of the congressional workload 
that involves matters of continuing concern or issues arising from previous legis-
lative enactments, rather than on bold new policy initiatives where the president 
may be as uncertain as Congress. For example, large and complex laws, like the 
Social Security Act and the Clean Air Act, require constant updating by minor 
and sometimes major legislative amendments that draw little public attention 
and are often highly technical. Many of these amendments originate as draft bills 
in the legislative clearance process where the president can decide which ones 
to forward to Congress and which to hold back. Since this kind of influence is 
expected to persist throughout the president’s term, and since the “continuing 
agenda” makes up a large and growing part of the legislative agenda (C. Jones 
1994), I argue that the president may ultimately exercise a greater overall influ-
ence on public policy through the persistent influence of his draft legislation on 
this continuing agenda rather than through setting the agenda for a handful of 
major legislative initiatives.
 My proposed model of the legislative clearance process can be broken down 
into three steps:
1. The president observes the policy expertise gathered by an executive 
agency on a given policy issue.
2. The president decides whether to submit a draft bill that contains 
executive expertise on the issue.
3. Congress decides whether to act on its own priority issue with uncer-
tainty about policy outcomes or on the president’s issue with more 
certainty about the final policy outcome.
This model looks like an adaptation of the standard Gilligan and Krehbiel 
(1987) setup for modeling the informational role of committees in the law-
making process, but there are two important differences: the model involves 
the choice among multiple issues, i.e., agenda setting, as well as the choice of 
policy on one of these issues; and here it is the president who provides policy 
information, though he enjoys neither the proposal power nor the amendment 
power that is shared by congressional committees. The equilibrium solution to 
this model is presented in chapter 4, and it suggests that presidents can indeed 
harness such expertise to influence the issues under consideration but only 
under the conditions stated above: for issues that are either highly technical 
or noncontroversial. These predictions are tested on new issue-level data in 
chapters 6 and 7.
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A New Issue-Level Analysis of Presidential Agenda Setting
Previous studies of presidential agenda setting have analyzed the president’s 
influence on enactments (Chamberlain 1946; Moe and Teel 1970; Goldsmith 
1983; C. Jones 1994), proposals (Light 1991; Peterson 1990), bills (Edwards 
and Barrett 2000; Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997; Taylor 1998; Theriault 
2002), and hearings (Edwards and Wood 1999; Flemming, Wood, and Bohte 
1999). Aside from Light (1991) and Peterson (1990), none of these studies has 
been conducted at the level of analysis, policy issues, that is most appropriate 
for studying agenda setting. Issues provide a more suitable unit of analysis for 
examining agenda setting than bills because many bills cover the same issue and 
are substitute solutions for the same problem. A hearing on a single policy issue 
may involve half a dozen bills. And many bills are laid on the table at some stage 
of the legislative process in favor of a substitute on the same issue that advances 
further on the agenda. In this case, the issue advances on the agenda, but it is not 
apparent from looking at the original bill. Furthermore, many bills cover a multi-
tude of issues, some of which may advance further and others which may stall.
 Conducting analysis of the congressional agenda at the level of issues instead 
of bills provides a more accurate understanding of the agenda process, but issues 
are not as easy to analyze as bills because they are harder to identify and distin-
guish. As I explain in chapter 5, I employ relational database techniques to exploit 
the multidimensional nature of most bills and to construct a database of congres-
sional activity with issues as the unit of analysis. This new relational database of 
congressional issue consideration allows me to directly study the issues as well 
as the bills on the congressional agenda, while still controlling for the valuable 
contextual variables associated with individual bills, like the number of sponsors, 
the main sponsor’s ideology, and whether the bill is multiply referred, and many 
others. What results is a completely new dataset on the legislative activities and 
characteristics of issues rather than bills, and it provides penetrating insight into 
the nature of the congressional agenda process.
 I explore the implications of my informational models of presidential agen-
da setting with new highly detailed data on the legislative actions on all bills 
referred to the House and Senate Commerce Committees over twelve Congresses 
(1979–2002). My data probe into the inner workings of committees and subcom-
mittees and allow me to construct an unprecedented and detailed examination of 
the forces shaping each stage of the agenda process from committee consider-
ation to the floor in both the House and the Senate.
 I also take into account the roles of important actors who are sometimes 
neglected in studies of presidential and congressional agenda setting and law 
making, like committee leaders and the Senate. And I analyze the effect of influ-
ential stages of the legislative agenda process that are sometimes overlooked, 
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such as “requests for executive comment” and floor consideration under “sus-
pension of the rules.”
 Finally, I use path-analytic statistical techniques to pinpoint the president’s 
direct effect on each distinct stage of the agenda process, as well as the indirect 
effects he exercises on these stages through his influence on other actors such 
as committee chairs and the other chamber. This means that I can separate the 
president’s direct influence on each agenda stage from any indirect influence 
that he exercises by working through important committee leaders or from the 
indirect influence he exercises in one chamber by setting the agenda of the other 
chamber.
 Altogether, I construct a detailed and complex portrait of the president’s 
influence on the congressional agenda, including the methods of influence that 
are effective, what kinds of issues these methods influence, what stages of the 
agenda process the president influences, and at what points in his presidency 
these influences are effective.
Plan of the Book
As the subsequent chapters will demonstrate, much of the president’s influence 
over the congressional agenda arises from the role he plays in acquiring and pro-
viding information about the optimal direction of national public policy both to 
voters and to Congress. 
 Chapter 2 introduces the conceptual and technical tools of rational choice 
methodology that will be used to model the president’s agenda-setting influence. 
In particular, I introduce a two-dimensional spatial model that provides a very 
general representation of the problem of issue-level agenda setting. Chapter 3, 
“Public Addresses and the Legislative Programming Process,” develops a formal 
model of the president’s agenda-setting influence that arises from providing the 
voters with information about the most urgent policy issues facing the country. 
The president can exercise influence through this process even when the policy 
preferences of the president and Congress are opposed, but this influence is 
expected to disappear after the president’s first Congress. 
 Chapter 4, “Draft Bills and the Legislative Clearance Process,” develops a 
formal model of the presidential agenda-setting influence that arises from execu-
tive policy expertise. Executive policy expertise lends the president influence 
over the congressional agenda only when the executive has a large advantage 
in expertise or when the president and Congress share somewhat similar policy 
preferences, but the president can exercise this power throughout his term. 
Chapter 5, “Redefining Congressional Agenda Setting,” discusses the inadequa-
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cies of studying bills to understand agenda setting and describes the advantages 
and disadvantages of the novel approach of studying the congressional agenda 
at the level of policy issues. Chapter 5 also describes the complex legislative 
process and the difficulty of determining when an issue is “on the agenda.” I 
analyze issue-level data to identify the three most important agenda stages in the 
agenda process in the House: hearings, markup, and floor. Chapter 6, “Presiden-
tial Agenda Setting in the House,” presents tests of the predictions of the formal 
models presented in chapters 3 and 4 using new data on the pre-floor action on 
all issues referred in the House Energy and Commerce Committee from 1979 
through 2002. Chapter 7, “Presidential Agenda Setting in the Senate,” presents a 
model of the role of the Senate in presidential agenda setting and tests the predic-
tions of this model using new data on the pre-floor action on all issues referred 
in the Senate Commerce Committee from 1979 through 2002. Chapter 8, “Infor-
mation and Presidential Agenda Setting,” reviews the findings of the book, con-
siders extensions of the argument, and discusses the political implications of the 
president’s agenda-setting power.
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As the government shifted portions of the radio-broadcasting spectrum from 
military to commercial use in the late 1980s, the increasing value of the radio 
spectrum led economists to question the government’s policy of using a lottery to 
provide exclusive licenses nearly free of cost. In return for free use of the spec-
trum, broadcasters were expected to provide emergency broadcasting and other 
public services, but some license recipients who had acquired licenses then sold 
them at a high profit (Mills 1990). When the George H. W. Bush administration 
offered a draft bill proposing that the Federal Communications Commission 
implement a sophisticated method of auctioning these spectrum licenses in order 
to introduce market mechanisms for their distribution, the Democratic leadership 
in the 102nd Congress complained that this would price the spectrum out of the 
reach of minority broadcasters and others who received licenses for a nominal 
fee in the lottery. In face of both Democratic opposition and public unfamiliarity 
with the issue, both the House and Senate still devoted a share of their crowded 
agendas to Bush’s spectrum auctions. The House Commerce Committee consid-
ered spectrum auctions in hearings and the Senate Commerce Committee marked 
up and reported a bill to the Senate floor that included auctions after Bush sub-
mitted his draft legislation proposing auctions. In this chapter, I will use the spec-
trum auction issue in the 102nd Congress to illustrate a simple game-theoretic 
model of the agenda-setting process that I will then elaborate in chapters 3 and 4 
in order to explore the president’s influence on the agenda.
 First, I use the example of spectrum auctions in the 102nd Congress to intro-
duce spatial models and the median voter theorem, a fundamental result that 
greatly simplifies modeling the policymaking process. I then generalize the basic 
21
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one-dimensional spatial model to a two-dimensional model in order to provide a 
general characterization of the agenda-setting process. This basic agenda-setting 
model has the potential for broad application to agenda-setting problems beyond 
those involving the president and Congress. In particular, it applies to situations 
where an agent has no formal control over an institution’s agenda and yet tries to 
use either outside pressure or expertise to influence the institution’s agenda. For 
example, this basic agenda-setting setup can also be used to model the efforts of 
interest groups and nongovernmental organizations to influence the issues con-
sidered by policymaking bodies at the local, national, and international levels. 
I develop this basic agenda-setting model to illustrate how the president’s sole 
formal legislative power, the veto, offers very limited influence in congressional 
agenda setting. This is in marked contrast to policy making on a single issue, 
where the veto is understood to wield considerable influence (e.g., Cameron 
2000). In the next two chapters, I apply the general agenda-setting model to the 
processes of presidential programming (public addresses) and legislative clear-
ance (draft bills), and I derive the conditions under which these processes can 
yield influence on the congressional agenda.
Issue-Level and Bill-Level Agenda Setting
For political scientists, “agenda setting” can refer to two very different pro-
cesses: (1) determining the voting order among alternative bills; or (2) determin-
ing the issues under active consideration. As an example of the first, bill-level 
type of agenda setting, consider the spectrum allocation bills introduced in the 
102nd Congress, including the administration proposal for auctions, H.R. 1407, 
sponsored by Rep. Don Ritter; and the Democratic proposal, H.R. 531, which 
proposed traditional lotteries to allocate the spectrum. Amendments were also 
suggested that would add user fees to the licenses and that would tax the total 
revenue from use of the spectrum. As represented in figure 2.1, these proposals 
can be arranged from lowest to highest on a single dimension according to the 
FIGURE 2.1 Spatial representation of policies on spectrum allocation in 102nd Congress
 
Leadership 
proposal 
+
- 
H.R. 531 H.R. 1407 User fees 
Administration 
proposal 
Free 
usage 
0% 
(free with 
public service) 
(auction) 
Tax on  
license 
revenue 
100% 
Larocca_final.indb   22 8/8/2006   12:48:05 PM
Chapter 2: Game Theory and Presidential Agenda Setting
23
amount that is charged for use of the spectrum: lotteries, auctions, user fees, and 
taxes on total revenue.
 After bills are reported or discharged from committee, the House Rules Com-
mittee can report “special rules” that govern the order in which these alternative 
bills and amendments will be voted—if the special rule is adopted by the House. 
An actor, like the House Rules Committee, which has the ability to determine 
the voting order of such alternatives is denoted a “monopoly agenda setter” in 
this literature, and the effects of such control are known to be potentially exten-
sive (Romer and Rosenthal 1978). The most powerful influence arises from the 
use of modified or closed rules that prohibit some or all amendments from being 
considered at all. In the extreme case, a monopoly agenda setter can offer take-
it-or-leave-it offers to those making policy decisions. Committee chairs can also 
act as monopoly agenda setters in scheduling bills for hearings and markup.
 Rather than looking at this monopoly agenda-setting power, however, I focus 
on the informal power to influence the issues under consideration. This issue-
level, agenda-setting power has received less attention in formal analysis, but I 
argue that it can often be more important for policy outcomes than direct con-
trol over the voting order among alternative bills (bill-level agenda setting). For 
example, in the 102nd Congress, there were many issues of potential importance 
for the Democratic majority that did not reach committee or floor consideration. 
The question for issue-level agenda setting is what influences led to the consider-
ation of radio spectrum auctions rather than many other possible issue priorities 
that never received consideration by the committee or floor. It is thus a question 
of the broader issues under consideration rather than just the alternative bills 
under consideration on a given issue. In this chapter, I provide a formal way of 
modeling such issue-level agenda decisions.
 For the study of presidential agenda setting in Congress, only the broader 
issue-level agenda setting is relevant, because the president has no formal author-
ity to schedule the voting order of bills in Congress. In fact, the president cannot 
even introduce a bill into Congress without a member of Congress sponsoring 
his legislation. Furthermore, whereas the bill-level agenda setting is usually exer-
cised as an explicit formal power, e.g., in the power of the Rules Committee to 
report rules that structure the voting on bills and amendments, issue-level agenda 
setting is usually exercised through the president’s informal powers, like persua-
sion and bargaining. The president’s sole formal legislative power, the veto, is 
exercised at the end of the legislative process. The veto can therefore influence 
the agenda setting that occurs at the beginning of the legislative process only 
indirectly, e.g., in the form of a threat. A veto threat may persuade Congress not 
to work on a given issue, but the threat does not allow the president to determine 
what issue Congress will turn to instead.
 Since the president has no direct formal powers over the legislative agenda, 
the problem I study is quite general. For example, the agenda-setting model I 
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develop may help explain how legislatures, committees, and other organiza-
tions come to be led or influenced by certain members inside or outside of the 
organization who have no formal leadership role in the organization. How does 
an agent who has little or no formal power over a group of decision makers nev-
ertheless come to exercise informal influence over the set of issues that will be 
considered by these decision makers? In this chapter, I develop a formal model 
to represent this canonical issue-level, agenda-setting problem. In the next two 
chapters, I will explore the source and extent of these informal powers in the 
context of the president’s influence over the congressional agenda.
 First, I introduce the median voter theorem, a fundamental result that permits 
a legislature to be modeled as a single agent under some rather general condi-
tions. Then I propose a two-issue model of agenda setting that captures a wide 
range of political processes. In the next two chapters, I use this basic agenda-set-
ting model to formally explore the impact of the president’s legislative program-
ming and clearance powers on the congressional agenda.
The Median Voter Theorem
The median voter theorem is a fundamental building block of many game-theo-
retic models of policy making, including the two models I construct in chapters 3 
and 4. In many cases it greatly simplifies the analysis of complex and otherwise 
intractable strategic situations. In the discussion that follows and throughout the 
rest of the book, I make a formal distinction between an issue and a policy or 
bill. By an issue I mean a whole spectrum of possible policy solutions to a given 
problem. For example, the problem of radio frequency allocations may suggest a 
spectrum of legislative remedies, each of which can be represented by a separate 
bill. A spatial model assumes that each issue can be represented by an infinite 
variety of legislative responses that can be arrayed along a single line in some 
sensible ordering. In figure 2.1, I order several of the proposed spectrum alloca-
tion solutions from the 102nd Congress in order from less to more taxation from 
left to right.
 Ordering all policies on a single-issue dimension allows the assignment of 
a unique numerical measure to each policy and more importantly the ability to 
measure the policy distance between the bills so that the utility of different poli-
cies can be measured as a function of the policy’s distance from an actor’s ideal 
policy. I assume that each of the policy alternatives yields spectrum prices that 
range from 0% to 100% of the revenue value of the license. The utility function, 
uc, of the median legislator in the House then can be represented as the nega-
tive-squared distance between his ideal point, c, and the enacted policy, b. This 
means that the median’s utility is maximized at his ideal policy, c, where it is 
Larocca_final.indb   24 8/8/2006   12:48:06 PM
Chapter 2: Game Theory and Presidential Agenda Setting
25
equal to 0, i.e., uc(c) = 0. Squared distance is typically used to measure disutility 
because this leads to a symmetric “single-peaked” utility function where policies 
the same distance to the left or to the right of the voter’s ideal point are equally 
distasteful.
 Technically, the negative quadratic utility functions and one-dimensional 
issue space imply a complete and transitive ordering of the median legislator’s 
preferences over all possible policy outcomes. Complete preferences occur 
when an actor is able to compare all possible policy alternatives on the issue and 
indicate either that she prefers one or the other or finds them equivalent. Transi-
tive preferences imply that whenever, for instance, an actor prefers H.R. 531 to 
H.R. 1407 and prefers H.R. 1407 to user fees, then she must prefer H.R. 531 to 
user fees. Preference orderings that are both complete and transitive constitute 
a minimum condition for game-theoretic modeling. Without such “coherent” 
preferences, agents cannot necessarily be considered rational because they make 
inconsistent choices. Rational agents are thus defined simply as decision mak-
ers with coherent preferences who choose actions that they believe will lead to 
outcomes they prefer.
 If a group of legislators has single-peaked utility functions on a single-
dimensional policy issue, then the median voter theorem insures that the ideal 
policy of the median legislator will defeat any alternative policy in pairwise 
voting (Downs 1957). The median legislator’s policy can defeat any alternative 
because the median is the middle legislator. Thus, if someone proposed a policy 
to the left of the median’s ideal policy, the half of the legislators located to the 
right of the median would prefer to vote for the median’s policy. And if someone 
proposed moving policy to the right of the median, then the majority of legisla-
tors to the left would prefer to vote for the median’s position. Thus, a majoritar-
ian legislature like the House is often represented in models simply by its median 
legislator, who is assumed to propose and pass his ideal policy on each issue 
under consideration.1 I make use of this simplification in this chapter and in the 
next two chapters, but I will consider a generalization of this median voter model 
in chapter 7 on the Senate, which—because of the filibuster—does not seem to 
act as a majoritarian institution (e.g., Brady and Volden 1997; Krehbiel 1998).
A General Model of Policy Making
The basic model of the issues considered in agenda setting throughout the book 
is represented in figure 2.2. While a large number of issues may be considered 
by any Congress, I argue that the basic process involved in issue-level agenda 
setting can be captured using a model with just two issues (dimensions). For 
example, in figure 2.2 Congress faces the issues of acid rain and radio frequency 
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auctions. Without loss of generality, the prevailing policy, or status quo, is locat-
ed at 0 on both issues. Since utility is measured as negative-squared distance, 
the president has more potential utility to gain from policy change on issue two, 
where his ideal policy p2 is far from the status quo, than from policy change on 
issue 1, where his ideal policy p1 is already close to the status quo. Congress 
has more potential utility to gain on issue 1, where its ideal point c1 is further 
from the status quo. An agenda-setting problem in this model arises only when 
Congress and the president are limited to changing policy on only one issue. If 
Congress could work on all possible issues, it would not have to face a choice 
of which issues to put on the agenda and which to leave off. While Congress 
certainly works on more than one issue per session, this abstraction is intended 
to capture the fact that each Congress is restricted by time and resources in the 
number of issues it can consider. Thus, each Congress must make agenda choices 
that force it to ignore some issues it may regard as important.
 I first consider a general policymaking game where (1) the president signals 
to Congress his desired agenda issue, through either a policy proposal on this 
issue or a veto threat against the other issue; (2) Congress then chooses an issue 
and passes a bill on the chosen issue that may or may not be different from the 
status quo; and (3) the president signs or vetoes the bill. Here I examine the condi-
tions under which the president’s veto power can lead to influence over the issue 
chosen by Congress. In the next two chapters I examine the president’s informal 
influences over the agenda using the same two-issue model. Formal development 
of the game proceeds as follows: First, I propose utility functions that reflect 
the policy preferences of the president and the median legislator (making use of 
the median voter theorem to represent the legislature by its median member). I 
FIGURE 2.2  Spatial representation of ideal points on two issue dimensions
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consider only one legislative chamber in this game as well as in chapters 3 and 
4, but I bring in bicameral concerns in chapter 7. Then, I specify the choices that 
are available to the president and Congress and the order in which they occur. 
Next, I define a strategy for each player and propose an equilibrium solution con-
cept that will be used to solve the game. Finally, I specify a set of strategies that 
satisfies this solution concept. These equilibrium strategies provide the model’s 
predictions about presidential and congressional policymaking behavior.
 Utility, ui, for each actor i is calculated as the sum of the negative squared 
distance from the actor’s ideal point to the enacted policy. Let i = p for the presi-
dent and i = c for Congress, so that the total utility ui for a policy {x1, x2} is:
up = −(p1 − x1)
2 −(p2 − x2)
2
uc = −(c1 − x1)
2 − (c2 − x2)
2
A utility function serves essentially as an abstract model of an actor’s preferences 
in the policymaking game. As such, it serves as a guide in determining the actor’s 
optimal strategy given the choices available to him and the strategies of the other 
actor. By specifying each actor’s utility as a simple sum of the negative-squared 
distances on both issues, I am assuming that the actor’s preferences across these 
issues are additively separable. This means that the policy enacted on one issue 
has no bearing on the actor’s preferences on the other issue. This abstraction 
is likely to fail whenever issues are related in some way, such as through bal-
anced-budget constraints. For example, the more money spent in one policy area 
may reduce an actor’s assessment of the ideal amount to be spent in other areas. 
Unfortunately, consideration of such issue nonseparability within formal mod-
els leads to complex games, which do not yield general solutions. In the simple 
models of agenda setting that I consider, I thus assume that the two issues under 
consideration are additively separable, while recognizing that this assumption 
may fail in some cases.2
 The basic agenda-setting game begins with the president’s choice of issue 1 
or 2. The president sends a message to Congress indicating which issue he would 
prefer Congress to address. In practice, this message may take the form of a men-
tion in his State of the Union address, draft legislation submitted to Congress, 
or even a veto threat. Next, Congress chooses to consider either issue 1 or 2 and 
then chooses a policy on the chosen issue. Finally, the president either signs or 
vetoes this bill. The president and Congress then realize their net utility from the 
chosen issue and policy.
 A strategy for the president in the policymaking game consists of both a 
choice of issue to signal and a sign/veto decision for each possible bill Congress 
may pass. Congress’s strategy specifies an issue and policy for each message 
that the president may send. This strategic situation requires a “dynamic” rather 
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than a “simultaneous-move” game, because Congress acts after observing the 
president’s message choice, and the president signs or vetoes after observing 
Congress’s policy choice. Dynamic games with no hidden information are com-
monly solved using an equilibrium solution concept known as “subgame per-
fect” equilibrium. Subgame perfection is a refinement of Nash equilibrium that 
requires that the actors’ strategies form a Nash equilibrium in each subgame. A 
pair of strategies form a Nash equilibrium whenever neither actor can improve 
his utility by unilaterally changing to a different strategy. In other words, both 
actors choose strategies that are optimal given the other actor’s strategy. In this 
way, a Nash equilibrium is meant to represent behavior that is self-reinforcing, 
i.e., in equilibrium. A subgame consists of both an actor’s decision at some point 
in the game and all possible subsequent decisions of all actors. In the agenda-set-
ting game, there are an infinite number of subgames because Congress can pass 
any law on the two policy dimensions. All of the possible sign/veto decisions 
that the president may face for each possible congressional bill form separate 
subgames. In addition, all actors with moves in a given subgame already know 
all of the actions that have occurred before that subgame is reached in the game. 
Subgame perfection thus requires that actors with choices in subgames will not 
want to change their Nash equilibrium strategy after seeing what the other actor 
has already done. Subgame perfection therefore eliminates the possibility of an 
equilibrium that includes a strategy supported by an incredible threat, like the 
presidential threat of vetoing a policy that he actually prefers to the status quo. 
The subgame perfect equilibrium concept simply specifies that if the president 
is going to hurt himself more by carrying out this veto threat than by signing it, 
then it is not rational for him to carry it out if Congress does pass such a bill. If 
Congress is aware that the president will hurt himself by carrying out the veto 
threat, then it can ignore such veto threats as bluffs and force the president’s 
hand. One of the advantages of adopting subgame perfect as the solution concept 
is that solutions that are supported by such incredible threats are ruled out, even 
though they may form a Nash equilibrium in the overall game. In the next two 
chapters I will utilize a further refinement of Nash equilibrium, perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium, which insures that actors update their beliefs rationally about hidden 
information that they do not fully observe.
 Subgame perfect equilibria are often solved by backwards induction, where 
one determines the optimal strategies in the terminal subgames of the game and 
then solves progressively earlier stages based on knowledge of how that game is 
expected to play out in later stages. Thus, in the last move of the game the pres-
ident’s sign/veto strategy must constitute a Nash equilibrium; i.e., it must be the 
president’s best response to the policy passed by Congress. Thus, the president 
signs an acid rain bill, b = {x1, 0}, if it is closer to his ideal acid rain policy than 
the status quo on that issue, 0 < x1 ≤ 2p1. The president also signs a spectrum 
auction bill, b = {0, x2}, if it is closer to his ideal spectrum auction policy than 
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the status quo on that issue, 0 < x2 < 2p2. This means that the president will sign 
any bill that he prefers to the status quo, even if he threatened to veto such a bill.3 
In figure 2.3, I illustrate the policies vetoed by the president on the air pollution 
and spectrum auction issues with crosshatched intervals.
 Given that the president will sign any bill that he prefers to the status quo, 
we can proceed with backwards induction to determine Congress’s optimal issue 
and policy choice. As long as the agenda-setting conditions, c1 > c2 and p1 < 
p2, hold, Congress prefers to enact its ideal policy c1 on the acid rain issue, and 
the president prefers to change policy on the spectrum auction issue. Since the 
president’s veto strategy dictates when Congress can successfully enact his bill, 
the equilibrium strategy of Congress is to choose its ideal acid rain policy, b = 
{c1, 0}, whenever this is acceptable to the president, 0 < c1 ≤ 2p1. As illustrated 
in figure 2.3, if c1 > 2p1 the president would veto c1, and Congress, anticipating 
this, would instead pass a more moderate acid rain bill, b = {2p1, 0}, if this bill 
offers it more utility than its best possible bill on spectrum auctions. If c2 > c1, 
Congress chooses its ideal policy on the spectrum auction issue, b = {0, c2}, as 
long as the president will not veto it. If c2 > 2p2, the president would veto c2, 
so Congress adjusts its policy to the policy closest to its ideal point that is still 
acceptable to the president, i.e., b = {0, 2p2}, if this is better than the best policy it 
can obtain on acid rain. Notice that Congress’s optimal decision does not depend 
at all on the president’s signal but only on his veto strategy. This occurs because 
Congress can determine when the president will or will not veto a bill from his 
sign/veto strategy, which it can deduce from the president’s ideal policies on both 
issues. A different dynamic would arise if Congress did not know the president’s 
exact ideal policy, in which case the veto may play a broader role.
FIGURE 2.3  Example of policy effects of veto in subgame perfect equilibrium
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 Proceeding with backwards induction, the president’s message strategy must 
be optimal given Congress’s policy strategy. However, since Congress’s policy 
choice does not depend at all on the president’s message, the president can send 
any message in equilibrium. Such messages, whether they are veto threats or 
policy proposals, will have no influence on the congressional agenda in this 
simple policymaking model. Thus, in the general policymaking game, there is 
not a unique subgame perfect equilibrium because the president’s messages can 
be ignored with impunity by Congress, and therefore it does not matter what the 
president says in his messages. The president’s messages, by themselves, have 
no credible agenda-setting influence in this model.
 The president’s veto has a very limited agenda-setting role because Congress 
can often modify its policy on its own preferred issue so that it is acceptable to 
the president rather than changing to the president’s preferred issue. For exam-
ple, in the example given in figure 2.3, although Congress is not able to enact its 
ideal policy on issue 1, c1, it is able to find a policy acceptable to the president, 
2p1, that it prefers to any policy on issue two. The veto does, however, prohibit 
Congress from enacting extreme policies, xi > 2pi, on either issue. In the models 
of presidential agenda setting in chapters 3 and 4, I explore how the president’s 
influence over the agenda can arise from other informal influences. In particular, 
the president’s messages become influential when they contain private informa-
tion held by the president that is transmitted to either Congress or voters and that 
may alter their policy or voting decisions. In these cases, what the president says 
in his message may indeed matter.
 The solution of this simple agenda-setting model suggests that the veto 
has very limited agenda-setting influence in Congress. If Congress knows the 
president’s range of acceptable policies, the veto can only be used to prevent the 
enactment of policies where Congress holds policy interests that are very differ-
ent from the president. For example, if the president wants to increase the cost 
of spectrum licenses, while Congress wants to decrease the cost, then the veto 
effectively acts to block consideration of that issue. When there are two issues 
where the preferences are not diametrically opposed, then the effect of the veto 
is very limited. Although I do not consider this case, if Congress is uncertain of 
the range of policies acceptable to the president, the veto may be more effective. 
Congress may, for example, avoid working on an issue priority because of uncer-
tainty about whether the president will sign or veto the final bill. Nevertheless, 
even in this case the veto is likely to exercise minimal influence because it only 
keeps Congress from working on a specific issue without otherwise affecting the 
alternative issue that is taken up by Congress. In the next two chapters I consider 
presidential agenda powers that allow the president to specify the issue taken up 
by Congress rather than just specifying the issues that are off-limits.
 In this chapter, I have shown how game-theoretic models of the policy pro-
cess can utilize the median voter theorem to construct simple models of the 
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policymaking and agenda-setting processes. I have also introduced the basic 
elements of game-theoretic models, including utility functions, subgames, strate-
gies, and equilibrium solution concepts that will be employed more extensively 
in chapters 3 and 4. I developed a simple model of the agenda-setting process 
that predicted that veto threats could have only limited influence over the agenda 
choices of Congress. In the next two chapters I examine the president’s ability to 
influence the congressional agenda through his major speeches (legislative pro-
gramming) and through draft legislation (legislative clearance). To characterize 
these processes, I use the same two-issue agenda-setting framework I introduced 
in this chapter. The predictions of these models are then tested using new data on 
the congressional agenda-setting process in chapters 6 and 7.
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In his first address to a joint session of Congress in 1981, President Ronald 
Reagan asked Congress to “put a cap on how much the Federal Government 
will contribute” to state Medicaid expenses (Reagan 1981). Medicaid had often 
been a polarizing issue that united Democrats in its defense and Republicans 
in opposition. Reagan’s Medicaid cap issue was so contentious that the House 
Commerce Committee could not reach agreement and reported two contrasting 
Medicaid bills to the floor. Reagan’s Medicaid cap was ultimately rejected by 
Congress in favor of a less drastic spending cut in Medicaid, but not before it was 
given serious consideration in both the House and the Senate. What is remark-
able, however, is that a Democrat-controlled House let this largely Republican 
issue arise on the agenda when it could have been easily squelched by House 
committee and party leaders. In this chapter I explore how the president is able 
to use his State of the Union addresses and other major addresses to place such 
issues on the congressional agenda—even when the issue is unfavorable to the 
majority party.
 In his address to Congress, Reagan had highlighted the Medicaid cap as a 
prime example of the ways the government could save money. Although health 
care costs had been rising at around 15% per year, Budget Director David Stock-
man proposed a 5% cap on the increase in expeditures for Medicaid in 1982 
(CQ Almanac 1981, 577). This seemed a draconian limit to some members of 
the Democratic House majority, but Reagan had brought a Republican majority 
to the Senate after his 1980 election victory, and a group of Southern Democrats 
in the House sided with Reagan frequently on critical policy questions. Neither 
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chamber gave Reagan the 5% spending cap he desired. The Senate passed a cap 
at 9%, and the House rejected the spending cap in favor of a less drastic cost 
control. Ironically, a key supporter of the House proposal was Democrat Henry 
Waxman, chair of the Health subcommittee of Energy and Commerce. Waxman 
was a staunch defender of Medicaid, and as Health subcommittee chair, was 
ideally placed to block the administration’s downsizing of Medicaid. Formally, 
Waxman had far more control over the congressional health care agenda than 
Reagan because Medicaid bills had to go through his subcommittee where he 
could unilaterally schedule hearings and markups.1 Politically, Waxman was 
opposed to the administration plan, claiming that it “may well have more tragic 
consequences than any other administration [budget] proposal” (CQ Almanac 
1981, 479). In this chapter I will explore why such a powerful subcommittee 
chair would yield control of the agenda to a presidential policy issue he opposed. 
I argue that the president’s major public addresses, particularly those delivered 
to a joint session of Congress, give him an unrivaled chance to shape what issues 
voters consider most important. I argue that it is this constituent concern for 
the president’s policy agenda that shapes congressional interest in the policies 
included in the president’s State of the Union addresses.
 Congressional party leaders provide signals that are informative in this 
regard only when they can speak authoritatively for their partisans in Congress, 
i.e., only when they can credibly deliver the policies. It is more often the case 
that the majority party’s interests are not so homogeneous. As Sundquist (1981) 
and C. Jones (1994) claim, Congress is sometimes forced to turn outside to 
the president for leadership because it faces a difficult coordination problem. 
The reason the Speaker cannot often serve in this capacity is that the majority 
party is often too heterogeneous to agree on a unified agenda (Rohde 1991). In 
rare circumstances, such as James Wright in 1987 and Newt Gingrich in 1995, 
the Speaker may be able to wrest control of the congressional agenda from the 
president. A Speaker without a unified majority party, however, does not enjoy 
enough effectiveness to draw significant public attention to his proposals. The 
president, as the sole nationally elected representative, can provide this salience 
single-handedly. Whereas congressional leaders appear on the evening news and 
in newspapers infrequently, the president is featured in the news almost daily—
even when he is on vacation! This gives the president a considerable advantage 
over congressional leaders in shaping the public salience of issues.
 The formal model of legislative programming developed in this chapter gen-
erates the prediction that the president’s major speeches can set the congressional 
agenda on major national issues, but the effectiveness of this type of agenda set-
ting declines rapidly over time during the president’s tenure. This declining politi-
cal capital is a direct result of the fact that voters are less able to hold the president 
accountable for the effects of his policies as the end of his tenure approaches.
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The Origins of Legislative Programming
Article II, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution instructs the president to “from 
time to time give to the Congress information of the state of the union, and rec-
ommend to their consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and 
expedient.” Since FDR, all presidents have used the State of the Union address as 
an opportunity to make a major public appeal for their policy proposals to Con-
gress (Light 1991). In the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act, Congress added the 
requirement that the president also submit an annual budget, and in the Employ-
ment Act of 1946, Congress extended this request for presidential reports to the 
area of unemployment. Later, Congress would also require regular presidential 
reports on the state of national security, the environment, and housing and urban 
growth (Sundquist 1981, 144).
 Through these required presidential reports, Congress has, in effect, insti-
tutionalized the president as national policy leader. Although the president was 
granted no additional legislative power, the Employment Act of 1946 requires 
the president to prepare “a program for carrying out policy” in the yearly Eco-
nomic Report (Sundquist 1981). Thus, the president’s economic program joined 
the State of the Union as a required annual report to Congress on suggested pol-
icy proposals, the former mandated by the Constitution and the latter by statute. 
Only infrequently delivered in person, presidents have sometimes used the eco-
nomic address to deliver their policy proposals in an address before Congress in 
their first year, since the incumbent administration is charged with delivering the 
State of the Union after a new president is elected but before he takes office.
 Truman’s budget director, James E. Webb, took the final step in institution-
alizing presidential agenda setting by establishing presidential programming as 
an annual process, an institution which all of the postwar presidents have main-
tained. A few days after the 1948 election, Truman called for all agencies to 
submit their legislative proposals for the next Congress. Budget Circular A-19, 
“Legislative Coordination and Clearance,” set out guidelines for coordination 
of the president’s legislative program, as well as the clearance process (Rudal-
evige 2002). The Budget Bureau, and later organizations closer to the president 
within the White House, would identify important proposals for inclusion in the 
president’s program, e.g., items for inclusion in the State of the Union address or 
other annual messages.
 Issues mentioned in the president’s State of the Union address are given 
special consideration, above issues mentioned in the president’s other public 
addresses, and form what is often called the president’s “legislative program.” 
Light (1991), for instance, chose State of the Union messages as the most impor-
tant indicator of presidential agenda items based on interviews with 126 staff 
members from five presidential administrations: “Most of the staff members 
interviewed suggested that we turn to the State of the Union address for the 
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agenda items. Though the message often includes a ‘laundry list’ of presiden-
tial requests, it is viewed by the Washington community as the vehicle for the 
President’s agenda. According to the staffs, the President’s top priorities will 
always appear in the message at some point during the term” (6). Further, as 
Light (1991), Kessel (2001), and Cohen (1997) argue, because State of the Union 
addresses are rare events, there is considerable debate and competition in the 
administration for the policy issues that appear there.
 Interestingly, both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations still publicly 
denied drafting many of their legislative proposals when they were introduced 
into Congress, typically by committee chairmen (Neustadt 1954). These presi-
dents tried to make a distinction between making policy proposals to Congress, 
which was their clear constitutional duty, and submitting draft legislation, which 
might be seen as infringing on congressional prerogative. In the White House, a 
separate process emerged for draft bills that the White House submitted to Con-
gress, and these draft bills offered a different kind of influence on Congress than 
the president’s major addresses, as I will discuss in the next chapter. First, I turn 
to a formal examination of the potential influence of presidential addresses on 
the congressional agenda.
An Informational Model of Presidential Programming
In previous attempts to explain the president’s agenda-setting power through his 
public speeches, Kernell (1993) and Miller (1993) argue that the president’s abil-
ity to “go public” can lead to his influence over legislative outcomes, because 
the president’s speeches can shift the salience of issues and therefore alter the 
policy preferences of members of Congress. Canes-Wrone (2001) formalizes and 
enriches this argument in order to explain why the president does not therefore 
seek to go public on all issues.
 Like Kernell (1993), Miller (1993), and Canes-Wrone (2001), I argue that 
when the president uses the legislative programming track to deliver his agenda 
items in his public addresses, he is able to raise the salience of issues that hold 
more potential utility for voters. However, I argue that the president’s success in 
raising the salience of issues is not automatic but depends on his credibility with 
voters. For instance, I will show that presidents can send more credible policy 
information to voters at the beginning of their term than at the end of their term. 
Particularly in their first Congresses, presidents can play an important role in 
domestic policy making by providing policy information to voters. Voters, who 
may ordinarily be inattentive to the issues considered by Congress, can thereby 
punish Congress by not reelecting representatives whenever Congress fails to 
deal with what the president considers the nation’s most pressing problems.
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 Since 1939 the Gallup Poll has asked Americans to identify “the most impor-
tant problem facing the country” in its frequent surveys of public opinion in the 
United States. Aggregate responses indicate that only about seven items were 
likely to be mentioned by a significant portion of the electorate at a single time 
(McCombs and Zhu 1995; Miller 1956; Shaw and McCombs 1977; Zhu 1992). 
To researchers, these “salient” issues comprised the public agenda, usually domi-
nated by economic (e.g., inflation or unemployment) or foreign policy concerns 
(e.g., wars) or both.
 In order to model the dynamic relationship between the public agenda, as 
influenced by the president, and the congressional agenda, I provide a more 
formal definition of salience that captures its meaning in both journalistic usage 
and its usage in the public opinion literature. I argue that salience consists of two 
components—the identification of a particular issue area or problem and a real-
ization that this problem is more pressing than other potential problems. Salience 
thus necessarily involves the prioritization of problems: salient issues causing 
either more disutility or more potential utility gains than nonsalient issues.2
 As in chapter 2, I consider a policy world in which there exist only two 
issues, e.g., the economy and defense. Each of these issues can be represented on 
independent spatial dimensions by assuming that each voter holds coherent and 
separable preferences across different outcomes located on these spatial dimen-
sions.3 With only two issues, I define the salient issue as that issue where the 
voter believes she can gain more potential utility. Technically, issue i is salient 
to the voter v if and only if Euv(bi = vi) ≥ Euv (bj = vj) for all issues j ≠ i. Here 
vi represents the ideal policy of the voter on issue i, and bi represents the policy 
outcome (bill) on that issue. Euv is a function representing the expected utility of 
a policy to the voter and is measured as a function of the distance from the policy 
outcome to the voter’s ideal point on an issue. I assume that actors’ utility is sepa-
rable across the two issues i and j so that an actor’s ideal policy on one issue does 
not depend on the policy outcome on another issue. The two issues I consider in 
this chapter, illegal drugs and the Medicaid cap, would not be independent, for 
instance, if higher illegal drug use affected how high an actor was willing to set 
the Medicaid cap.
Voter Uncertainty about Optimal Policies
Using the median voter results that are reviewed in chapter 2, I will consider a 
single median voter who represents the national electorate. By definition this 
median voter will always have a salient issue, i.e., an issue where she believes 
her policy preferences differ most from the status quo. On all other issues, I 
assume that voter has some uncertainty about the best course of policy action; 
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i.e., the voter may not realize the full effects of a given Medicaid cap on the 
number of practices willing to accept Medicaid patients, the budget deficit, or on 
the cost of health care to non-Medicaid users. If the voter could understand all of 
these effects, then she would be in a better position to identify the ideal policy on 
this issue. Because of their greater policy expertise, I assume that the president 
and Congress become better informed than the voter about policy effects of dif-
ferent levels of Medicaid caps. Access to this policy expertise could help voters 
better evaluate the policy choices made by the president and Congress. I will 
argue, however, that the voter needs only very crude information that allows her 
to assess the most important problem in order to be able to evaluate Congress’s 
agenda choices. It is this information about the most important problem that the 
president is well suited to provide through his public speeches.
 Figure 3.1 represents the canonical agenda-setting problem. There are two 
issues and three actors: the voter, v; the president, p; and Congress, c. On one 
issue, illegal drug use, the voter has complete information about the effects of 
implemented policy so that the voter observes her exact ideal policy to be v1. 
This issue may be thought of as the salient issue indicated by the “most impor-
tant problem” question on the Gallup Poll of national public opinion. Complete 
information is assumed because voters are more likely to be informed on this 
issue than on less salient issues for a variety of reasons, including media attention 
to the problem and the voters’ concern for the problem. When Congress focuses 
its attention on this issue, it is following public opinion. Nontrivial agenda set-
ting arises only if the president is able to divert Congress’s attention to another 
nonsalient issue. The only reason voters would be interested in having Congress 
work on an issue other than the issue they consider the most important problem 
FIGURE 3.1 Configuration of ideal points and uncertainty on two issues in legislative 
programming
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is if there is a another issue where they do not have a full understanding of the 
effects of implementing different policies. In figure 3.1 the possibility of such an 
issue is represented by issue 2, the Medicaid cap.
 From figure 3.1, it is clear that Congress considers illegal drug use a more 
important problem because it finds the status quo further from its ideal point on 
illegal drug use. Similarly, the president finds the Medicaid cap more pressing. I 
will assume, however, that the voter is unsure whether her ideal point on issue 2 
in each period t is at the status quo, v2,t = 0, in which case she would find illegal 
drug use more important, or at v2,t = 1, in which case she would find the Med-
icaid cap more pressing. The voter’s relative uncertainty about her ideal policy 
may arise because she does not know the implementation effects of each policy 
as well as Congress and the president. The ideal policies of Congress and the 
president are not indexed by the period t, because they are assumed to be fixed in 
each period. I will also assume that the voter knows that there is an equal prob-
ability of her ideal point on issue 2 being either 0 or 1. In each period, then, the 
voter faces a completely new issue (issue 2), about which she is uncertain of the 
implementation effects of any policy. I assume that on each of these new issues 
and in each period t, she believes her ideal policy is distributed in the same way, 
i.e., at v2,t = is equally likely to be 0 or 1 in each period t.
 Utility is derived as a function of the distance from the player’s ideal point to 
the bill passed by Congress. The only uncertainty is about the voter’s ideal policy 
on the nonsalient issue 2 in each period because of her uncertainty about the 
implementation effects of different policies on this issue. The policy (bill) enact-
ed by Congress in each period t is represented as bt = {b1,2, b2,t}. The preferred 
policy of each actor a on an issue i is represented as ai. The utility or welfare of 
each actor on an issue i in each period t or legislative session is a function of the 
squared distance between the enacted policy bt and the actor’s ideal policy.
 I set up a policymaking game that is repeated over and over in order to model 
the incentives of actors in repeated interaction. In order to avoid infinitely valued 
payoffs for some repeated policy choices, payoffs each period are discounted at 
the rate, δt−1, where δ represents a common discount factor, and 0 < δ < 1. A com-
mon discount factor between 0 and 1 means that all actors value future policy 
benefits less than they do current policy benefits.4 Actors with lower discount 
factors are myopic and prefer to choose actions that provide immediate benefits 
rather than actions that have delayed benefits, even when those delayed benefits 
are greater. In each period t, an actor a’s expected utility from the policy bt is:
voter: Euv,t = (Σi − (vi,t − bi,t )2
 − k)δt−1
Congress: Euc,t = (Σi − (ci,t − bi,t)2
 + k)δt−1
president: Eup,t = (Σi − (pi,t − bi,t)2 + k)δt−1
Larocca_final.indb   38 8/8/2006   12:48:10 PM
Chapter 3: Public Addresses and the Legislative Programming Process
39
Because of separable preferences, each actor’s utility is thus derived as the sum 
of the actor’s utility from the separate issues. Notice that the voter’s utility func-
tion has the wage term −k and Congress and the president have the wage term 
k, because the voter must pay a wage to the representative and president in each 
period in order to make them prefer to deliver the voter’s ideal policy in each 
period in exchange for being reelected.
“Are You Better Off Today Than You Were Four Years Ago?”
When the game begins, nature reveals v2,t, the voter’s ideal point on issue 2 to 
the president and Congress but not to the voter. In other words, Congress and the 
president observe whether there is another issue that could potentially benefit 
the voter more than the issue the voter considers salient. If v2,t = 0, then there 
is no such issue. If v2,t = 1, then issue 2 offers more potential voter utility. The 
president then sends a message to voters and Congress that may or may not 
reveal which issue and bill offers the voter the most potential utility. Congress 
subsequently chooses a policy, choosing both an issue and a specific bill on that 
issue. It is in limiting Congress to deal with one problem at a time that an agenda 
problem arises in the first place. If Congress could work on all possible issues 
at once, delivering perhaps an omnibus policy, then there would be no need to 
decide which issue is most important. Congress has neither the time nor organi-
zational ability to dispatch policy in such a comprehensive fashion. Its approach 
is necessarily piecemeal.
 The voter observes her previous period utility, the president’s message and 
the policy issues chosen by Congress, and decides whether to reelect the presi-
dent and Congress. In measuring agenda setting, the concern is with whether the 
president’s message can affect the issue chosen by Congress. If the president 
does have such an influence, it operates indirectly through his influence on the 
voter’s reelection strategies.
 I make a further distinction between major policy issues and minor policy 
issues. Instead of hinging on the amount of utility available to actors from an 
issue, like issue salience, major issues are simply defined as those whose policy 
effects cannot be judged immediately, but only over time. Thus, while different 
actors can view different issues as salient, I assume that all agree which issues 
are major vs. minor issues. Examples of major issues include Jimmy Carter’s 
1979 energy plan, Bill Clinton’s 1993 health care plan, and George W. Bush’s 
2001 homeland security plan. So I distinguish minor issues as those issues whose 
effects can be known to voters within the same legislative session. These might 
include disaster relief bills, extending unemployment benefits, and tax rebates. 
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Alternatively, Congress could concern itself with issues such as pork barrel 
spending that reveal more immediate benefits to their voters. Since I assume the 
separability of issues, the only way such short-sighted behavior hurts the long-
term interests of the voter is by ignoring more important issues with delayed 
benefits. In the real world, short-sighted policies like pork barrel spending may 
affect the voter’s long-term interests more directly by, for example, raising the 
national debt and thus interest rates. In the model below, both issue 1 and issue 
2 are assumed to be major issues; i.e., the effects of policies on these issues are 
not observed before the next congressional election. That the standards for mea-
suring the success or failure of policies often extends beyond a single Congress 
is suggested by the familiar presidential reelection refrain: “Are you better off 
today than you were four years ago?” used by Reagan in his 1980 election cam-
paign.
 Figure 3.2 traces the chronology of the legislative programming stage game 
for major issues. Notice that the effects, uv,t, of the policy bt in period t are not 
realized until after the midterm election rm,t. The voter must therefore decide 
whether to reelect members of Congress before she knows whether Congress 
has pursued policies that will benefit her. The president can send a message mt 
before the midterm election that helps voters evaluate whether Congress has pur-
sued her interests. In the policy space described in figure 3.1, the president can 
indicate to the voter whether or not the voter’s ideal point on issue 2 is further 
from the status quo than her ideal point on issue 1, in other words, whether issue 
2 is more important than issue 1. 
 After observing the president’s message and the policy issue subject to con-
gressional action, the voter must make a midterm reelection decision that can 
be contingent on the message sent by the president and the policy chosen by 
Congress, but not on the utility she gains from that policy. After all, she doesn’t 
realize the full effects of the president’s major policy proposals until near the end 
of the presidential term. After the midterm election, the voter observes her actual 
utility uv,t from the previous legislative action bt. The president sends another 
message and Congress chooses another policy bt+1 in the second Congress. The 
voter must make reelection decisions rp,t+1 for both the president and Congress in 
the presidential election year. The stage game is repeated indefinitely whenever 
FIGURE 3.2 Chronology of the legislative programming stage game
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there are no term limits and once when the president is allowed to serve two con-
secutive terms.
The Dynamics of Presidential Agenda Setting
Since the voter has incomplete information in each period, she is unsure whether 
her ideal policy on issue 2 will yield her more or less utility than her ideal policy 
on issue 1. If the voter never acquired information about her preferred policy on 
issue 2, she could use her knowledge of issue 1 to demand that Congress pro-
vide a policy located at her ideal point, v1, on that issue. The voter gains utility 
from this policy, but she could do even better if Congress delivered her ideal 
point on issue 2, v2, whenever it yields a value higher than v1. Congress knows 
when v2 = 1, but is reluctant to choose a policy at the voter’s ideal point on 
this issue because Congress gains lower utility from this policy. Without policy 
information, then, the voter is not able to efficiently monitor the behavior of her 
representative. If, however, the voter elects another representative with differ-
ent interests than Congress, such as the president, he might be able to signal to 
the voter whenever v2 = 1. This information enables the voter to hold Congress 
to the higher standard in these cases. The president may have different interests 
even from a Congress controlled by his party, since he is elected by a different 
constituency than any member of Congress.
 The president’s attention to an issue in his State of the Union address or in 
some other major speech carries an inherent claim that his issue is of overriding 
importance. As discussed earlier, this is by nature a claim that voters can accrue 
the greatest benefits if Congress is able to solve this policy problem. In the words 
of the model developed here, the president is claiming that issue 2, Medicaid caps, 
has a voter ideal policy located at 1 rather than 0. If the voter were able to elect a 
president whose interests mirrored hers perfectly, the president would be able to 
convey this information perfectly to the voter (Crawford and Sobel 1982).
 Congress could also make claims about the most important problem facing 
the country, but voters are aware that individual members of Congress may have 
interests at odds with the good of the country as a whole. When all members 
vote for the revealed preferences of their districts, for instance, the aggregate 
policy result may make all of the voters worse off than some other coordinated 
policy. Congressional parties also play some role in keeping Congress focused 
on national concerns. Indeed, in two recent Congresses, the 100th and 104th, the 
House was able to generate and pass an endogenous national legislative program. 
But, ultimately, parties have little power to keep representatives from voting their 
districts. The rewards the party offers in leadership positions and other induce-
ments are secondary to the reelection concerns of incumbents.
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 If the president has ideal points as represented in figure 3.1, then there exists 
an equilibrium in the repeated game where the president is able to signal infor-
mation to the voter that allows her to efficiently monitor congressional behavior. 
This would not be the case if the president’s policy interests coincided perfectly 
with those of Congress, in which case Congress and the president would have 
an interest in colluding to deceive the voter. The president can essentially signal 
which issue offers more potential utility, and the voter can use knowledge of this 
issue to make reelection decisions regarding Congress. I list the strategies that 
constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the legislative programming game in 
table 3.1. A formal statement and proof of equilibrium are given in Appendix A.
 The voter must design her strategy regarding the reelection of Congress in 
a way that makes choosing a policy at her ideal point in each case attractive, or 
incentive compatible, to Congress. Notice, for example, that Congress always 
does best policywise in any given term by choosing a policy located at its ideal 
point on issue 1, c1. The voter, therefore, has to make reelection contingent on 
Congress choosing a different policy in order to make Congress comply. This 
leads to an incentive constraint that must always be satisfied in equilibrium. Con-
gress must always prefer its expected net present value of delivering the voter’s 
preferred policy to defecting and choosing its own preferred policy in the current 
period, which might lead to it being thrown out of office. In particular the incen-
tive constraint requires that Congress prefer to choose the policy v1 when v2 = 0 
and the policy v2 whenever v2 = 1.
 The voter is also concerned that the president sends the proper messages 
regarding the value of v2, i.e., information about the most important problem 
facing the country. As I noted earlier, if the president and the voter share the 
same interests, the president will always follow the voter’s interests without the 
need for monitoring. Voters, however, rarely elect such trustworthy leaders. In 
the game I have modeled, the president always prefers a policy b2 = 1 regard-
TABLE 3.1 Legislative programming equilibrium strategies
Actor Action First Congress Later Congresses
president mt signals voter’s interests faithfully signals his own preferred issue
Congress bt
chooses voter’s preferred policy on 
issue indicated by president
chooses voter’s preferred policy on Con-
gress’s preferred issue
voter cm,t, cp,t, k
reelects Congress (and pays wage 
k) if Congress follows president’s 
program 
reelects Congress and president (and pays 
wage k) if she realizes her utility expecta-
tions 
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less of the value of the voter’s ideal point. We might expect the president to 
always tell the voter that her ideal policy is at the same location on issue 2. But 
the voter can monitor utility she experiences from legislative action and thereby 
sometimes observes whether the president has been truthful. For example, if v2 
= 0, the voter can achieve uv,t = 0 but not if v2 = 1. A presidential signal to set 
expectations higher than those available from the status quo policy can never be 
satisfied by Congress. Thus, the voter can monitor the president’s honesty in sig-
naling by requiring future utility to equal the expectations set by the president in 
order for the voter to reelect the president as well as Congress. Moreover, since 
Congress knows that it will not be reelected when the president sets expectations 
that cannot be met, it defects in such cases and chooses a policy at its own ideal 
point—a policy that offers the president less utility than he could have secured 
from an honest signal. The president thus finds an incentive to signal honestly 
independent of the voter’s reelection strategy for him. I will discuss why this 
is not generally the case in presidential agenda setting in the next section. For 
now I want to establish the significant role played by a president who can send 
informative signals to voters. The chief role of the president in the game is edu-
cating the voter about the most important problem so that the voter can more 
efficiently monitor Congress’s agenda choices. This distinguishes this model 
from the Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) model of information transmission, which 
I use to model legislative clearance in the following chapter. In the Gilligan and 
Krehbiel model, the amount of information that can be conveyed between two 
actors is determined by the similarity of their preferences, and perfect informa-
tion can only be transmitted between actors who have identical interests. My 
model of legislative programming is novel because it shows how introducing an 
elected third party, the president, can lead to full information revelation to the 
voter and thus to fully efficient representation—even when actors do not have 
identical preferences. The key difference from the Gilligan and Krehbiel setup 
is that additional agenda-setting agents, like the president, can be employed for 
the sole purpose of acquiring and revealing hidden information, which the voter 
could not have credibly acquired from the Congress. The principal role of the 
president in his major addresses is, I contend, exactly the provision of this type of 
policy information to voters in order to influence the issues on the congressional 
agenda.
 Table 3.1 specifies a separating equilibrium in the legislative programming 
game in which the voter gets her optimal legislative issue and bill in the first 
term and in which the president’s message influences both the issue and bill 
chosen by Congress. A separating equilibrium is defined as a behavioral pre-
diction where the president sends different messages depending on his private 
information about the implementation effects of the policy, so that the voter can 
separate issues where her ideal policy is low from issues when her ideal policy is 
high. A formal specification of equilibrium strategies is presented in Appendix A. 
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Nontrivial agenda setting occurs even though the president plays no direct role in 
the legislative process in the model. The president’s agenda-setting influence is 
nontrivial when Congress chooses an issue other than that which it would have 
chosen without presidential signaling.
 In figure 3.3, I arbitrarily set v1, v2, p1, and c2 and plot in gray the values 
of c1 and p2 for which presidential agenda setting occurs in equilibrium. The 
president’s ability to use the legislative programming process to set the con-
gressional agenda depends on the relationship between the ideal policies of the 
president, Congress, and the median voter. Incentive constraint ICp indicates 
that the president will only be willing to send informative messages to the voter 
when the president’s ideal policy on issue 2 is sufficiently far from the status quo 
that he prefers to work on issue 2 rather than Congress’s priority, issue 1. Incen-
tive constraint IC4 indicates that Congress will only be willing to respond to the 
president’s agenda-setting messages when the preferences of Congress and the 
voter are not too far apart on issue 1. In the light gray area marked “trivial agenda 
setting,” both the president and Congress prefer to work on issue 2. When c1 falls 
to the right of IC4, it is very large compared to c2, and Congress prefers to work 
on issue 1 regardless of the president’s message. Although the range of ideal 
policies where non-trivial agenda setting occurs is restricted in figure 3.3, it is 
also clear that the preferences of the president, Congress, and voter do not have 
to be identical for perfect communication to occur. When non-trivial presidential 
agenda setting does occur, i.e., in the light gray area in figure 3.3, its results can 
be dramatic because the voter gets her ideal policy on her most important issue 
in some periods.
FIGURE 3.3 Presidential preferences with respect to congressional preferences for Legislative  
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The Consequences of Legislative Programming
The equilibrium strategies in table 3.1 lead to several predictions about the 
presidential agenda-setting power that derives from public addresses. First, the 
president only exercises this agenda-setting influence during his first Congress. 
The second Congress still delivers the voter’s ideal policy, but on Congress’s 
preferred issue rather than on the issue indicated in the president’s message. Sec-
ond, Congress is reelected in each period, even though it ignores the president’s 
messages after the first period. Finally, the president and Congress do not have 
to have identical preferences for the president to exercise this type of agenda 
influence.
 If one thinks of the interest of the members of Congress as coincident with 
those of special interest groups or those who provide campaign contributions, 
then the role of the president is fundamental in keeping the actions of Congress 
geared towards the national constituency rather than such special interests. If 
the interests of Congress are understood instead as the particularistic interests of 
each congressional district, then the president’s role here can be understood as 
turning Congress to collective goods legislation. With this interpretation it is easy 
to see that without presidential agenda setting collective goods legislation would 
be worked on less frequently by Congress.
The Plausibility of Presidential Mandates
The predictions of the public address model of presidential agenda setting are 
consistent with the idea of “presidential mandates” because both stress the 
president’s effectiveness at the beginning of his term. It is often argued in jour-
nalistic coverage of politics that presidents can translate an electoral mandate, if 
they secure one, into policy success in Congress. Technically, a mandate is a set 
of instructions from the voter that tell the politician how to vote (Pitkin 1967). A 
president who secures a mandate in an election might see himself as instructed 
and empowered by voters to enact the policy proposals he emphasized in his 
electoral campaign. However, the idea that mandates occur in presidential elec-
tions has been disparaged by political scientists (e.g., Dahl 1990; Edwards 1989; 
Kelley 1983), who see the electorate as too ill-informed and candidates as too 
vague in their policy positions for a clear mandate to exist. Still, talk of man-
dates is heard from both politicians and journalists, and Conley (2001) points 
out that both Reagan and Clinton claimed mandates from the voters. Conley 
discards the traditional view of mandates and interprets them instead as infer-
ences that members of Congress make about the level of public support for the 
president’s program. Her understanding of a mandate is very close to what Paul 
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Light (1991) calls “presidential capital,” congressional and popular support that 
presidents can use in support of major policy changes. Conley’s model offers 
a helpful way of understanding presidential policy making, because she shows 
how futile it is for presidents like Clinton to try to claim a mandate when they 
do not have the congressional and public support for major policy change. In 
other words, she dispels Dahl’s fear that the “myth” of a mandate “elevates the 
president to an exalted position at the expense of Congress” (Dahl 1990, quoted 
in Conley 2001), and concludes that presidents cannot use mandate claims alone 
to dominate policy making.
 To simply say, “I have a mandate for change,” does not offer the president 
any additional leverage over Congress, in the way that Dahl had feared. Gener-
ally, presidents claim they have mandates when they also have congressional and 
voter support for major policy change. What matters is not whether the president 
claims a mandate—since the claim by itself has no effect on Congress—but 
only whether the president initiates major policy change when political condi-
tions are ripe for that change. Saying “I have a mandate” and introducing major 
legislation are, in fact, indistinguishable actions in Conley’s model. But in ratio-
nalizing mandates, Conley also defines a way that they might serve as a unique 
explanation of presidential agenda setting. Her mandates do not serve as specific 
instructions from voters but only as imperfect signals of the political conditions 
for major policy changes. However, Conley’s model is also about bill passage 
rather than agenda setting as I define it, because the president actually serves as 
a monopoly agenda setter for Congress in her model. Congress either passes the 
president’s bills or it passes nothing at all. I ask instead why Congress would 
consider the president’s legislation when it can alternatively consider any legis-
lation of its own devising. This, as I see it, is the central question in determining 
the president’s effect on the congressional agenda.
 While my model of legislative programming produces a prediction similar 
to mandate theory, i.e., that presidents will be able to influence the congressio-
nal agenda with their policy program most effectively at the beginning of their 
term, the source I identify of this declining influence is quite different. Rather 
than arising from instructions from voters from the recent election, as in the con-
ventional view, or from inferences about public support for the president, as in 
Conley’s model, I model this influence as arising from the credibility of the pol-
icy information the president provides to voters that depends on the president’s 
accountability in the next election. It is at the beginning of the presidential term 
that such messages have the most credibility, because the term limits imposed on 
the president by the 22nd Amendment reduce his electoral accountability as his 
tenure progresses.
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—Robert S. Gilmour, 1971
In February 1983, President Ronald Reagan sent Congress a proposal to further 
the deregulation of natural gas that had been initiated under President Jimmy 
Carter in 1978. Carter’s deregulation had preserved price controls on gas that 
was flowing before April 20, 1977, at $1.25 per thousand cubic feet, well below 
market value. Reagan’s draft legislation would remove this price control on any 
new contracts for this “old” gas. At the time, however, there was considerable 
consumer concern because natural gas prices were rising rather than falling 
despite Carter’s deregulation (CQ Almanac 1983, 366). The most immediate 
effect of Reagan’s proposed decontrol of old natural gas would be to raise prices 
on the more abundant old gas, though this was expected by the administration 
to eventually bring down the price of the previously deregulated new gas. The 
argument that deregulation would bring down prices was complex and depended 
on a number of uncertain factors.
 Public sentiment was running against further deregulation because of ris-
ing prices in the face of abundant natural gas. House Commerce chair John D. 
Dingell Jr. claimed that deregulation of old natural gas would take place “over 
my dead body” (CQ Almanac 1983, 369) and introduced a bill that would re-
regulate prices for “new” gas. In this environment, it seems unlikely that the 
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issue of natural gas deregulation would have been given serious consideration 
without the strong public support of President Reagan. Reagan never mentioned 
the deregulation of natural gas in his State of the Union and economic addresses 
before or after submitting his draft legislation. Nevertheless, after Reagan’s pro-
posal was introduced, both the House and the Senate took up the issue of natural 
gas deregulation in committee hearings and markups, and the Senate brought the 
issue to a floor vote.1 In this chapter I provide a model to explain how Reagan’s 
draft legislation was able to move natural gas regulation to active consideration 
in Congress without raising the public salience of the issue.
 The policy issue of natural gas deregulation is significant because of its com-
plexity and the resulting uncertainty about any given policy solution: “Predic-
tions were difficult to make because of the impossibility of predicting the “mix 
of old and new gas pipelines would carry and sell” (CQ Almanac 1983, 366). 
The administration proposal had two features that responded to this uncertainty: 
it prevented producers from passing along price increases that were greater than 
the inflation rate, and it allowed pipeline companies to break and renegotiate 
contracts with gas producers. In short, Reagan’s draft legislation drew on techni-
cal expertise from the federal bureaucracy that members of Congress found use-
ful because it altered their perception of the problems of natural gas regulation 
and deregulation. In the end, the 98th Congress failed to pass legislation deregu-
lating natural gas, but it had put aside other important business to give serious 
consideration to the problem, even though the issue never achieved high salience 
with the general public. I develop a model to explain how technical expertise can 
be used by the president to influence the issues on the congressional agenda, and 
to examine the conditions under which this agenda-setting power is effective.
 Miller (1994) and Peterson (1995) argue that there are two types of uncer-
tainty that can plague lawmakers in determining public policy: political uncer-
tainty and programmatic uncertainty. Political uncertainty involves both the state 
of public support for a policy and the question of who will benefit or suffer from 
the proposed policies. Programmatic uncertainty involves more technical and 
objective concerns about what policy will achieve the most effective results. It 
is in reducing programmatic uncertainty in particular that the president’s draft 
legislation may be useful to Congress. Legislators can rely on personal experi-
ence, lobbyists, and opinion surveys as well as major public addresses to try to 
overcome political uncertainty. Opinion surveys and the like, however, are not 
helpful in addressing the more technical programmatic uncertainty on complex 
issues like natural gas deregulation, air pollution, and electromagnetic spectrum 
auctions. The most important congressional institutions for reducing program-
matic uncertainty in technical issues are each member’s staff and the committee 
and subcommittee systems in the House and Senate. While lobbyists and interest 
groups can also provide valuable technical information, other institutions have 
also arisen to address the increasingly complex programmatic uncertainty in law-
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making, including executive agencies, think tanks, and congressional agencies 
like the Congressional Budget Office (Peterson 1995).
 The president, by contrast, has a much greater arsenal of technical policy 
expertise at his disposal. The legislative clearance process, as it has developed, 
has put him in control of much of the policy expertise emanating from the federal 
bureaucracy.2 These resources put the president in a position to have tremendous 
influence on law making on technical issues. In this chapter I examine how the 
president can use that informational advantage to shape both what issues are con-
sidered by Congress and the policies enacted on those issues.
The Development of the Legislative Clearance Process
In 1921 under President Warren G. Harding, Congress created the Bureau of the 
Budget and required the president to submit an annual budget for the federal 
government. Agencies would no longer send their budget requests directly to 
Congress but would have to have them cleared through the newly created bureau 
(Neustadt 1954).
 Six months after signing the Budget and Accounting Act, the new Budget 
Director Charles G. Dawes introduced Budget Circular 49 in response to a request 
by the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee that the Budget Bureau 
review legislation that diverted appropriated funds to other purposes. The budget 
circular, which was cleared by the House Appropriations Committee, required 
that all proposed legislation that would affect the public treasury would be cleared 
through the Budget Bureau. While the circular allows the bureau to withhold draft 
legislation that conflicts with the president’s fiscal goals, it does not forbid agen-
cies from responding to requests for executive comment on legislation.3 Instead, 
such agency comments were to “include a statement of the advice received from 
the Budget Bureau” (Neustadt 1954). Dawes and the Harding administration, 
however, met resistance to Circular 49, and it was not implemented until the 
Coolidge administration. Under Calvin Coolidge the clearance process was used 
only on bills that required appropriations, and the Budget Bureau commented only 
on the fiscal matters in the legislation, not on the policy.
 Hoover exempted private bills from legislative clearance, and he exempted 
negative comments on public bills from the necessity of including the Budget 
Bureau’s advice (Neustadt 1954). Private bills, such as bills granting permanent 
residency to an individual, typically have only a small fiscal or public policy 
component and are thus of little interest to the Budget Bureau. They are, how-
ever, a very important means of constituency service to members of Congress. 
The president saw no need to attach advice to negative comments produced by 
agencies because the role of the clearance process at this point was economy. 
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If that economy was established by the agency acting alone, by recommending 
against spending entailed in a bill, then the bureau did not have to oversee that 
agency’s actions.
 In 1935, FDR issued Circular 336, which established clearance of non-appro-
priations legislation through the president’s Emergency Council as well as appro-
priations legislation through the Budget Bureau, because he had been “quite 
horrified—not once but half a dozen times—by reading in the paper that some 
department or agency was after this, that, or the other without my knowledge” 
(quoted in Neustadt 1954). Agency bills, comments, and even oral testimony 
before congressional committees were to include a statement indicating whether 
it was “in accord with the president’s program.”
 FDR distinguished three types of administration bills he sought to identify: 
(1) legislation the administration sees as mandatory; (2) legislation that the 
administration has no objections to; and (3) legislation that the administration 
opposes. Thus, he identifies the distinction between legislative programming, 
the first type; legislative clearance, the second type; and the enrolled bill process, 
which determines whether the president should sign bills passed by both cham-
bers (Neustadt 1954). By 1937, a new Budget Circular 344 placed all clearance 
functions in the Budget Bureau (later renamed Office of Management and Bud-
get), where they remain today.
 Part of Roosevelt’s purpose was to separate the landmark legislation from 
the more routine requests developed in due course by executive agencies. How-
ever, if routine legislation is understood as the drafting of amendments to make 
corrections to current laws, this activity would grow in importance as the size, 
scope, and number of legislative enactments increased, so that today the “nation-
al government has an agenda that is continuous because much of it is generated 
from existing programs” (C. Jones 1994, 164). In FDR’s presidency such routine 
legislation would indeed seem insignificant compared to the new programs intro-
duced as a part of the New Deal. By the post-reform Congress, however, techni-
cal amendments to comprehensive environmental legislation, like the Clean Air 
Act and the Clean Water Act, could by themselves constitute major legislation.
 Despite the use of task forces and vastly differing legislative temperaments of 
presidents since Harry Truman, Gilmour (1971) reports that the legislative clear-
ance process remained largely unchanged until Richard Nixon. During Nixon’s 
administration, the Bureau of the Budget was brought under tighter presidential 
control and renamed the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The OMB 
is still charged with carrying out the clearance and programming functions under 
Circular A-19. In addition, Nixon’s Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970 estab-
lished the Domestic Council, an inner White House organization that routinely 
identified items in the legislative clearance process of special importance in order 
to make them a part of the president’s program. Nixon also further politicized the 
OMB by adding four political appointees at the associate director level so that 
Larocca_final.indb   50 8/8/2006   12:48:14 PM
Chapter 4: Draft Bills and the Legislative Clearance Process
51
the review of legislation came more directly under the political appointees rather 
than the career bureaucrats (Spitzer 1993).
 Since Nixon, there have been repeated attempts to centralize the legislative 
clearance process by reorganizing and creating new offices within the White 
House, but it is the congressional and presidential environments in which these 
processes operate that have changed more dramatically (Rudalevige 2002). These 
changes included the decentralization of Congress after organizational reforms 
in the 1970s, the rapid growth in the use of party primaries in the selection of 
presidential candidates after the 1968 Democratic convention and subsequent 
McGovern-Fraser Commission reforms, and the rise of budgetary politics with 
the growth of deficit spending in the 1980s. In this environment I will examine, 
in part II of this book, the president’s influence on the congressional agenda aris-
ing from both his legislative programming and clearance functions.
An Informational Model of Legislative Clearance
Executive proposals that are approved through the legislative clearance process 
are sent on to Congress as draft legislation. These proposals incorporate the 
specialized information acquired by the agency or department about the likely 
policy consequences of legislative action on the issue. For example, Reagan’s 
natural gas deregulation plan included both a plan to deny pipelines the power to 
pass through price increases that rose faster than the rate of inflation and a plan 
to allow pipelines to break old contracts with gas producers that included unfair 
“take or pay” provisions that forced them to pay for most of the gas ordered 
even if it was not needed by the time it was delivered. However, because Con-
gress realizes that the president’s policy goals are often different from its own, it 
observes that the draft legislation will also be biased in the direction of the presi-
dent’s or executive agency’s preferred policy ends. For example, many members 
of Congress may have believed that the president was committed to deregulation 
even if it would lead to higher natural gas prices. If the president and Congress 
have identical policy goals, Congress can trust the president’s draft legislation 
to perfectly reveal the president’s private information about the consequences of 
the bill. With divergent policy preferences, Congress will not know how much 
of the bill is informative about the likely policy consequences of the legislation 
and how much is biased by the president’s preferences. Because of this, and the 
fact that the president cannot easily leverage voters on these less visible and more 
complex issues, Congress will not always fully trust the administration bill as a 
reliable means of achieving Congress’s own policy goals.
 Despite its potential bias, the president’s draft legislation may serve an infor-
mative role. Congress has limited resources and time and cannot explore the 
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consequences of all possible pieces of legislation.4 In choosing agenda items, 
Congress must estimate both the policy preferences of its constituents on an 
issue, i.e., political uncertainty, and the likely policy consequences of enacting a 
bill, i.e., programmatic uncertainty. The president’s drafts can be informative of 
the likely policy consequences of legislation on an issue because draft legislation 
incorporates the expertise of the executive agencies.
 I build on the “cheap-talk” communication model of Crawford and Sobel 
(1982), who model costless communication between two parties with different 
interests.5 In one of the first applications of the Crawford and Sobel model to 
political science, Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) argued that congressional com-
mittees gained more information about the policy effects of different proposals 
by acquiring expertise in areas where they specialize and then using this exper-
tise in crafting legislative proposals for the floor. In their model, the floor, i.e., 
the entire House, benefits from this policy expertise by deferring to the commit-
tee’s proposal rather than re-crafting it to serve the less informed interests of the 
broader chamber. Gilligan and Krehbiel proposed that restrictive rules govern-
ing debate and amendment served to facilitate this deference to more informed 
committee proposals. In a similar way, I argue, through the legislative clearance 
process, the president’s administration coordinates the wide-ranging expertise 
of the executive bureaucracy, and this gives it an informational advantage over 
Congress when legislating on complex and technical issues. As in the Gilligan 
and Krehbiel committee model, this informational advantage can be used to 
bring policy closer to the president’s ideal on a given issue, but I focus instead 
on how the president uses this informational advantage to determine what issues 
are considered by Congress.
 I examine the agenda-setting influence that the president wields through 
bureaucratic expertise with the simple two-dimensional model of the policy-
making process developed in chapter 2. The two issues under consideration are 
the issue considered most important by Congress and the issue considered most 
important by the president. As an example, I assume that Congress is concerned 
above all with the air pollution and that the president is concerned above all 
with the deregulation of natural gas. It is worth reiterating that because of its 
time and resource constraints, I assume that Congress cannot legislate on both 
issues. Although this is an unrealistic abstraction, it serves merely to focus the 
model on the fact that Congress cannot work on all possible issues at once. It is 
the fact that something has to be left off of the agenda that is the critical part of 
the assumption. Without such a restriction in the number of actions, there is no 
agenda-setting problem because Congress can act on all issues that require atten-
tion.6 I assume under this agenda constraint that Congress would therefore prefer 
to legislate on air pollution, but the president may try to persuade it that natural 
gas deregulation is a more pressing priority. In the model in this chapter I will 
also set aside the president’s ability to raise the public salience of issues in order 
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to isolate instead his ability to provide expertise to Congress that alters its agen-
da. In practice, however, the president may employ both techniques of agenda 
setting on the same issue. I present a formal model to explain whether and how 
the clearance process gives the president agenda-setting power, and then I use the 
model to generate predictions about when and where this agenda influence will 
be effective.
 As explained in chapter 2, I define an agenda-setting problem as a choice of 
which issue to legislate on rather than a choice of the exact policy on a given 
issue. Concern for the exact policies chosen on each issue will, however, shape 
which issue is chosen, because both the president and Congress will want to 
work on the issue where they can bring the status quo further towards their ideal 
policy.
 In the formal model of legislative clearance, two actors, Congress and the 
president, play a “signaling” game in which the president tries to influence the 
issue and policy chosen by Congress by providing signals that inform Congress 
of the unforeseen consequences of legislation. The president observes private 
information about the possible policy consequences of action on an issue by 
reviewing executive draft legislation and then he may try to signal this informa-
tion to Congress in a way that encourages Congress to choose to act on an issue 
preferred by the president. Any policy chosen by Congress is also subject to a 
presidential veto. Whenever the president is able to persuade Congress to work 
on an issue that it would not have considered in the absence of the president’s 
signal, the president is said to exercise nontrivial agenda-setting influence over 
Congress. In cases of trivial agenda setting, the president’s message indicates the 
issue that would have been chosen by Congress even without presidential agenda 
setting.
 Modeling agenda setting requires measuring Congress’s choice of issue 
dimension as well as its choice of a particular bill within each issue dimension. 
The agenda choice faced by Congress can be understood as a choice between the 
issue it ex ante prefers and any other issue on which the president would rather 
have Congress take action. Congress’s ex ante preferences are those it holds 
before it observes any private information that the president may communicate 
to Congress in the legislative clearance process. Congress will ex ante prefer the 
issue on which its ideal policy gives it the most expected utility given its initial 
beliefs about policy consequences on both issues.
 I assume that any given issue that Congress may consider entails some pro-
grammatic uncertainty, i.e., either uncertainty about the conditions necessitating 
policy change or uncertainty about effects of implementing any policy on the 
issue. The programmatic uncertainty on each issue i is represented as the prob-
ability that a positive shift, ωi = ϖi occurs in the ideal policy of each actor. Ini-
tially, on each issue i, the president observes two equally likely ideal policies, 
pi and pi + ϖi, but he does not know which one applies on each issue because 
Larocca_final.indb   53 8/8/2006   12:48:15 PM
Part I: The Theoretical Problem
54
of uncertainty about the value of ωi. Similarly, Congress has two equally likely 
ideal policies, ci and ci + ϖi, but it does not know which one applies on each 
issue. In the model, the president is able to gain information about whether the 
policy shift, ω2 = ϖ2, occurs on issue 2 because he obtains draft legislation and 
other reports created by the Department of Energy or another federal agency. In 
figure 4.1, I further assume that the president and Congress are equally uncertain 
on both of the issues under consideration, air pollution and natural gas regula-
tion. This equal uncertainty is represented by the fact that both the president and 
Congress have a pair of equidistant ideal policies for each issue, representing a 
similar range of uncertainty spanned by the light and dark grey bands, respec-
tively. Later I will relax the assumption that there is equal uncertainty on both 
issues in order to analyze what happens to the president’s agenda-setting influ-
ence when there is more uncertainty on one issue than the other. The president’s 
potential agenda-setting influence arises here because Congress does not observe 
information about the policy shift on issue 2 and yet this policy shift affects 
Congress’s ideal point in exactly the same way that it affects the president’s. It is 
only because the president and Congress share a common interest in understand-
ing the policy shift, ω2, that communication of policy information is possible 
between them. As will become clearer later, if policy shifts affect the president 
and Congress unequally, less information can be conveyed, all else being equal. 
And if the policy shift affects the president and Congress in opposite ways, no 
communication would be possible.7
 Agenda setting occurs when the president is able to communicate to Con-
gress that a policy shift occurs on issue 2, and this persuades Congress to work 
on issue 2 where it can deliver its ideal policy rather than on issue 1 where it is 
still uncertain of its ideal policy. This simple communication problem, however, 
becomes enormously complicated because the president may prefer that Con-
FIGURE 4.1  Configuration of ideal points on two issues in legislative clearance game
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gress work on policy 2 even when there is not a policy shift on that issue. This 
means that the president will sometimes have an incentive to lie about whether 
the policy shift has occurred on issue 2. In game-theoretic modeling, however, 
actors try to anticipate the behaviors of other actors. In this case, Congress can 
anticipate conditions when the president has an incentive to lie about the policy 
shift on issue 2, and it will not believe the president under these conditions. This 
strategic anticipation on Congress’s part thus puts limits on the conditions under 
which communication, and thus agenda setting, is possible. Next I explore those 
conditions informally, and they are treated formally in Appendix B.
 Because of the possibility of policy shifts affecting the implementation of 
policy on either issue, neither the president nor Congress knows their exact ideal 
policy initially. I assume that the president and Congress share common knowl-
edge about the high and low values of this uncertain knowledge, indicated by 
shaded bands in figure 4.1, and that both possible values within that range are 
equally likely. Thus, instead of a unique ideal policy, the president and Congress 
each observe two possibilities on each issue: a “low” policy and a “high” policy. 
Before he observes whether a policy shift has occurred on either issue, the presi-
dent has a preference for dealing with issue 2, natural gas regulation, where his 
ideal policy is on average further from the status quo. This can be seen in figure 
4.1, where the Congress’s ideal policies fall further away from the status quo on 
the air pollution issue, and the president’s preferences fall further from the status 
quo on the natural gas issue.
 I next assume that the president is able to use the expertise of the federal 
bureaucracy to reduce his uncertainty about the effects of any policy enacted on 
issue 2. I model the president’s acquisition of this private knowledge about the 
policy shift on issue 2 by assuming that he observes the value of ω2 at the begin-
ning of the game. Congressional committee staffs may have conducted their own 
analysis of rising natural gas prices, but they are usually outmatched in technical 
resources by the executive agencies that are channeled through the legislative 
clearance process. Lobbyists and policy experts also provide information to Con-
gress, but such information can also only be credibly conveyed when lobbyists 
and members of Congress share similar policy preferences. This further suggests 
that the president may not find all bureaucratic expertise equally credible, but I 
assume that internal policy differences in the executive branch are less dispa-
rate than those between the executive and legislature because of the president’s 
appointment and management functions within the executive branch.
 Suppose, for instance, that there is uncertainty about why natural gas prices 
are rising in spite of deregulation and abundant supplies. If Department of Energy 
analysts discover that many natural gas producers are shifting from production of 
regulated “old gas” to exploring for “new gas” that can be sold at higher prices 
because of Carter’s deregulation laws, this may imply a need for a policy shift 
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towards more deregulation. Because of its control over the clearance process, the 
White House can then decide whether or not to forward such draft legislation to 
Congress.
 The president is able to influence Congress’s choice of issue with his policy 
expertise because the uncertain element, ω2, on issue 2 influences the ideal poli-
cies of the president and the Congress in the same way. When ω2 calls for a high 
policy from the president, it also calls for a high policy from Congress. Both 
therefore confront a higher urgency for dealing with issue 2 when ω2 is high, i.e., 
when there has been a larger than expected amount of “old gas” producers who 
have switched to exploring for new gas. Presidential agenda setting can occur 
when the president is able to convey this information to Congress and persuade 
Congress to legislate on issue 2 rather than on issue 1. But as I noted earlier, a 
difficulty arises because if Congress believes whatever the president says, then 
the president has an incentive to sometimes indicate issue 2 is a priority even 
when Congress would do better to work on issue 1.
Equilibrium Predictions of the Legislative Clearance Model
In general, there are often many equilibria in cheap-talk games. For instance, a 
“babbling” equilibrium always exists where the president always sends the same 
message regardless of ω2, which is therefore completely uninformative, and 
Congress chooses an issue and bill based on its unchanged prior belief E(ω2) = 
ϖ2 /2. In such a babbling equilibrium, no information is conveyed from the presi-
dent to Congress, and he exercises no nontrivial agenda influence.
 More important for agenda setting is a two-partition equilibrium in which 
the president sends two different messages depending on the state of ω2. In non-
trivial agenda setting, each message can be understood as signaling which issue 
and bill Congress should choose. When the preferences of the president and 
Congress are close enough relative to the amount of uncertainty on issues 1 and 
2, an equilibrium exists that satisfies both the conditions for a Perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium, which is defined in Appendix B, and the conditions for nontrivial 
agenda setting. Thus, the president is sometimes able to influence the congres-
sional agenda because of the transmission of private information he holds regard-
ing the consequences of different courses of legislative action. The strategies and 
beliefs listed in table 4.1 constitute a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the legisla-
tive clearance game for preferences close enough, i.e., when the following four 
conditions hold:
President’s low-message incentive constraint (ICL): ϖ2 < p2  + (½)[4(p2)2 + 4(c1)2 
− ϖ1 2]½
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President’s high-message incentive constraint (ICH): ϖ2 < − p2 + (½)[4(p2)
2 − 
4(c1)2 − ϖ1 2]½
Congress’s participation constraint (PC): ϖ2 > (½) (2c1 + ϖ1)
President’s veto constraint (v): ϖ1 > 2c1
In equilibrium the president’s message is sometimes able to persuade Congress 
to work on issue 2, b = {c1 + ϖ1/2, 0}, the president’s preferred issue, if ϖ2 is 
relatively high, i.e., where the constraints ICH and PC are satisfied. This occurs 
because both the president and Congress suffer greater disutility from ignoring 
issue 2 when ω2  = ϖ2 and is high. In this equilibrium the president is able to 
reveal his private information so that Congress’s beliefs μ are determined by the 
message m sent by the president. In a two-partition equilibrium, then, the pres-
ident’s signals serve only to indicate whether ω2 = ϖ2, in which case Congress 
prefers to take action on issue 2, or ω2 = 0, in which case Congress prefers act-
ing on issue 1. In the next section I examine more carefully the conditions under 
which such agenda setting can occur.
Presidential Agenda Influence through Legislative Clearance
In figure 4.2, the size of the possible policy shift on each issue is held fixed at 
the same level, ϖ1 = ϖ2  = 1, and I examine how the president’s agenda-setting 
TABLE 4.1: Agenda-setting equilibrium messages, beliefs, and policies
State of the World
Ω = (ω1, ω2)
President’s Equilib-
rium Messages
m*(ω2)
Congress’s Equilib-
rium Beliefs
μ*(m)
Congress’s Equilib-
rium Policies
b*(m|μ*(m))
(0, 0)
m = 0 μ(0) = 0 b = {c1 + 1ω /2, 0}
(ϖ1 = 0 )
(0, ϖ2)
m = ω2 μ(ω2) = ω2 b = {0, ω2}
( ϖ1 = ϖ2 )
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influence depends on the similarity of the president’s and Congress’s ex ante 
ideal policies. Presidential agenda setting is possible when ideal policies of the 
president and Congress are not identical, but as their preferences diverge the pos-
sibility of agenda setting diminishes. In figure 4.3, the incentive constraint, ICL, 
is one boundary above which agenda setting breaks down. Holding ϖ1 = ϖ2  = 1, 
when p2 is above the incentive constraint, ICL, the president prefers to lie and 
send the message m = ω2 even when ω2 = 0. Congress’s participation constraint, 
PC, indicates the boundary to the right of which Congress will work only on 
issue 1. Holding ϖ1 = ϖ2  = 1, when c1 is greater than ϖ1 /2, then Congress will 
always work on issue 1 because issue 2 never offers greater expected utility.
 The question naturally arises whether the president can gain additional influ-
ence over the agenda if he is able to acquire private information on issue 1 as 
well. Surprisingly, when the president is informed on both issues, the range of 
conditions under which he can reveal full information about the policy shift on 
issue 2 is reduced. This occurs because a new incentive arises, when the presi-
dent has private information on both issues, to sometimes divert Congress to 
issue 2 by falsely signaling that there is no policy shift on issue 1. Congress, 
aware of the president’s incentive to divert, will trust the messages of the presi-
dent in fewer conditions than is the case when he is informed only on issue 2. 
This incentive to divert is explored formally in Larocca (2004).
FIGURE 4.2 Conditions on c1 and p2 for existence of separating equilibrium
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 In figure 4.3, I fix the president’s and Congress’s ideal policies in order 
to explore how changing the size of the policy shift on each issue influences 
presidential agenda setting. Here a different picture emerges. Because of the 
assumptions of the model, this can roughly be interpreted as varying the amount 
of uncertainty on each issue, while holding the policy preferences constant. The 
size of the policy shift on issue 2 is more important in determining whether 
agenda setting occurs. Agenda setting is possible for all positive values of, but 
only for ϖ2  > 2c1. When ϖ2  falls below the incentive constraint, ICH, com-
munication breaks down because the president prefers to send message m = 0, 
even when ω2  = ϖ2, in order to get Congress to deliver policy change on issue 
1. Although I do not portray the role of the veto in figure 4.3, it would play an 
active role in agenda-setting equilibria for ϖ1  > 2c1, because the president will 
veto Congress’s ideal policy on issue 1 under these conditions. When ω2 falls 
below the participation constraint, PC, then Congress prefers to legislate on issue 
1 regardless of the occurrence of any size policy shift on issue 2.
 Together, the agenda-setting equilibrium conditions displayed in figures 4.2 
and 4.3 reveal the conditions under which the president influences the congres-
sional agenda through legislative clearance, i.e., when he has more policy exper-
tise than Congress. The main results are that the president can exercise such 
influence only when either his policy preferences are quite similar to Congress’s, 
as shown in figure 4.2, or when he has a large informational advantage over Con-
gress on issue 2, as shown in figure 4.3.
 The role of the president’s informational advantage displayed in figure 4.2 
also allows speculation about where in the congressional process the president’s 
FIGURE 4.3 Conditions on ϖ1 and ϖ2  for existence of separating equilibrium when 
c1 = p2 = ¼
ϖ1
ϖ
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draft legislation is likely to have the largest effect on the agenda. Since the pres-
ident’s draft legislation can influence the agenda mainly by providing expertise 
that reduces programmatic uncertainty on an issue, it is likely to be most effec-
tive at stages where expertise plays a more prominent role than political concerns 
and other considerations. As I will argue in chapter 5, more detailed consider-
ation of bills is given in subcommittee and full committee hearings and mark-
ups than on the floor. After bills are considered in subcommittee or committee, 
Congress is likely to have acquired more information about the issue from these 
committee activities. Committee consideration is therefore likely to put Congress 
on a more level playing field with the executive in terms of expertise on the 
issue. The president’s greatest informational advantage therefore is for issues that 
have not yet been considered in committee stages. Therefore, I expect expertise 
to play a more prominent role in prompting consideration at these earlier stages, 
and it is here that I expect draft legislation to have its strongest impact. Thus, the 
submission of draft legislation on an issue should exert a direct positive influence 
on whether that issue is considered in committee or subcommittee but less direct 
influence on floor consideration of the issue.
 It is also useful to consider how the president’s agenda-setting influence var-
ies throughout his term or throughout the congressional calendar. It should be 
noted that the expertise of the federal bureaucracy does not necessarily diminish 
with usage in the way the president’s political capital is often said to (e.g., C. 
Jones 1994; Light 1991). As a result, there should be no necessary decline in the 
effectiveness of this agenda-setting power throughout the president’s term. Thus, 
the model of legislative clearance yields four predictions about the president’s 
agenda-setting influence: (1) legislative clearance only influences the agenda if 
the president and Congress are not far apart, e.g., noncontroversial issues; or (2) 
if the president has a large advantage in policy expertise, i.e., complex or techni-
cal issues; (3) this agenda influence is strongest at the committee and subcom-
mittee stages of the legislative process; and (4) this agenda influence is relatively 
constant throughout the president’s term. In the next chapter I argue for the test-
ing of these predictions of the president’s influence on issue-level data rather 
than the more traditional bill-level data on the legislative process.
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In his first address before a joint session of Congress and in a special address in 
the fall of 1993, President Bill Clinton called for “bold steps to reform our health 
care system.” In the wake of Clinton’s speeches, health care reform dominated 
the schedules of House legislators more than any single policy issue Congress 
had faced in more than a decade. In addition to numerous public hearings, there 
were less visible committee markups (in Education and Labor and Ways and 
Means in the House1) and behind-the-scenes bill writing by party and committee 
leaders. Twenty health care reform bills were introduced in Congress between 
the time Clinton first called for health care reform and when his bill, H.R. 3600, 
was introduced (Rovner 1995). In the 103rd Congress, alternative health care 
reform proposals from Representatives Jim McDermott (H.R. 1200) and Jim 
Cooper (H.R. 3200) acquired many sponsors and also received hearings. In spite 
of all of this activity, however, the House leadership failed to bring any version 
of health care reform to a floor vote.
 The fate of Clinton’s health care reform highlights two questions that I will 
address in this chapter. First, to examine only the fate of the bills submitted by 
the president is to miss the president’s potential influence in cases where his draft 
legislation is dropped in favor of one or more alternative bills. For example, if 
we merely studied the fate of Clinton’s H.R. 3600, we would overlook the fact 
that his focus on the issue of health care reform provoked multiple alternative 
health care reform bills and that some of these received agenda consideration 
also. In this chapter, I turn to an examination of how the congressional agenda 
is influenced by the issues raised by the president’s proposals, rather than just 
examining whether the president’s bills receive agenda consideration. This will 
61
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allow me to more accurately assess the president’s overall influence on the con-
gressional agenda because even if the president’s proposal is declared “dead on 
arrival,” it may bring to life other more passable bills that have been initiated by 
others. Many observers have noted that this might have indeed occurred during 
the Clinton health reform effort had Clinton not threatened to veto any bill that 
did not provide “universal coverage” (CQ Almanac 1994; Johnson and Broder 
1996; Rovner 1995; Schick 1995). Issue-level analysis of presidential agenda 
setting, however, will require developing a new way of measuring what issues 
are on the congressional agenda and in presidential proposals. In the first part of 
this chapter, I develop a new framework for analyzing such issues.
 The second question, which arises out of the example of Clinton’s health care 
reform agenda, is how to assess the president’s influence on agenda actions that 
occur before a bill reaches a floor vote. In the case of health care reform, if we 
were to examine merely floor votes it would seem that Clinton’s health care pro-
posal had no influence on the congressional agenda during the 103rd Congress. 
This is misleading because Clinton’s health care reform actually dominated 
every stage of the congressional agenda except the floor. Even when committee-
level agenda setting is fruitless in the sense that it fails to produce enacted laws, 
it is still important because it crowds out the consideration of other potentially 
important issues. In this chapter, I explore committee and floor agenda setting 
in the House in order to determine which stages are most crucial for presidential 
influence on the agenda.
 I begin by explaining how the “units of analysis” previous researchers have 
used to identify items on the congressional agenda are sometimes misleading, 
and I then explore the problems and advantages of conducting agenda analysis at 
the issue level. Next, I identify the most important stages in the House committee 
and floor agenda process using both bill-level and issue-level analysis, and show 
how the proposed issue-level analysis leads to a more accurate understanding of 
the president’s influence on the congressional agenda process than the traditional 
bill-level analysis. I end the chapter by analyzing the relationship between the 
House and Senate agendas at both the bill and issue level.
An Agenda of Bills or Issues?
Previous studies of presidential agenda setting have analyzed the president’s influ-
ence on enactments (Chamberlain 1946; Moe and Teel 1970; Goldsmith 1983; C. 
Jones 1994), proposals (Peterson 1990; Light 1991), bills (Edwards, Barrett, and 
Peake 1997; Taylor 1998; Edwards and Barrett 2000; Theriault 2002), hearings 
(Edwards and Wood 1998; Flemming, Wood, and Bohte 1999) and budget requests 
(Canes-Wrone 2001; Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts 2001). Aside from Light 
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(1991) and Peterson (1990), none of these studies has been conducted as the level 
of analysis that I argue is most appropriate for studying agenda setting: policy 
issues. Issues provide a more suitable unit of analysis for examining agenda set-
ting than bills because several bills cover the same issue and are substitute solu-
tions for the same problem. A hearing on a single policy issue may involve half 
a dozen bills. And many bills are laid on the table at some stage of the legislative 
process in favor of a substitute on the same issue that advances further on the 
agenda. In this case, the issue advances on the agenda, but it is not apparent from 
looking at the original bill. Furthermore, many bills cover a multitude of issues, 
some of which may advance further and others that may stall.
 Although Light and Peterson study the presidential agenda at the level of 
issues (proposals), they look only at presidentially initiated proposals. They do 
not directly address the question of how congressional issues are affected by 
presidential agenda setting because they do not compare presidentially initated 
proposals to congressionally initiated proposals. Neither study therefore tests 
whether the president has a significant independent influence on the congressio-
nal agenda.
 Using time-series data, Edwards and Wood (1998) and Flemming, Wood, 
and Bohte (1999) analyze the influence of presidential speeches on congressio-
nal hearings over time and find more conflicting results. However, these studies 
are incomplete in the sense that they do not take into account the numerous bills 
and issues on the legislative agenda that never receive a hearing. As I will show, 
many important legislative issues advance on the legislative agenda without 
receiving hearings. To the degree that such issues are systematically (uniformly) 
different from the set of issues that receives hearings, the president’s influence on 
hearings may yield a biased estimate of the president’s influence on the overall 
agenda. To mitigate this bias in the analysis of chapters 6 and 7, I measure the 
president’s influence on hearings while simultaneously assessing (controlling 
for) his influence on other stages of the agenda process. Thus, while hearings 
cannot be ignored they can at best tell only part of the story of the president’s 
influence on the agenda.
 Rather than studying the president’s influence on policy initiatives, Canes-
Wrone (2001; Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts 2001) analyzes the president’s 
ability to influence the budget allocations of agencies and programs and finds 
that the president can influence appropriations by making specific appeals in his 
public speeches. Because of the centrality of the budget process in congressional 
lawmaking,2 this level of analysis is very important, but it departs from the con-
ventional concern of the presidential agenda-setting literature, i.e., determining 
whether and how the president can determine the policy issues for new legisla-
tion. My focus lies in this more traditional concern of the presidential agenda-
setting literature, and therefore I consider the president’s impact on policy issues 
rather than bills, hearings, or budget allocations.
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 Bills (including enacted bills) have been by far the most common unit of 
analysis in studies of agenda setting. Though bills are convenient units of analy-
sis—they are both easily recognizable and traceable through the legislative 
process—they can also be misleading indicators of the agenda. As the Clinton 
health care example demonstrates, many bills are alternative solutions for the 
same problem and therefore cover the same or similar issues. In order to accu-
rately assess the impact of presidential initiatives, bills that cover roughly the 
same policy issue must be identified. If this is possible, it is a simple matter 
then to assess whether the agenda consideration of a bill is affected by its cover-
ing the same issue as a presidential initiative. If the president calls for national 
health care reform, as Clinton did in the 103rd Congress, but not improved drug 
enforcement, then one would expect to see increased congressional consideration 
of bills that cover health care reform but not necessarily of bills that cover drug 
enforcement, all else being equal. But consider the following scenario: (1) The 
president introduces a policy initiative on national health care reform; and (2) 
members of Congress deduce that national health care reform will be salient to 
voters and therefore introduce many alternatives to the president’s plan, seek-
TABLE 5.1 Ratio of scope (number of bills) of presidential issues to scope of non-presidential 
issues, for both the State of the Union (SOTU) and presidential draft (draft) legislation
Issues in State of the Union (SOTU) Address Issues in Presidential Draft Legislation
Congress
Average Number 
of Bills
on Non-SOTU 
Issues
Average Num-
ber of Bills on 
SOTU Issues
Ratio of  
SOTU to Non-
SOTU Bills
Average Num-
ber of Bills 
on Non-Draft 
Issues
Average Num-
ber of Bills on 
Draft Issues
Ratio of Draft 
to Non-Draft 
Bills
96 4.91 11.02 2.24 3.79 5.24 1.38
97 3.56 15.38 4.32 3.43 5.24 1.53
98 4.12 7.24 1.76 3.54 15.09 4.27
99 4.44 15.18 3.42 3.95 16.72 4.24
100 5.45 6.85 1.26 4.23 21.31 5.03
101 5.09 22.07 4.34 4.21 24.25 5.76
102 6.68 19.42 2.91 4.07 21.60 5.31
103 8.34 23.65 2.84 5.18 22.78 4.40
104 9.91 26.27 2.65 3.96 29.23 7.39
105 9.33 15.73 1.69 5.35 41.63 7.79
106 11.28 16.15 1.43 6.25 61.51 9.85
107 10.57 20.00 1.89 5.24 38.53 7.36
Average 6.97 16.58 2.56 4.43 25.26 5.36
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ing to gain credit for introducing a salient issue and perhaps even for sponsor-
ing enacted legislation. As a result, there would be more bills on average—all 
else being equal—on the president’s issues than on issues not initiated by the 
president. As I showed in the beginning of this chapter, this is exactly what hap-
pened on health care reform in the 103rd Congress. As long as the analysis is 
conducted at the bill level, this influx of alternative proposals may either exag-
gerate or underestimate the influence the president has on the agenda, depending 
on the stage of the agenda process one considers. To examine this problem, in 
table 5.1, I list the number of bills and issues covered by the president’s State of 
the Union addresses and presidential draft legislation for the 96th through 107th 
Congresses.
 Table 5.1 shows that on average there are likely to be both more bills intro-
duced on the issues mentioned in the president’s State of the Union address and 
on issues on which the president submits draft legislation. This presents at least 
two difficulties for studying the president’s influence on the agenda consider-
ation of bills: (1) An alternative bill on the same issue may be considered by 
Congress instead of the president’s proposal, making it look like the president did 
not have an influence on the agenda—even if it was the president’s influence that 
led to consideration of the alternative; and (2) it is also difficult to distinguish 
whether the president is causing an increase in the number of bills introduced on 
these issues or whether the president is choosing issues that are already salient in 
Congress. It is therefore necessary to adjust for the number of bills covered by 
an issue to avoid mistaking such spurious association for the president’s actual 
effect on the agenda consideration of an issue. To assess the president’s influ-
ence, then, one needs to identify whether any bill covering the same issue as the 
presidential initiative receives consideration, and to control for the number of 
other bills that cover the same issue.
 The analysis of issues at the bill level becomes more problematic if each bill 
can cover more than one issue, as nearly all of the bills I consider do, because 
one must then decide whether to be concerned with (1) whether any of the issues 
covered by the bill receives agenda consideration, (2) whether all of the issues 
covered by the bill receive consideration, or (3) whether some critical proportion 
of the issues covered by the bill receives consideration. It is more convenient to 
move the units of analysis from bills to issues, where one can study directly the 
president’s influence on the policy issues on the congressional agenda.
 The trade-off here is between the precise information available on the agenda 
actions on individual bills, which are poor proxies for issues, and the more dif-
ficult to define and measure information on the agenda actions on issues them-
selves. I take the second route here in order to more clearly analyze the president’s 
influence on the fate of individual issues on the congressional agenda, which I 
believe is really the implicit goal of most attempts to analyze agenda setting.
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Complications of Using Issues as the Unit of Analysis
Political scientists have developed several available indexes for coding bills into 
issue areas. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) code roll call votes into one of 99 policy 
areas. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) code congressional hearings, public laws, 
and Congressional Quarterly Almanac stories into more than 200 topics. Both of 
these coding schemes succeed in classifying votes or hearings into a single domi-
nant issue area, even though complex bills often cover many issue areas. The 
ability to identify a single issue for each bill is enormously helpful in subsequent 
statistical analysis. Issues can become a unit of analysis because the resulting 
set of issues is mutually exclusive, i.e., bills do not get assigned to two or more 
issues, and exhaustive, i.e., every bill gets assigned to an issue. A set of mutu-
ally exclusive and exhaustive issues helps eliminate the problem arising from the 
president’s inadvertent tendency to promote the introduction of many alternative 
bills, which I discussed in the previous section, because alternative bills on the 
same issue are no longer treated separately.
 But the increased parsimony from considering issues rather than bills comes 
at a cost. The use of a limited number of categories forces the grouping together 
of bills that can be strikingly different. And many bills seem to defy classifica-
tion into a single area. As an illustration of the first point, note for example that 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) do not include a separate category for abortion, 
but instead code hearings that address abortion rights under their “freedom of 
speech” topic, combining what are more naturally thought of as quite differ-
ent issues. The determination of any coding scheme cannot avoid this problem 
entirely because there is no definitive, mutually exclusive, and exhaustive set 
of issues. Yet, the set of possible issue categories identified should resonate 
with what are commonly considered issues on the congressional or presidential 
agenda. Kingdon (1995) suggests that this means identifying issues at a high 
level of precision, but this is not possible in the limited Poole and Rosenthal or 
Baumgartner and Jones taxonomies.
 Another serious problem for any issue-coding scheme is the undeniable 
multidimensional nature of many bills. For example, the economic regulation of 
airlines concerns both the airline industry and regulatory reform, two separate 
issues. When a bill is forced into a single mutually exclusive issue, the coder 
must decide on a dominant topic, a very difficult task for many complex bills. 
Because of such multidimensional classification problems, I use the Congres-
sional Research Service’s Legislative Indexing Vocabulary (CRS-LIV), which 
codes each bill into multiple topics in addition to using more detailed issue cod-
ing than either Poole and Rosenthal (1997) or Baumgartner and Jones (1993). 
The CRS-LIV has added relevance because it is the database that is actually used 
by members of Congress and their staffs to find bills that cover a particular topic. 
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In fact, that is exactly the purpose for which the Congressional Research Service 
created its taxonomy of issues.
 The use of the CRS-LIV index as the basis for analysis presents a new set 
of problems for statistical analysis. First, the set of CRS-LIV issues changes 
continuously with the addition of new issues of the congressional agenda and 
with the refining of the database by CRS. Second, the issues in the CRS-LIV 
are not mutually exclusive and therefore overlap with some issues being more 
general than others (unlike the Poole and Rosenthal and Baumgartner and Jones 
indexes). Moreover, there is a hierarchy of issues from the very specific, like 
hospital costs, to the very general, like health care, and it is difficult to determine 
the level of generality at which the president’s influence on the agenda should be 
studied.
 Given the breadth and the multifaceted nature of legislative issues and the 
complex interrelationships among issues, a set of mutually exclusive and exhaus-
tive issues is impossible to establish. As a visual illustration of the problem, 
consider figure 5.1, which represents the CRS-LIV hierarchical coding of abor-
tion-related issues so that the height of the issue identifies its “scope,” or how 
broad the issue is. Nested issues are linked in figure 5.1 so that the broader issue 
is above the narrower issue. It is clear, however, that even side-by-side issues that 
are at the same level of the hierarchy are not identical in scope (e.g., the issue 
of “health care” is broader in scope than “counseling”). And issues at any given 
level of scope are likely to overlap, as is the case for the four abortion issues—
Abortion, Abortion Procedures, Abortion Policy, and Abortion Counseling—that 
are located at the same level of scope in figure 5.1.
FIGURE 5.1 The hierarchy and scope of CRS-LIV abortion-related issues in the 107th 
Congress
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 Rather than searching in vain for a privileged level or scope where the issues 
are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, I introduce a measure of issue scope as 
a control variable in the statistical analyses of agenda setting of chapters 6 and 
7. Control variables essentially extract the influence of potentially confounding 
effects, like issue scope. That is, I acknowledge that the president’s influence on 
the agenda consideration of an issue may depend on the scope of the issue under 
consideration, and I try to avoid the problem of having the scope confound the 
president’s influence on the agenda by explicitly measuring and extracting the 
influence of the scope of each agenda issue.3
 Considering CRS-LIV issues rather than bills as the units of analysis, how-
ever, opens up the possibility of an ecological inference problem (Achen and 
Shively 1995). An ecological inference problem is a potential bias that can occur 
when making inferences about individual-level behavior from aggregate-level 
data, when the aggregation rule is unknown. Consider the two scenarios shown 
in table 5.2. Both of the scenarios produce misleading results when one analyzes 
the president’s effect on the congressional agenda using the set of all issues with-
out controlling for issue scope. Two types of mistakes can occur: In scenario 1, 
one might not observe the president’s influence even when it exists if the presi-
dential agenda includes mostly narrow-scope issues, simply because Congress is 
more likely to act on broad-scope issues. And, in scenario 2, one might think that 
the president actually has influence if the presidential agenda is more likely to 
include broad-scope issues, and broad-scope issues are also more likely to appear 
on the congressional agenda. In other words, the president’s actual influence on 
the congressional agenda can be hidden by the president and Congress focusing 
TABLE 5.2 Misleading scenarios resulting from analysis of issues with different scopes
Scenario 1: Presidential Influence 
 Underestimated (real correlation 
 hidden)
a. At any given level of scope, presiden-
tial issues are more likely to be on 
the congressional agenda than non-
presidential issues.
b. Broad scope issues are more likely to 
be on the congressional agenda than 
narrow-scope issues. 
c. The presidential agenda includes 
more narrow-scope issues than broad-
scope issues. 
 
Scenario 2:  Presidential Influence 
 Overestimated (spurious correlation 
observed)
a. At any given level of scope, presiden-
tial issues are no more likely to be on 
the congressional agenda than non-
presidential issues. 
b. Broad scope issues are more likely to 
be on the congressional agenda than 
narrow-scope issues.
c. The presidential agenda includes 
more broad-scope issues than narrow-
scope issues. 
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on either broad or narrow issues.
 Differing issue scopes do not necessarily mean different sets of issues. A dif-
ferent issue scope might also represent the same issue seen from a different level 
of aggregation, like the difference between “Abortion” and “Abortion Policy” in 
figure 5.1. So a correlation of agendas rooted solely in the scope of the issues 
pursued by the president and Congress is indeed an ecological fallacy. Fortu-
nately, I can measure the number of bills covering each issue, and include this 
estimate of the scope of the issue as a control variable to mitigate this ecological 
fallacy.
 In figure 5.2, I show the relationship between a table of bills and a table of 
issues from the 96th Congress as they are represented in a relational database, 
and table 5.3 lists the titles of the 96th Congress bills in figure 5.2. A relational 
database contains several interrelated tables of data and links them so that com-
plex relationships between the variables in different tables can be analyzed. For 
example, my issue-level database contains separate tables that contain informa-
tion about bills, committees, members of Congress, and issues. These tables 
can be linked through “queries” in order to produce data that involve data from 
multiple tables. Because of the multidimensional nature of bills, any given bill 
might cover several different issues. For instance, H.R. 44 covers seven different 
issues:  the drug industry, consumer protection, drug advertising, labeling laws, 
FIGURE 5.2 The complexity of bills and scope of issues as represented in the relationships 
between tables of a relational database
complexity
of bill
scope
of issue 
Bill Table 
Sponsor Bill
Rosenthal H.R. 43 
Rosenthal H.R. 44 
Guyer H.R. 378 
Issue Table 
Topic
Drug advertising 
Drug industry 
Drugstores
Bill-Issue Table 
Bill Issue
H.R. 43 Drug industry 
H.R. 43 Consumer protection 
H.R. 43 Prescription pricing 
H.R. 44 Drug industry 
H.R. 44 Consumer protection 
H.R. 44 Drug advertising 
H.R. 44 Labeling laws 
H.R. 44 Pharmacists 
H.R. 44 Prescription pricing 
H.R. 44 Drugstores
H.R. 378 Drug industry 
H.R. 378 Consumer protection 
H.R. 378 Product safety 
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pharmacists, prescription pricing, and drugstores. Because bills that cover more 
issues are more likely to be more complex, I define a measure I call “complexity” 
for each bill, which is simply the number of issues covered by the bill, as coded 
by the CRS-LIV.
 Likewise, each issue might be covered by more than one bill. For instance, 
the drug industry is covered by bills H.R. 43, H.R. 44, and H.R. 378. In gen-
eral, the more bills covering an issue, the broader is the scope of the issue. For 
instance, the narrower topic of drugstores is covered by only one of these bills, 
H.R. 44. The correspondence between number of bills and scope of an issue is 
not as precise as that between the complexity of a bill and the number of issues 
it covers, because an issue might be connected to a large number of bills simply 
because the issue is salient and many members of Congress introduce alternative 
bills. Nevertheless, the number of bills per issue makes the most convenient mea-
sure of an issue’s scope that can be used for each of the Congresses I study. Both 
complexity and scope are used as control variables in later analyses of agenda 
setting in order to mitigate the variation that occurs in both the scope and degree 
of overlap in the CRS-LIV issues. In this way I hope to minimize the ecological 
inference problem that arises in trying to study issues with a hierarchical set of 
overlapping issues.
 In table 5.4, I provide a correspondence between the number of bills (in 
parentheses) and the number of issues in different stages of the legislative pro-
cess. Note that while the number of bills receiving hearings is generally higher 
than the number of bills that pass, the number of issues that receive hearings is 
almost always less than the number of issues that are passed. Much of this dis-
crepancy occurs because there are typically many substitute bills, which cover 
largely the same issues, that receive hearings together. When bills are used as a 
direct measure of issues, the occurrence of these substitutes will tend to overes-
timate the number of issues under consideration in hearings, because many bills 
TABLE 5.3 The titles of 96th Congress bills from figure 5.2
• H.R. 43: A bill to permit the advertising of drug prices and to require retailers of 
prescription drugs to post the prices of certain commonly prescribed drugs. 
• H.R. 44: A bill to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act so as to require 
that in the labeling and advertising of drugs sold by prescription the “established 
name” of such drug must appear each time their proprietary name is used, and for 
other purposes. 
• H.R. 378: A bill to expand the medical freedom of choice of consumers by amend-
ing the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to provide that drugs will be regulated 
under that Act solely to assure their safety. 
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that concern the same topic are likely to be considered in the same hearing. But 
only one of a given set of substitute bills will be passed by the House, so at the 
passage stage there is much less overlap, and a smaller number of bills covers 
a broad range of issues. This suggests a problem of interpreting the meaning of 
legislative action at early stages of the agenda process with analysis at the bill 
level. It is also surprising that more bills reach the floor than appear in markup 
sessions. This occurs because many bills find a way around committee consider-
ation, as I will discuss in the next section.
 In chapters 6 and 7, I analyze the president’s influence on policy issues cov-
ered by all bills submitted to House and Senate Commerce Committees from 
1979 to 2002. First, in the next section, I determine the most important stages in 
the legislative process for presidential agenda setting.4
TABLE 5.4 The number of CRS-LIV issues in different stages of the legislative process 
among bills referred to the House Commerce Committee (number of bills in    
parentheses)
Congress Introduction Hearing Markup Floor Pass
97 1167 415 289 380 308
(806) (111) (42) (57) (42)
98 1376 594 619 654 589
(812) (179) (110) (82) (62)
99 1898 551 580 1011 936
(871) (124) (68) (92) (61)
100 2471 1138 1090 1547 1474
(939) (150) (91) (126) (104)
101 2254 822 668 1010 946
(1030) (139) (69) (98) (81)
102 2616 1034 1008 1356 1215
(1046) (95) (67) (90) (65)
103 2872 1060 866 1737 1501
(851) (62) (49) (76) (57)
104 3264 1284 885 1559 1431
(799) (71) (64) (95) (70)
105 2887 1014 821 1323 981
(850) (54) (44) (81) (59)
106 3198 1096 991 1552 1215
(1118) (76) (50) (100) (67)
 Sources: House Commerce Committee Calendars, 1981–99, and THOMAS legislative information system, Library of 
Congress.
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Critical Stages of the House Agenda Process
My analysis of the critical stages of the House agenda process derives from the 
formal legislative process for bills. Though the study of presidential agenda 
setting ultimately demands analysis of issues rather than bills, the fact remains 
that issues are conveyed through most stages of the legislative process by bills 
and amendments. In the House, issues that have not been introduced by a bill 
can only be discussed in hearings and in debate, but not included in markup or 
amendment, because of the House’s prohibition against nongermane amend-
ments. In every stage of the House legislative process where the text of a bill 
can be changed, the nongermane amendment rule applies.5 Therefore, the formal 
rules and stages that affect the movement of bills through the legislative process 
also govern the movement of issues as well. The framework for the analysis that 
follows, then, will look familiar, since it derives from the traditional legislative 
process for bills. First, I provide a detailed analysis of how bills pass through that 
process and then compare it to a detailed analysis of how issues flow through 
the process. A comparison of the two further demonstrates the problems of using 
bills rather than issues to analyze the legislative agenda.
 There are three distinct institutions through which most bills pass in the 
House legislative process: (1) subcommittee; (2) full committee; and (3) the 
floor. In table 5.5, I report the number and percentage of House Commerce bills 
and issues that are processed through these stages of the House agenda. First con-
sider the pattern for bills. From the 96th through 107th Congresses less than 10% 
TABLE 5.5 Percentage of all House Commerce bills and issues in major agenda stages,
1979–2002 
Major Agenda Actions Total bills Percent of Bills Total Issues
Percent 
of Issues
Introduction 11,379 100.0 28,804 100.0
Subcommittee: Executive comment 810 7.1 11,903 41.3
Subcommittee hearing* 1,126 10.0 9,435 32.8
Subcommittee markup 696 6.1 8,592 29.8
Full Committee: Subcommittee report 625 5.5 7,942 27.6
Full committee markup 731 6.4 9,884 34.3
Floor: Full committee report 726 6.4 9,701 33.7
Committee discharged 161 1.4 5,171 18.0
Suspension of rules 494 4.3 6,090 21.1
Special Rule 152 1.3 7,233 25.1
Total floor 990 8.7 13,916 48.3
* Hearings are held in full committee as well, but these are relatively rare in House Commerce, accounting for a total of 
28 hearings from 1979–2002.
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(990 of 11,391) of bills referred to the House Commerce Committee eventually 
made it to the floor. Although it is not reported in table 5.5, nearly all bills intro-
duced in the House are referred to a committee. Except in very rare cases when 
bills are summoned directly to the floor before referral, House procedure requires 
the Speaker or Parliamentarian to refer all bills introduced in the House to the 
committee(s) with the proper jurisdiction (Deschler and Brown 1984, 16.3.1). 
Committee chairs are typically required by committee rules to refer all legisla-
tion to the subcommittee with the appropriate jurisdiction within two weeks. This 
means that almost all legislation routinely reaches the subcommittee stage.
 The subcommittees and committees are largely responsible for determining 
the bills that reach the floor agenda because getting out of committee is the big-
gest hurdle in the legislative consideration of bills. Once in the subcommittee 
stage, only a small percentage of bills (5.5%) are ever reported out. But those 
bills that are reported by subcommittees almost always go on to full committee 
markup and are reported to the House floor. A higher percentage of bills (6.9%) 
is reported from full committee than from subcommittee (5.5%) because some 
bills circumvent the subcommittee stage. In turn, most bills that are reported 
from committee are granted a floor vote of some kind.
 Consider figure 5.3, which offers a more detailed look at the agenda paths of 
bills by tracing the major paths of all House bills referred to House Commerce 
from 1979 to 2002.6 Each arrow in figure 5.3 indicates the proportion of bills that 
proceed from one stage to another by the percentage indicated next to the arrow 
and by the relative thickness of the arrow. Subcommittee, full committee, and 
floor stages of the legislative process are circumscribed by dashed boxes, and 
more advanced stages of the legislative process generally occur as bills move 
across from left to right and from top to bottom in the diagram. Since only a very 
small proportion of bills progress to stages beyond subcommittee markup without 
going through subcommittee markup, these markups are a critical stage in the 
House agenda process. By contrast, many more bills go around subcommittee 
hearings or requests for executive comment, marking them as less essential agen-
da stages. By this standard, full-committee markup also appears to be essential 
because only a small portion of bills reach the floor without first being marked up 
in full committee.7 But full committee markup is less selective than subcommittee 
markup because most bills that are reported to the full committee are scheduled 
for a full-committee markup, whereas only a small proportion of those bills that 
reach earlier subcommittee stages are scheduled for subcommittee markup.
 Figure 5.3 shows that the textbook legislative procedure is a vast simplifi-
cation of the House legislative process and that there are many routes to floor 
consideration.8 Indeed, there are even more routes than shown in figure 5.3, but 
I have excluded paths that at least 0.2% of bills did not follow in order to keep 
the figure simple enough for visual interpretation. A 1975 House Administration 
Committee report identified more than 100 different possible stages in the consid-
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eration of a bill (quoted in Oleszek 2001, 20). The most important stages in terms 
of the percentage of bills they process are: (1) request for executive comment; 
(2) subcommittee hearing; (3) subcommittee markup and report; (4) full commit-
tee markup and report; and (5) consideration under suspension of the rules or by 
unanimous consent. The first and last stages are missing from the typical textbook 
process. All textbook authors, even the otherwise meticulous Oleszek (2001),9 
ignore the first stage—requests for executive comment. Requests for executive 
comment are formal requests sent to executive agencies for their views on pend-
ing legislation. And most textbooks, though not Oleszek in this case, emphasize 
the granting of a special rule and consideration under these special rules, rather 
than suspension of the rules. However, most laws—including many on Mayhew’s 
(1991) list of significant enactments—are created from bills that are passed in the 
House under suspension of the rules because most public bills that reach a floor 
FIGURE 5.3 Paths of House bills referred to House Commerce, 1979–2002
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Introduction 
Subcommittee 
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vote pass without significant opposition. Special rules typically limit debate and 
amendments and can be used to expedite floor consideration and to prevent hostile 
debate or amendment tactics from undermining a bill. Suspension of the rules and 
unanimous consent are supermajoritarian procedures that expedite voting on non-
controversial, but not necessarily unimportant, legislation.
 Returning to table 5.5, a different pattern emerges when one considers issues 
rather than bills. Nearly 50% of the CRS-LIV issues covered by bills submitted to 
House Commerce make it to the floor, whereas less than 10% of bills make it to 
the floor. And although 38.2% of issues receive either subcommittee markup or 
hearing, a considerable percentage (10.1%) of issues arrive at the floor without 
receiving these main subcommittee actions. By contrast, a much smaller per-
centage of bills arrive on the floor without receiving either subcommittee markup 
or hearings.
FIGURE 5.4 Paths of issues covered by House bills referred to House Commerce, 1979–2002
Larocca_final.indb   77 8/8/2006   12:48:23 PM
Part II: An Empirical Study of Presidential Agenda Setting in Congresss
78
 Figure 5.4 traces issues rather than bills through House agenda stages. An 
issue is considered to have advanced from one stage to another if at least one 
bill covering the issue advances between the given stages, even if there are many 
other bills on the same issue that do not advance. In comparing figures 5.3 and 
5.4, at least four important differences are apparent: (1) There is a much greater 
percentage of issues than bills that receive attention in the textbook stages of the 
legislative process. (2) While most bills take a single path through the legislative 
process portrayed in figure 5.3, a single issue can be both reported by a commit-
tee and discharged from the same committee (although through different bills), 
and a single issue can be considered both under a special rule and by suspension 
of the rules or unanimous consent (again through different bills). (3) The set of 
issues under consideration does not narrow as dramatically as the set of bills in 
later stages of the legislative process. (4) A greater percentage of issues receive 
requests for executive comment than hearings. It is thus apparent that analysis of 
agenda influence at the issue level may yield a different, and I argue more accu-
rate, picture of the congressional agenda-setting process.
 The first difference between figure 5.3 and figure 5.4 is also the most dramat-
ic. Whereas 38.7% of House-originated issues receive either hearings or request 
for executive comment and 48.3% of House-originated issues receive floor con-
sideration, only 15.4% of all House bills receive either hearings or request for 
executive comment and only 8.7% of House bills receive floor consideration. It 
is often stated that the committees are the graveyards of most bills, or that the 
committees exercise enormous gatekeeping power, because very few bills ever 
make it out of committee. Figure 5.4 suggests that much of this graveyard effect 
may be exaggerated due to the fact that many bills are alternates that cover the 
same issues. The committees are much less restrictive when the analysis is con-
sidered at the issue level. The House Commerce Committee, at least, is not as 
restrictive in bottling up issues as one would be led to believe by looking at the 
aggregate fate of its bills.
 The above analysis suggests that three pre-floor legislative stages are particu-
larly important in the agenda process for issues: requests for executive comment, 
subcommittee hearings, and subcommittee markup. I will discuss each of these 
important agenda stages in turn.
Requests for Executive Comment
As noted earlier, requests for executive comment are formal requests sent to 
executive agencies for their views on pending legislation. Since 1934, responses 
to these requests have been channeled through the White House for administra-
tion approval before being sent to Congress. The executive comments that are 
approved by the White House and forwarded to Congress can thus indicate both 
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whether the president will support the legislation and the agency’s expert opin-
ion on the issue. Congressional committees will request such information either 
when they are seeking to obtain valuable expertise held by an executive agency 
on a given issue or when they desire to know whether the president approves of 
the policy changes proposed by a given bill.
 A committee uses both requests for executive comment and hearings to 
gather information about a bill or issue. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show that they seem 
to be used for different types of bills and issues (16.1% of all House bills receive 
a request for either executive comment or hearings whereas only 0.7% receive 
both, and 52% of issues receive a request for either executive comment or hear-
ing whereas only 13.5% receive both). This non-overlapping nature of requests 
for executive comment and hearings also holds for Senate bills considered in the 
House and for House and Senate bills considered in the Senate. It is therefore 
likely that requests for executive comment are used by committees to gather 
information for different kinds of issues than hearings are. Requests for execu-
tive comment seem to be useful where there is either congressional uncertainty 
about whether a bill is acceptable to the president or where there is congressio-
nal uncertainty about the policy effects of a bill. Hearings can also provide the 
expertise of executive agencies, but in hearings this information is often supple-
mented by the testimony of outside experts. Hearings thus allow committees to 
gather information on issues where committees do not trust the information in 
executive comments, perhaps because of the administration’s supervision of this 
process. And while hearings may also play a role in raising the publicity of an 
issue, perhaps in order to promote further legislative success, requests for execu-
tive comment offer no direct way to raise the publicity of a bill or issue.
 Thus, requests for executive comment are likely to occur on issues where 
either (1) Congress is uncertain about whether the president will veto a given bill 
or (2) the policy preferences of the committee and administration are not too far 
apart and where the executive agency has a large advantage in expertise over the 
committee.10 I argue that the latter case is most likely to occur on non-contro-
versial or technical issues. On controversial issues, e.g., where the committee’s 
and administration’s policy preferences are far apart, the agency’s executive 
comment is likely to be distrusted, and hearings may instead be used to invite 
testimony from experts whose policy preferences make them more trustworthy 
to the committee.11
Subcommittee Hearings
According to former House Parliamentarian William H. Brown, there are three 
main types of hearings: “(1) legislative hearings, which are held to consider the 
enactment of a measure into law, and which provide a forum where informa-
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tion and opinions on the measure can be presented; (2) investigative hearings, 
designed to inform the House as to activities which may call for legislation; and 
(3) oversight hearings, which are inquiries that invoke the investigative pow-
ers of the House as overseer of federal programs and operations” (Brown and 
Johnson 1996, 253). Legislative hearings play a direct role in agenda setting, but 
oversight and investigative hearings can also play a preliminary role by provid-
ing a forum for determining whether legislation is needed on a given issue. Such 
hearings necessarily lie outside of our study because they cannot be easily con-
nected with bills and issues that are later introduced as a result of these hearings. 
To the degree, then, that such investigative and oversight hearings play a role 
in setting the later legislative agenda, I underestimate the influence of hearings. 
I suspect that this influence is small compared to the direct agenda-setting role 
played by the legislative hearings that I do study.
 Many previous scholars have defined hearings as synonymous with the legis-
lative agenda (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Edwards and Wood 1999; Edwards, 
Barrett, and Peake 1997; Edwards and Barrett 2000; and Flemming, Wood, and 
Bohte 1999). The path of a large proportion of bills and issues through the House 
legislative process without hearings, which is apparent in figures 5.3 and 5.4, 
calls into question this definition of the agenda. While 28.9% of issues receive 
hearings and then proceed to further stages of the legislative process, 21.3% of 
issues proceed to further stages without hearings. This pattern is also reflected 
at the bill level, where only 4.3% of bills that receive hearings go on to further 
agenda stages, while 6.1% of bills that do not receive hearings still go on to 
further stages of the agenda. In chapter 6, I not only will explore the president’s 
influence on the issues covered in hearings but will also examine the effect that 
hearings may have on later stages of the agenda process. In my analysis, hear-
ings are shown to be an important stage in the agenda process, but not the most 
important stage in determining which issues reach the floor.
 Studies of the president’s ability to set the agenda of congressional hearings 
have found mixed results (Edwards and Wood 1999; Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 
1997; Edwards and Barrett 2000; and Flemming, Wood, and Bohte 1999). These 
studies, however, have not differentiated legislative, investigative, and oversight 
hearings. The president might have different levels of influence on each of these 
different types of hearings. As table 5.6 shows, legislative hearings make up less 
than half of the total hearings held by House Commerce in each Congress from 
1979 to 2002. It is also evident from the last column in table 5.6 that many leg-
islative hearings cover more than one bill because the average number of bills in 
a legislative hearing is greater than one for each Congress from the 96th through 
the 107th. Many of the bills that are considered in a single hearing are likely to be 
alternates, so that the number of bills that receive hearings in a single Congress 
is likely to be a misleading measure of the number of issues under consideration 
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in that Congress’s hearings. Thus, by moving the analysis to the level of issues 
covered by legislative hearings, I avoid the overcounting of items under consid-
eration in hearings that afflicts bill-level analysis.
Subcommittee Markup
As shown in figure 5.3, only a fraction of the bills that receive hearings are also 
subject to subcommittee markup. Figure 5.4 shows that this is not the case for 
issues, where nearly the same percentage of issues receive markup (25.1%) as 
receive hearings (28.4%). This difference can partly be explained by the differ-
ence between these types of committee actions. As table 5.6 shows, several bills 
may be considered in the same hearing, as long as they cover similar topics, but 
rarely will more than one bill be marked up at a time. Unlike hearings, which can 
serve many functions, markups are usually used to rewrite and advance legisla-
tion. In markup sessions a single bill is considered line by line so that amend-
ments may be offered, including alternative language for different parts of the 
bill. These committee amendments are presented to the floor as recommendations 
when the bill is reported. Markups attract less public attention than hearings, but 
they are more central to the process of reporting bills to the floor because they 
directly influence the language of the bill, and they are usually followed by the 
Congress Total Hearings Total Legislative Hearings
% of Total  
Hearings Legislative
Average Number of Bills 
per Legislative Hearing
96th 235 104 44.2 2.21
97th 275 89 32.4 1.52
98th 231 113 48.9 1.83
99th 251 81 32.3 1.80
100th 294 124 42.2 1.48
101st 236 108 45.8 1.47
102nd 187 72 38.9 1.76
103rd 197 81 41.1 1.17
104th 116 48 41.4 1.52
105th 150 42 28.0 1.29
106th 187 60 32.1 1.40
107th 152 19 12.5 1.37
96th–107th 2,511 941 37.5 1.61
Source: House Commerce Final Calendars, 1980–2002.
TABLE 5.6 Average number of bills per legislative hearing in House Commerce, 1979–2002
Larocca_final.indb   81 8/8/2006   12:48:25 PM
Part II: An Empirical Study of Presidential Agenda Setting in Congresss
82
reporting of the bill to the next agenda stage. Bills almost never receive subcom-
mittee hearings after receiving subcommittee markup.
 Nearly every bill (98.8% from 1979 to 2002) that House Commerce marks 
up in full committee receives a favorable vote for report to the floor. In other 
words, full committee markup and full committee report are nearly synonymous 
for House Commerce. This is not so clearly the case with subcommittee markup 
and report, where 85.3% of markups are favorably reported to the full committee, 
and this difference suggests that subcommittee markup plays a more important 
gatekeeping role in the agenda process. In other words, whereas the full commit-
tee markup stage passes along almost everything it receives, the subcommittee 
markup stage is more selective in what bills and issues it passes along. This is 
probably because more detailed consideration is given to issues in subcommit-
tee markup than in full committee markup, where the full committee can rely on 
the work done by the subcommittee. It is also easier to distinguish statistically 
the subcommittee markup stage from floor consideration than it is to distinguish 
full committee markup from floor consideration. For these reasons I define the 
markup stage of the House agenda process by the occurrence of subcommittee 
markups alone, rather than combining subcommittee and full committee mark-
ups, as I did in the case of hearings.
 No previous study of presidential agenda setting has isolated the president’s 
influence on the decision to markup a bill in committee or subcommittee, and 
yet this is empirically and theoretically one of the most important stages in the 
congressional agenda process. Because markup involves changing the language 
of the bill and plays a central agenda-setting role, it is a key place to look for the 
president’s influence. An argument could be made that subcommittee markups 
are, in fact, the most important single stage in the agenda process, since most 
bills that are reported from subcommittee pass without amendment on the floor. 
The difficulty until now has been the inaccessibility of information on subcom-
mittee and committee markups. Until the advent of the THOMAS legislative 
database, such information was most easily accessible in the legislative calendars 
of the individual committees, which vary in the amount of legislative information 
printed depending on the committee. The legislative calendars for the House and 
Senate Commerce Committees do provide detailed information about subcom-
mittee markups.
The Floor
All bills reported from committee are placed on one of five House calendars: 
(1) Union, (2) House, (3) Private, (4) Corrections,12 or (5) Discharge. The great 
majority of bills, and their corresponding issues, are put on the House or Union 
Calendars after being reported from full committee. The Union Calendar is used 
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for revenue bills or for bills that authorize expenditures. The House Calendar 
receives most policy legislation. The Discharge Calendar holds bills that are dis-
charged from committee. Bills are placed on each of these calendars in chrono-
logical order, and they are theoretically to be considered from the calendars in 
that same order. However, almost all bills that are considered on the floor are 
done so out of order through procedures like suspension of the rules or the grant-
ing of a special rule.
 Most bills reach the floor by being reported from a committee, in which 
case the bill is accompanied by a report that “describes the purposes and scope 
of the bill, explains the committee revisions, notes proposed changes in existing 
law, and usually, includes the views of the executive branch agencies consulted” 
(Oleszek 2001, 102). A much smaller number of bills, but a significant propor-
tion of issues, are placed on the Discharge Calendar by being discharged from a 
committee or on the Corrections Calendar. Although a discharge petition can be 
used to force a bill out of a committee that refuses to report it, in practice, most 
discharges occur with the approval of the committee. Bills can also reach the 
floor without first being placed on a calendar. In particular, bills at any stage of 
the agenda process can be brought to a floor vote by a vote to suspend the rules 
or by unanimous consent, even in some cases before they are referred to a com-
mittee.
The Bicameral Agenda
Because bills must pass in both chambers before they can be presented to the 
president for enactment, it is also important to consider the agenda dynamics of 
the Senate. In figure 5.5, I plot the paths of all 7,879 bills introduced in the 103rd 
Congress (rather than just those referred to House Commerce) through impor-
tant stages of both House and Senate consideration. Here again, the thickness 
of the lines indicates the relative percentage of bills that pass from one stage to 
another. Besides including all bills from the 103rd Congress, this diagram is dif-
ferent from figure 5.3 in two important ways: (1) I have included the stages of 
Senate consideration so that I can trace the paths of bills sequentially through one 
chamber and then the next. (2) Furthermore, I have separated House and Senate 
bills by different gray lines in the diagrams. As indicated by the light gray lines, 
the pattern of House consideration for House bills is similar to that for the House 
Commerce bills plotted in figure 5.3, suggesting that consideration of the bills 
referred to the House Commerce Committee may be representative of the consid-
eration of bills in the broader House. A more precise assessment of the relation-
ship between House Commerce issues and the issues considered in other com-
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mittees in the 103rd Congress is offered in table C.1 in Appendix C, where the 
characteristics of bills and issues considered in all committees are compared.
 Figure 5.5 also allows me to trace the typical pattern of House bills through 
the Senate after they pass in the House. House bills tend to follow a different pat-
tern through the Senate than do Senate bills, and House bills are more likely than 
Senate bills to be considered directly on the floor without intervening committee 
actions like hearings and markups. It is also clear from the thickness of the light 
gray lines in the Senate stages in figure 5.5 that the House is a powerful agenda-
setting force in the Senate at the bill level. Senate bills are also more likely to 
be considered directly on the House floor than House bills, but these make up 
a much smaller proportion of the House agenda than do House bills in the Sen-
ate, as seen by the thinner black lines in the House stages. Next I examine these 
bicameral dynamics at the issue level. 
 In figure 5.6, I plot the paths of the 7,468 issues that were covered by all 
7,879 bills introduced in the 103rd Congress. As was the case for the issues 
considered by House Commerce alone in figure 5.4, the overall House agenda is 
FIGURE 5.5 Legislative paths of all 7,879 bills introduced in the 103rd House and Senate
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much less restrictive in terms of issues than one would be led to believe by the 
analysis of bills alone in figure 5.5. I use light gray lines to indicate the paths 
of issues covered exclusively by House bills, black lines to indicate the paths 
of issues covered exclusively by Senate bills, and dark gray lines to indicate 
the issues covered by both House and Senate bills. One of the advantages of 
using issue-level rather than bill-level analysis is that it permits a visualization 
of the overlap (dark gray lines) in House and Senate legislation and its role in 
the agenda process. It is clear from figure 5.6, for instance, that the Senate is far 
more likely than the House to have both House and Senate bills at a given leg-
islative stage that cover the same issue. The visualization of overlapping issues 
also reveals more clearly than the bill-level diagram of figure 5.5 the extent of 
the House’s influence over later stages of the Senate agenda. Indeed more House 
issues (light gray) passed in the Senate than Senate issues (black) and shared 
issues (dark gray) combined.
 It seems, then, that an issue may stand a greater chance of advancing on the 
Senate agenda if it is introduced in a House-passed bill. This is not surprising 
FIGURE 5.6 Legislative paths of all 7,468 issues covered by bills introduced in the 
103rd House and Senate
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both because any House-passed bill will be informed by the policy expertise 
acquired during House consideration and because the Senate faces less political 
uncertainty about issues that have already passed in the House. Other consider-
ations being held equal, House-passed measures stand a better chance of being 
enacted than other bills in the Senate because the crowded House agenda has 
already been navigated. Issues originating in Senate bills face a similar advan-
tage in the House agenda process, but they make up a much smaller share of 
the bills introduced in the House and must contend with a more crowded House 
agenda. Because of this greater House “presence” in the Senate, I will take spe-
cial care in analyzing the influence of the House on the Senate agenda in chapter 
7. I will consider, for instance, whether the president may be able to exercise 
influence on the Senate agenda indirectly by controlling the House agenda.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have laid out a new framework for studying congressional 
agenda setting at the issue level rather than at the bill level, while still taking 
into account the valuable multidimensional nature of bills. The study of issues 
provides a more intuitive and accurate grasp of the kind of agenda setting that 
is often associated with the president, i.e., an informal influence over the issue 
topics considered by Congress. When studying such hierarchical and overlap-
ping issues I have shown that it is necessary to take into account both the scope 
(number of bills) of issues and the complexity (number of issues) of the bills with 
which they are associated.
 The agenda process of such issues looks in several ways quite different from 
the pattern of the consideration of bills in the House. A much higher percentage 
of issues than bills proceed to floor consideration. Issues also figure more promi-
nently at the request for executive comment, discharge, and special rule stages. 
The most important stages in the agenda consideration of issues are requests for 
executive comment, subcommittee hearings and markup, and the various forms 
of floor consideration. I have also shown that House and Senate can exert influ-
ence over the issues on each other’s agendas, and the House in particular cannot 
be ignored in looking at influences on the Senate agenda. In the next chapter I 
examine the president’s influence on the consideration of issues in these most 
important stages of the House agenda process. In chapter 7, I examine the pres-
ident’s influence on the consideration of issues in the most important stages of 
the Senate agenda process.
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In chapters 3 and 4, I argued that the president’s ability to influence the congres-
sional agenda can arise from at least two processes: (1) through public appeals 
in his speeches that raise the salience of an issue; and (2) through draft legisla-
tion that channels the policy expertise of the federal bureaucracy. In this chapter 
I will examine how the president has been able to use both of these processes 
to advance issues to different stages of the House agenda using new issue-level 
data on all legislation considered by the House Commerce Committee from 1979 
to 2002.
Key Actors in House Agenda Setting
The main focus of this chapter is to examine how the president can influence 
the congressional agenda through the use of State of the Union policy requests 
and through the use of draft legislation that draws on the expertise of the federal 
bureaucracy. In order to examine presidential influence, I first assess and con-
trol for the other important actors in congressional agenda setting. Thus, I begin 
by looking at the expected influence of all three of the main actors involved in 
House agenda setting: (1) the committee leadership, i.e., full committee chair and 
subcommittee chairs; (2) the Senate; and (3) the president.
 It is widely recognized that the committee chair and subcommittee chairs 
have an extraordinary amount of discretion in making scheduling decisions, 
which essentially makes them the default committee and subcommittee agenda 
61
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setters, respectively (Oleszek 2001; Sinclair 1986; Taylor 1998). Chairs can be 
overridden by a majority of their committee or subcommittee, but this rarely 
happens. “Chairs win. . . . The expertise that committee and subcommittee chairs 
bring to the process, their ability to write the actual language of the bill in the 
markup process, and their dominant formal and informal participation in White 
Table 6.1 Predicted direct effects of president, committee leaders, and the Senate on stages of 
the House agenda
• President’s State of the Union Issues 
• Floor Stage: The president is expected to exercise positive influence over the consideration 
of issues in later, more public stages of the House agenda, e.g., the floor, with mentions in his 
State of the Union addresses. This occurs because the president’s speeches can influence some 
conditions in the political environment, such as the public salience of an issue problem, which 
can in turn affect issue consideration on the floor. But these political environment consider-
ations are somewhat less important at the committee level, where technical expertise plays a 
significant role.
• First Congress: The president is expected to be able to use his State of the Union addresses to 
exert positive influence over the House agenda only in his first Congress, when he can be held 
most accountable for the consequences of the issues he raises.*
• President’s Draft Legislative Issues 
• Hearings and Markup: The president is expected to exercise positive influence over the issues 
considered in earlier information-gathering stages of the House agenda, e.g., hearings and 
markups, by introducing draft legislation, because these early stages make greater use of policy 
expertise than later stages, e.g., floor consideration, where political environment concerns are 
more likely to dominate. 
• All Congresses: The issues the president introduces in draft legislation are expected to exercise 
positive influence over the agenda in every Congress, because the usefulness of this expertise 
does not decline in the way the president’s potential accountability does throughout his term.  
• Committee Leadership 
• All Agenda Stages: Since committees vote by majority rule whether to report legislation to the 
floor, chairs are expected to have less influence over floor consideration than over whether an 
issue is scheduled for hearing and markup. Chairs are still expected to have some influence on 
the floor since they can schedule the vote to report. 
• All Congresses: Since the committee and subcommittee chairs can unilaterally schedule hear-
ings and markups, they are expected to have a strong and persistent positive influence over the 
issues considered in committee and subcommittee. 
• Senate 
• Floor Stage: Senate issues are more likely to influence later stages of the House legislative pro-
cess, e.g., the floor, where the concerns for final enactment are more likely to be salient. 
• All Congresses: The Senate is expected to have a strong and persistent positive influence over 
the issues considered on the House floor. 
*In later Congresses, voters will not trust the president to promote a legislative program that is in their best interests, 
because the president can suffer no direct electoral penalties for ignoring their interests. 
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House negotiations . . . are major and important institutional endowments that 
validate the many claims made for the power and influence of these chairs” 
(Weissert and Weissert 2002, 315).
 It is less widely recognized that the Senate is an important actor. However, 
any bill that has already passed in the Senate stands a higher chance of becom-
ing law, since it is has already cleared a difficult hurdle in the legislative process. 
To the degree that House actors are concerned with the future prospects of their 
issues and bills in the Senate, the likelihood that the issues covered by Senate-
passed bills will advance on the House agenda will increase.
 I considered the hypothesized effects of the president in detail in chapters 3 
and 4, where I modeled the effects of presidential speeches and draft legislation 
on the congressional agenda. The expected influence of the president, committee 
leaders, and the Senate on the House agenda is summarized in table 6.1.
Isolating Presidential Influence on the House Agenda Process
The almost unilateral ability of subcommittee and committee chairs to sched-
ule hearings and markup sessions makes their influence particularly important. 
Presidents, aware of this power, will often ask committee chairs to sponsor their 
legislation when it is introduced in Congress. In other words, the president may 
try to leverage the committee chair’s influence in his attempt to get his policy 
issues on the congressional agenda. Because of this, there is always the danger 
that any statistical attempt to isolate presidential influence on the congressional 
agenda that “controls for” or “holds constant” the role of committee chairs is 
likely to underrepresent the president’s influence to the degree that it is exercised 
through the committee chair. Multivariate regression measures the association 
between two variables when the effects of other control variables are essentially 
extracted, but if the president’s influence is partly exercised indirectly through 
his influence on the committee chairs, this indirect influence on the agenda will 
be extracted by controlling for the committee chair. It may thus be impossible to 
accurately measure the president’s influence while “controlling for the commit-
tee chair,” exactly because the president may depend on the committee chair’s 
influence to bring more attention for his policy priorities. In this case, simple 
multiple regression controls for too much. Instead, as shown in figure 6.1, the 
president may influence any agenda stage either directly or indirectly through his 
influence on earlier stages. For example, the president can influence markup of 
an issue directly or through two possible indirect routes: (1) by influencing hear-
ings that subsequently have a direct influence on markup; or (2) by influencing a 
committee leader who can subsequently have both a direct effect on markup and 
an indirect effect through hearings.
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 To account for the president’s indirect effects on the agenda, I perform four 
distinct regressions in each Congress to determine the president’s influence on 
(1) the committee chair’s decision to sponsor a bill concerning a given issue, (2) 
hearings on the issue, (3) subcommittee markup of the issue, and (4) floor con-
sideration of the issue. The endogenous (explained) variables in each of these 
regressions are numbered correspondingly in figure 6.1, which summarizes the 
predicted influences of the theoretical models of presidential influence as well as 
the expectations about the role of committee leadership and Senate passage from 
table 6.1.1 
 Each arrow in figure 6.1 represents a predicted positive influence of one 
variable on an agenda stage. A chain of two or more arrows together represents 
an indirect influence of the first variable on the last, mediated by those variables 
between them. The causal diagram on the left represents the expected chain of 
influences on the agenda in a president’s first Congress, and the causal diagram 
on the right represents a president’s subsequent Congresses. The definition and 
measurement of the complete set of variables used in the four agenda-setting 
models are given in table 6.2. The results of the four individual regression equa-
tions are given in the tables in Appendix F.
An Overview of the President’s Influence on the House Agenda
Using the issues covered by all bills referred to the House Commerce Commit-
tee from the 96th through the 107th Congresses,2 table 6.3 summarizes the total 
agenda-setting effects of the president’s State of the Union topics and draft leg-
Figure 6.1 Causal models of House Commerce agenda process
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State of Union—a dichotomous (0, 1) variable indicating whether a given issue was mentioned in 
the president’s State of the Union speeches. Coded by the author.
Draft Legislation—a dichotomous (0, 1) variable indicating whether the president submitted draft 
legislation covering a given issue. Source: House Commerce Final Calendars and THOMAS legis-
lative database. 
Markup—a dichotomous (0, 1) variable indicating whether any bill covering a given issue was 
subject to subcommittee markup in the House Commerce Committee. Source: House Commerce 
Final Legislative Calendars, 1979–2002, and THOMAS legislative database.
Hearing—a dichotomous (0, 1) variable indicating whether any bill covering a given issue was 
subject to subcommittee or full committee hearing in the House Commerce Committee. Source: 
House Commerce Final Legislative Calendars, 1979–2002, and THOMAS legislative database.
Committee Leader—a dichotomous (0, 1) variable indicating whether any bill covering a given issue 
had a primary sponsor who was a House Commerce committee or subcommittee chair. Source: 
House Commerce Final Legislative Calendars, 1979–2002, and THOMAS legislative database.
Senate Bill—a dichotomous (0, 1) variable indicating whether any bill covering a given issue was 
passed by Senate and referred to House Commerce. Source: House Commerce Final Legislative 
Calendars, 1979–2002, and THOMAS legislative database.
Request Executive Comment—a dichotomous (0, 1) variable indicating whether an executive 
comment was requested for any bill covering a given issue. Source: House Commerce Final Legis-
lative Calendars, 1979–2002, and THOMAS legislative database.
Maximum Cosponsors—the maximum number of cosponsors for all bills associated with a given 
issue and referred to House Commerce. Coded from the final number of cosponsors at the adjourn-
ment of a given Congress for each bill, as recorded in the THOMAS legislative database.
Scope (of Issue)—a count of the number of bills referred to House Commerce that cover a given 
issue. Coded from the CRS-LIV issues assigned to each bill by the Congressional Research Service 
after compiling this information into a relational database.
Minimum Complexity (of Bills)—the minimum complexity (number of issues) for all bills associ-
ated with a given issue and referred to House Commerce. Coded from the CRS-LIV issues assigned 
to each bill by the Congressional Research Service after compiling this information into a relational 
database.
Multiply Referred—a dichotomous (0, 1) variable indicating whether any bill covering a given 
issue was referred to more than one committee. Source: House Commerce Final Legislative Calen-
dars, 1979–2002, and THOMAS legislative database.
Authorization Issue—a dichotomous (0, 1) variable indicating whether an issue concerns autho-
rization or reauthorization of a program. Source: House Commerce Final Legislative Calendars, 
1979–2002, and THOMAS legislative database.
Table 6.2 Definition and measurement of independent variables for House Commerce models
(continued)
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islation as well as the total effects of issues sponsored by committee leaders and 
issues that are passed by the Senate on House floor consideration. Because the 
set of Congressional Research Service’s Legislative Indexing Vocabulary (CRS-
LIV) issues, by which bills are classified into issues, varies from Congress to 
Congress, the president’s effect on the congressional agenda must be analyzed 
separately for each Congress. The values in table 6.3 are calculated by adding the 
“statistically significant” direct and indirect effects of each variable on the floor 
consideration of an issue.3 Indirect effects are calculated according to the method 
of path analysis, which is explained in the appendix to this chapter. Technically, 
the values in table 6.3 are interpreted as indicating the average increase of the 
probability of floor consideration that is associated with a one-unit increase in 
the explanatory variable of concern, controlling for all other variables in the 
model. Since most of the independent variables in the models are dichotomous, 
the coefficient simply measures the average increase in the probability of an 
issue reaching a given agenda stage given that a specific condition holds, e.g., 
the issue covered a bill with a Democratic sponsor, ceteris paribus. More sim-
ply, the larger the value in table 6.3, the greater the total expected influence of a 
given variable on floor consideration in that Congress, controlling for all other 
factors. Negative values indicate that the probability of floor consideration tends 
to decrease as the variable is increased, controlling for all other factors.
 Table 6.2 reveals some support for the hypothesis that the president only 
exercises positive total influence over the floor agenda through the legislative 
programming process (State of the Union addresses) in his first Congress. Nine 
of the Congresses studied are consistent with this hypothesis, but there are three 
important exceptions: Reagan fails to exercise significant influence on his first 
Congress, the 97th, and yet has a small significant effect on his last Congress, 
the 100th; and Carter experiences significant influence on his second Congress, 
the 96th. I explore these discrepancies further in individually reported results 
TABLE 6.2 Definition and measurement of independent variables for House Commerce 
models (continued)
Timing of Introduction—the lowest bill number associated with a given issue divided by the last 
bill number referred to House Commerce in the same Congress. Source: House Commerce Final 
Legislative Calendars, 1979–2002, and THOMAS legislative database.
Democrat Sponsor— a dichotomous (0, 1) variable indicating whether the primary sponsor of any 
bills covering an issue is a Democrat for a given issue. Source: House Commerce Final Legislative 
Calendars, 1979–2002; THOMAS legislative database; and Swift et al. (2004).
Maximum Sponsor Experience—the highest years of experience in the House of the primary 
sponsors of all bills associated with a given issue. Source: House Commerce Final Legislative Cal-
endars, 1979–2002; THOMAS legislative database; and Swift et al. (2004).
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for each president. It is important to keep in mind, however, that table 6.3 sum-
marizes total effects on the floor agenda, while the predictions listed in table 
6.1 and illustrated in figure 6.1 are pitched at the level of direct effects on hear-
ings, markup, and floor levels. I will test these more detailed predictions of the 
president’s direct effects on hearings, markup, and the floor in individual sections 
devoted to each president.
 In table 6.1, draft legislation was only hypothesized to have a direct influence 
on hearings and markup, but it can also be expected to exercise some indirect 
influence on the floor through these important early stages. Draft legislation does 
indeed allow the president to exert a positive total influence over the floor agenda 
in all Congresses, except for a negative total effect on the floor in the 96th, 99th, 
and 102nd. In each of these Congresses, however, draft legislation exercises a 
positive influence over early stages of the legislative process. I explore these 
cases in detail in the individual studies of each president to follow. Overall, the 
total effects results also support the hypothesis that the president’s influence on 
the congressional agenda is more persistent and at times stronger through the leg-
islative clearance process (draft legislation) than through programming (public 
speeches).
 There is consistent support for the hypothesized influence of the committee 
leaders and the Senate on the House floor agenda. Both have a persistent, statisti-
cally significant, positive influence on the floor agenda in each Congress in the 
TABLE 6.3 Statistically significant (p < .10) total effects from president, committee, and 
Senate on the House floor agenda for all issues covered by bills referred to House Commerce, 
96th–107th  
President Congress State ofUnion
Address
Draft
Legislation
Committee
Leader
Senate
Bill
Executive
Comment
Requested
Total 
Number of 
Issues
Carter 96 .011 -.012 .035 .342 0.02 1,556
Reagan 97 .085 .438 .144 0.01 1,145
98 -.008 .057 .508 .135 -0.01 1,362
99 -.018 .326 .207 -0.05 1,871
100 .012 .049 .115 .174 -0.04 2,410
Bush I 101 .075 .115 .276 .115 -0.03 2,236
102 -.074 .427 .067 0.00 2,597
Clinton 103 .041 .243 .247 .069 0.01 2,858
104 .140 .279 .029 -0.01 3,261
105 .011 .272 .091 0.00 2,853
106 -.016 .119 .359 .092 0.03 3,176
Bush II 107 .121 .288 .378  .096 0.01  3,207
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study. The standardized total effect of the committee chair is particularly impres-
sive, usually several times the magnitude of the influence of the president or the 
Senate. The strength of the committee chairs’ influence reaffirms the necessity of 
using path analysis to calculate the president’s indirect influence on each agenda 
stage that is exercised through the committee chair. I explore this indirect influ-
ence in the individual studies of each president to follow.
1. Maximum Cosponsors—The maximum number of cosponsors for bills covering a given issue 
offers an imperfect measure of the level of support for consideration of an issue in the House, 
ceteris paribus. The maximum number of cosponsors should therefore have a positive effect 
on consideration at all stages of the agenda process. Although the number of cosponsors often 
changes during the life of a bill, the final number of cosponsors as reported in the THOMAS 
legislative database is used.
2. Multiply Referred—Until 1975, the Speaker could refer a bill to only one committee (Oleszek 
2001), and the use of multiple referrals grew over the period of our study, reaching a plateau 
in the late 1980s (Davidson, Oleszek, and Kephart 1988). If any bills on an issue are singly 
referred, then that issue is more likely to be central to the committee’s jurisdiction, and thus 
more likely to receive consideration in committee.
3. Authorization Issue—Most federal programs require reauthorization every two or three years. 
Reauthorization measures are often considered must-pass legislation, since technically funds 
cannot be appropriated for programs that have not been authorized (though Congress often 
finds ways around this (Oleszek 2001)). The CRS-LIV includes separate issue categories for 
reauthorizations. Thus, there should be a positive relationship between reauthorization issues 
and consideration at the floor stage. 
4. Timing of Earliest Introduction—The timing of introduction of an issue in the House is cal-
culated by dividing the number of the earliest bill introduced on that issue by the number of the 
highest bill introduced in the same Congress. Issues that appear earlier are more likely to see 
legislative action, all other things being equal, because the legislative calendar gets crowded 
late in the session. Thus, there should be a negative* relationship between timing of earliest 
introduction and appearance on the congressional agenda, particularly at earlier stages of the 
agenda process, such as hearings and markup, since these stages may be circumvented for 
urgent issues that arise late in the Congress. 
5. Democratic Sponsor—If the sponsor of any bill covering a given issue is a Democrat, then the 
issue is more likely to rise on the agenda under Democrat-controlled Houses (96th–103rd) and 
less likely to appear on the agenda in Republican-controlled Houses (104th–107th). 
6. Maximum Sponsor Experience—The maximum tenure of primary sponsors in years is an 
indicator of whether the issue is being advanced by a senior members of the House. Thus, there 
should be a positive relationship between the maximum sponsor experience of an issue and 
advancement along each stage of the agenda.
 
* Here, a negative influence means that on average bills that are introduced later in a given Congress tend to be less likely 
to reach the floor agenda, controlling for all other factors.
TABLE 6.4  Expected influence of issue characteristics on the House agenda 
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 More ambiguous results arise with respect to the total influence of “requests 
for executive comment.” Requests for executive comment, which are a very 
preliminary form of legislative action, do not seem to have a predictable total 
effect on the floor agenda across Congresses. The general role of these requests 
in policy making is an important question that deserves further attention but is 
beyond the scope of the present study.
 I also expect some issue and primary bill sponsor characteristics to influence 
whether an issue proceeds through the agenda process. In table 6.4, I summarize 
the expected total effects of each of these control variables.
 Table 6.5 summarizes the total measured effects of key contextual variables 
on the floor agenda. The direct effects of all variables on each individual stage 
of the agenda process are available in tables F.1 through F.4 in Appendix F. As 
in table 6.3, each indirect effect is considered statistically significant only if all 
links in the causal chain of direct effects are statistically significant. To calculate 
the total effect, I add up the statistically significant indirect and direct effects that 
exist between the variable and the floor agenda. Three variables in table 6.5―
maximum number of cosponsors, timing of earliest introduction, and maximum 
main sponsor experience―are not dichotomous (0, 1) variables, but the indirect 
effects are all calculated by multiplying by intervening variables that are all 
TABLE 6.5 Statistically significant total effects from selected issue and contextual binary 
variables on the House floor agenda for all bills referred to House Commerce,    
96th–107th
Congress
Maximum 
Number of 
Cosponsors*
Multiply
Referred
Authoriza-
tion
Issue
Timing of 
Earliest 
Introduction*
Sponsored 
by
Democrat
Maximum Main 
Sponsor 
Experience*
Total 
Number of 
Issues
96 0.0006 0.05 0.00 0.068 0.01 0.001 1,556
97 0.0008 -0.09 0.12 0.304 0.16 0.019 1,145
98 0.0008 -0.31 0.15 -0.103 0.14 0.017 1,362
99 -0.0013 -0.07 0.08 -0.252 0.01 0.044 1,871
100 0.0001 -0.02 0.10 0.109 0.48 0.029 2,410
101 0.0011 -0.18 0.22 0.159 0.11 0.033 2,236
102 0.0010 -0.32 0.08 -0.234 0.22 0.017 2,597
103 0.0008 -0.16 0.02 -0.054 0.35 0.024 2,858
104 0.0015 -0.05 0.04 -0.067 -0.16 0.017 3,261
105 0.0012 -0.15 0.05 -0.065 -0.29 0.017 2,853
106 0.0022 -0.04 0.00 -0.309 -0.13 0.001 3,176
107 0.0013 -0.06 0.14 -0.388 -0.20 0.019 3,207
 * Not a dichotomous variable.
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dichotomous so that they still provide interpretable information. The problems 
of dichotomous dependent variables and path analysis are discussed in detail in 
Appendix D, “The Linear Probability Model with Dichotomous Independent 
Variables,” and Appendix E, “Indirect and Total Effects in Path Analysis.”
 The total measured effects of the maximum number of cosponsors, multiple 
referral, authorization, Democratic sponsorship, and maximum main sponsor 
experience are in the predicted direction in all but two cases. The timing of ear-
liest introduction, however, seems to have a less predictable total influence on 
the House floor agenda. In eight Congresses, the maximum number of cospon-
sors has the predicted positive effect on the floor agenda, but in the other four 
Congresses it has a surprising positive total effect on the floor. In tables 6.4 and 
6.5, I leave out the total effects for scope and minimum complexity of an issue 
because these variables are entered mainly as control variables rather than for 
their isolated effect on the agenda. Their direct effects are available in the tables 
of regression coefficients in tables F.1 through F.4 in Appendix F.
 Having summarized the total effects of each of the control variables on the 
floor, I now turn in much greater detail to the consideration of main variables of 
concern: the president, committee leaders, and the Senate. For each Congress I 
will examine the influence of these variables on the three most important stages 
of the congressional agenda: hearings, subcommittee markup, and the floor. My 
main concern, however, is with the influence that the president exercises on 
the agenda, and I will examine the direct and indirect effects of the president’s 
influence on committee leaders, markups, hearings, and the floor to assess more 
carefully the hypotheses of presidential agenda setting generated by the formal 
models of chapters 3 and 4.
Jimmy Carter
Table 6.6 displays the agenda success in the House Commerce Committee of 
the issues mentioned by Carter in his State of the Union addresses to the 96th 
Congress. A quick perusal of the table would suggest that Carter did indeed have 
considerable success with the 96th Congress. Nearly half of the relevant issues 
mentioned by Carter in his 1979 and 1980 State of the Union addresses reached 
some stage of the committee agenda process. And many of those issues that were 
not taken up by the committee, like congressional elections and education, lie 
outside of the committee’s main jurisdiction. This quick perusal, however, can 
be misleading in at least two ways: (1) The fact that half of Carter’s issues were 
considered by Congress does not reveal whether Carter had influence on the con-
gressional agenda unless it is compared to the fate of issues not mentioned by 
Carter, while controlling for other factors, like sponsorship by committee chairs 
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TABLE 6.6  Scope, complexity, and agenda consideration of issues from Carter’s State of 
the Union addresses to the 96th Congress
CRS-LIV Issue Scope Average Complexity Hearing Markup Floor
Antitrust law 21 20.2 X X X
Atomic weapons 3 7.0
Capital investments 2 19.0
Coal 27 13.4
Competition 14 24.7 X X X
Comprehensive health care 13 21.2
Congressional elections 1 4.0
Education 3 11.7
Energy conservation 41 15.0 X X X
Energy policy 39 11.7 X X X
Executive departments—Management 1 19.0
Executive reorganization 106 15.3 X X X
Exports 15 17.7
Federal aid to education 5 15.4
Fossil fuels 8 29.1 X X X
Government regulation 23 11.8
Government regulation—Economic aspects 1 3.0
Hospital rates 11 18.5 X X X
Industrial production 1 6.0
Intelligence services 1 11.0
International relations 1 5.0
Manpower training programs 5 22.4
Military personnel 2 5.0
National defense 1 11.0
National health insurance 10 24.2
Natural resources 1 7.0
Nutrition 17 7.6
Nutrition policy 1 9.0
Petroleum prices 19 7.9
Railroads 30 9.7 X X
Restrictive trade practices 19 12.6 X X X
Rural economic development 7 8.9 X
Savings accounts 1 99.0
Solar energy 18 27.2 X X X
Sunset legislation 8 22.4 X X X
Synthetic fuel 15 17.5 X X X
Technology 1 40
Trade agreements 1 59.0
Trucking 5 3.2
Urban areas 2 8.5 X
Youth 1 15.0
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and passage by the Senate, which may have also influenced the congressional 
agenda; and (2) because the set of CRS-LIV issues is hierarchical and overlap-
ping, it is necessary to take into account the scope, or number of associated bills, 
of each issue. Broad-scope issues are inherently more likely to receive agenda 
attention regardless of whether the president promotes them because they tend to 
be more general in coverage. Any attempt to measure the president’s influence on 
the agenda must take into account this inherent advantage of high-scope issues 
by controlling for the scope of each issue.
 A further complication is that some of the issues in table 6.5 do not fit in 
either the committee’s statutory or common law jurisdictions (King 1997). For 
example, a bill concerning Internet connections in schools, H.R. 4600—“[t]o 
require schools and libraries to implement filtering or blocking technology for 
computers with Internet access as a condition of universal service discounts 
under the Communications Act of 1934”—was referred exclusively to Energy 
and Commerce in the 106th Congress, even though education is the primary 
jurisdiction of another committee.4 This means that part of what is measured here 
as the president’s influence on the committee’s agenda includes his influence on 
issues that are outside of the committee’s normal jurisdiction. It is still important, 
however, to include such issues because, for instance, if the president emphasizes 
education, this may make committees other than the Education and Labor Com-
mittee turn attention to education-oriented legislation.
 I am able to control for the fact that an issue is not the committee’s primary 
concern in two ways. First, I control for whether an issue is a component of any 
bills that get referred solely to House Commerce using the “Multiply Referred” 
variable from table 6.4. Singly referred issues will generally be more central to 
the committee’s jurisdiction, although the educational dimension of H.R. 4600 
shows that even some singly referred issues are outside of House Commerce’s 
traditional jurisdiction. Second, I control for the scope of the issue. Broader 
issues like education and energy policy that cover more bills will tend to reach 
across committees. In the analysis that follows, I control for these influences, 
while at the same time separating the influences of the president, committee lead-
ers, and the Senate on different stages of the agenda.
 I begin with a brief summary of significant specific bills and issues promoted 
by Carter in the 96th Congress and then turn my attention to a more general 
analysis of the president’s influence on the different stages of the agenda process. 
I begin in Carter’s second Congress, the 96th, for a technical reason relating to 
the way Congress introduces bills, rather than in his first Congress, the 95th5 
Carter conducted steady business with House Commerce because some of his 
most pressing priorities like energy, transportation regulation, and health care 
were a part of its jurisdiction. Among issues referred to House Commerce, the 
96th Congress passed Carter’s request for railroad deregulation and an energy 
conservation law (S. 1030). Carter did not call for the toxic waste cleanup leg-
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islation now known as “Superfund” in his State of the Union addresses, but he 
did submit draft legislation that was introduced in the Senate Environment and 
Public Works Committee. The House and Senate passed an alternate House mea-
sure, H.R. 7020, sponsored by Jim Florio of New Jersey instead. Congress failed 
to pass Carter’s requests for national health care, hospital cost control, sunset 
legislation, and lobbying and campaign reform legislation, but all of these issues 
reached some stage of the agenda consideration. Congress also passed Carter’s 
requests for a windfall profits tax on oil and a synthetic fuels subsidy through 
bills that were not referred to the committee.
 Ordinary least squares is used for estimation of the direct effects rather than 
logit or probit, which are more common for dichotomous explained variables, 
because least squares is less problematic when all or most of the independent 
variables are also dichotomous and because logit and probit are nonlinear esti-
mators that do not allow the straightforward calculation of the indirect and total 
effects. The advantages and disadvantages of using ordinary least squares are 
discussed at length in Appendix D, “The Linear Probability Model with Dichot-
omous Independent Variables,” and Appendix E, “Indirect and Total Effects 
in Path Analysis.” Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (White 1980) are 
used to determine statistical significance because all endogenous variables are 
dichotomous (0–1) and yield heteroskedastic standard errors under ordinary 
least squares. The usual t-statistics apply to the robust standard errors. I present 
the direct effects on the four agenda stages that meet at least the (two-tailed) p 
< .10 level of statistical significance in the path diagram in figure 6.2, where it 
FIGURE 6.2 Direct effects on the House agenda for 96th House Commerce issues.
 
Hearing 
 
(R2=.25) 
Markup 
 
(R2=.59) 
House 
Floor   
(R2=.57) 
Presidential 
Drafts 
Presidential 
Speeches 
Committtee 
Leader 
(R2=.24) 
Senate 
.452 
.105 
.100 
-.055 
-.064 
.079 
.569 
.442 
.292 
.073 
.182 
.185 
.072 
-.049 
Larocca_final.indb   99 8/8/2006   12:48:31 PM
Part II: An Empirical Study of Presidential Agenda Setting in Congresss
100
is easier to assess the indirect influence of the president, committee leaders, and 
the Senate, through chains of connected causal arrows. The path diagram also 
indicates R2, the amount of variance in each endogenous (explained) variable 
that is determined by its explanatory variables. An R2 near 0 indicates that the 
model has not explained much of the variation in the endogenous variable, and 
an R2 near 1 indicates that the model has explained nearly all of the variance in 
the endogenous variable.
 The size of the direct effects on each endogenous variable is also reflected 
in the thickness of the causal arrows between variables in figure 6.2. In a pattern 
that will persist, the strongest influences on each agenda stage are the previous 
agenda stages themselves. The occurrence of hearings on an issue is by far the 
most important determinant of whether an issue reaches the markup stage. Simi-
larly, the occurrence of a markup session on an issue is the strongest determinant 
of whether an issue reaches the floor. Hearings have both a direct effect on the 
floor agenda (.185) and an indirect effect through their influence on markups, 
which is calculated simply by multiplying the effect of hearings on markup 
(.569) by the effect of markup on the floor agenda (.442). So the indirect effect 
of hearings on floor is .251, meaning that if an issue receives hearings this leads 
to a .251 increase in the probability on floor consideration on average, control-
ling for all other variables (those listed in the regression table not just those in the 
path model). The total effect of hearings on the floor agenda is calculated by add-
ing the direct and indirect effects, yielding a .436 value for the total effect. This 
means that holding a hearing on an issue is associated with a total increase of 
.436 in the probability of floor consideration, controlling for all other variables. 
This is a very strong influence indeed.
 The path diagram in figure 6.2 for the 96th Congress reveals that Carter’s 
State of the Union addresses had statistically significant direct effects on the 
appearance of issues in markup and on the floor agenda. This is inconsistent with 
the theoretical model of chapter 3 that suggested presidents should only be able 
to exercise such influence in their first Congress. It may be that unified govern-
ment, where one party controls both the presidency and Congress, plays a role in 
enhancing the president’s influence here. However, there are only two Congress-
es with completely unified government within the 24 years of the analysis: the 
96th and 103rd, and only the 96th offers a look at a president’s second Congress. 
It is therefore difficult to say anything authoritative at this point about the role of 
unified government in enhancing the president’s agenda-setting influence.
 Carter was less influential with draft legislation in the 96th House, exercising 
a negative direct effect on an issue’s likelihood of being considered in hearings 
and a negative total effect on the floor, in spite of having a strong positive influ-
ence on committee leader sponsorship. This puzzling result is one of only three 
cases where the president’s draft legislation exercised a negative total effect on 
the floor. Ironically, Carter’s influence on committee chairs is the highest record-
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ed for any Congress in this study. But in this case, this powerful influence does 
not translate into measurable influence on the floor agenda. In fact, Carter’s 96th 
Congress is one of three cases where the president’s draft legislation suffers a neg-
ative total influence on the floor agenda. This means that issues in Carter’s draft 
legislation are actually less likely than other issues to be considered on the floor, 
in spite of the fact that these issues are more likely to be sponsored by commit-
tee leaders. The only other Congresses, the 99th and 102nd, where the president’s 
draft legislation suffered a negative total influence on the floor agenda occurred 
under the much more contentious partisan environment of divided government. 
However, in neither of these divided government cases did the president’s State 
of the Union addresses exercise a measurable influence on the floor. It may be 
that focus on the president’s more public State of the Union program eclipsed the 
agenda influence of Carter’s draft legislation in the 96th Congress. Facing reelec-
tion in troubled times and after only limited policy successes in the 95th Congress, 
the administration and/or Congress may have decided that success of the presi-
dent’s more public program was more critical than processing the administration’s 
clearance program. To fully resolve the puzzle of the 96th Congress we must look 
at the policy decisions of the administration and Congress in much more detail. 
Carter’s influence on the 96th Congress shows that it can be misleading to look 
at either the direct effects alone or at the total effects alone when trying to assess 
the president’s influence on the hearing, markup, and floor stages of the House 
agenda. I will therefore consider direct, indirect, and total effects in examining 
each subsequent president’s influence on the congressional agenda.
Ronald Reagan
Ronald Reagan’s 1980 election victory over incumbent Jimmy Carter brought a 
Republican majority to the Senate. In this new Congress, Reagan exercised enor-
mous influence in passing both his Economic Recovery Tax Act and dramatic 
spending reductions that were included in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1981. In addition, the 97th Congress witnessed a significant change in 
the jurisdiction of the House Commerce Committee, which gained jurisdiction 
over several new energy policy areas (King 1997). The committee was renamed 
“Energy and Commerce” to reflect the new jurisdictional focus of the commit-
tee, but there is little evidence that Reagan’s State of the Union addresses were 
able to exercise much influence over the agenda of the new House Commerce 
Committee. This runs counter to the expectation that presidents will be able to 
use the legislative programming track to influence the floor agenda in their first 
Congress. The absence of Reagan’s influence in the 97th Congress, however, is 
perhaps easier to explain than Carter’s surprising influence in the 96th. Reagan 
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made very few requests in his 1981 economic message that were directly rel-
evant to Energy and Commerce. Only requests to deregulate oil price controls 
and his call for enactment of Clean Air Act amendments make specific legisla-
tive requests of the committee. His 1982 State of the Union also had few policy 
proposals relevant for House Commerce. Reagan’s narrow agenda thus provided 
little guidance for House Commerce’s agenda. Thus, it seems that even the broad 
jurisdiction of the Energy and Commerce Committee is too limited in this case 
because Reagan aimed his agenda largely towards other committees. In table C.1 
in Appendix C, I compare the bills and issues considered by Energy and Com-
merce to other committees in the 103rd Congress. While Energy and Commerce 
is one of the committees that is most representative of the entire chamber, it still 
has a limited agenda as one of more than 20 standing committees in the House. 
A study of all issues in the 97th Congress would perhaps demonstrate that the 
president’s speeches did have a positive influence on the floor agenda.
 Reagan did, however, exercise the expected influence over the early stages 
of the House agenda through the legislative clearance process, as shown in fig-
ure 6.3. Among prominent issues, the 97th Congress passed the Nuclear Waste 
Repository Act, for which Reagan submitted draft legislation but which he did 
not mention in his economic message in 1981 or in his State of the Union address 
in 1982. But the House failed to consider a Reagan request for revisions to the 
Clean Air Act and his draft legislation calling for more equitable treatment of 
health maintenance organizations and other deregulation requests. Reagan’s draft 
legislation exercised the expected positive direct effect on committee leaders, 
hearings, and markups, and this led to a positive total effect on the House floor.
FIGURE 6.3 Direct effects on the House agenda for 97th House Commerce issues.
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 When Reagan delivered a more substantial agenda to Energy and Commerce 
in the 98th Congress, the issues mentioned in his State of the Union did indeed 
exercise a direct positive effect on the floor agenda, as shown in figure 6.4. This 
is remarkable because Reagan lost 26 House seats in the 1982 midterm elec-
tion between the 97th and 98th Congresses, and yet he wielded a stronger direct 
influence over the floor agenda in the 98th Congress than in the 97th. But the 
total effect of Reagan’s State of the Union addresses on the floor agenda was 
negated by their negative influence on the markup of issues and sponsorship by 
the Democratic committee leaders. Overall, the president’s speeches exercised a 
slight negative total effect on floor consideration. Thus, while the positive direct 
effect on the floor suggests that Congress’s floor decisions were positively influ-
enced by Reagan’s State of the Union addresses, the overall floor agenda was 
dominated by issues arising from committee consideration where the Democratic 
majority seems to have largely avoided the president’s agenda issues. Congress 
took some form of action on the president’s requests for abortion, acid rain, and 
the Clean Air Act legislation but failed to act on “the skyrocketing cost of health 
care,” or on “catastrophic health insurance for older Americans” (SOTU 1983). 
Reagan was also able to use his draft legislation to exert the expected positive 
total influence only on sponsorship by committee leaders, and this was strong 
enough to yield an indirect positive influence on floor consideration.
 In his State of the Union addresses to the 99th Congress, Reagan called for an 
end to the subsidization of Amtrak, health care vouchers, slowing the growth of 
Medicare and Medicaid, the expansion of Superfund, the deregulation of natural 
gas, legislation to restrict abortions, further deregulation of the bus and railroad 
industries, and announced he was developing his own plan to deal with cata-
FIGURE 6.4 Direct effects on the House agenda for 98th House Commerce issues.
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strophic illness. In spite of this ambitious agenda, and his landslide 1984 reelec-
tion, he failed to exercise a statistically significant influence over the House 
Commerce agenda through his State of the Union addresses. This is consistent 
with the model of legislative programming from chapter 3, which predicted that 
such influence would only be effective in a president’s first Congress.
 In the draft legislation he sent to the 99th Congress, Reagan called for revi-
sion of the Clean Water Act, provision of voluntary coverage for Medicare ben-
eficiaries, stockpiling of children’s vaccines, amendment of health maintenance 
organization authorities, requiring Medicare providers to accept military and vet-
erans health insurance plans, deregulation of natural gas, and allowing the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to 
collect user fees. Reagan’s influence on the 99th Congress is summarized in fig-
ure 6.5. While Reagan was able to use his draft legislative proposals to exercise 
the predicted positive influence over the committee leader, hearing and markup 
stages of the House Commerce agenda process, he also experienced a negative 
direct influence on floor consideration. Thus, these draft proposals actually had 
a very weak negative total influence on the floor agenda. Only Carter in the 96th 
and George H. W. Bush in the 102nd also experienced a negative total effect on 
the floor agenda through his draft legislation. But in each case, the president did 
exhibit a positive influence on the early agenda stages, where draft legislation is 
expected to exercise its greatest influence because of the policy expertise it con-
tains. In the 99th and 102nd Congresses, it appears that the expertise provided 
in draft legislation was useful in committee consideration, but that political con-
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FIGURE 6.5 Direct effects on the House agenda for 99th House Commerce issues.
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cerns of the Democratic majority became dominant in determining what issues 
to bring to the floor.
 The 100th Congress was in many ways a preview of the revolutionary 104th 
Congress. In both, the opposing party took over at least one chamber of Congress 
and an aggressive Speaker of the House forged a bold domestic agenda at odds 
with the president. In both Congresses, the president also took a decidedly more 
passive role in congressional agenda setting. Ironically, because they occurred 
under the most hostile divided government years in my analysis, the 100th and 
104th Congresses mark the high water mark for the House Commerce Commit-
tee for initiating laws on Mayhew’s (1991) index of landmark legislation. James 
Wright’s and Newt Gingrich’s Houses provide a counterexample to the conven-
tional wisdom—sometimes originating in Congress itself—that suggests that the 
Congress is inherently incapable of developing a coherent agenda and seeing it 
through to passage (e.g., Sundquist 1981). Very few of the items on Mayhew’s 
index that were referred to House Commerce in the 100th and 104th Congresses 
were passed because of presidential initiative, indicating that Congress was quite 
capable in these two cases of formulating its own agenda.
 In his State of the Union addresses to the 100th Congress, Reagan included 
calls for catastrophic health insurance for the elderly, “a program of welfare 
reform through community based demonstration projects” (SOTU 1987), further 
regulatory reforms, new science and technology centers, a halt in all federal fund-
ing for abortion, and a constitutional amendment banning abortion. Reagan was 
able to use State of the Union messages to exercise a direct positive influence on 
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FIGURE 6.6 Direct effects on the House agenda for 100th House Commerce issues.
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House Commerce hearings in the 100th, as shown in figure 6.6. Although this 
direct influence on hearings did give Reagan some indirect influence over sub-
committee markups and a very small amount of indirect influence on the floor, 
this is one of the three cases (96th, 97th, and 100th) that did not fit the predictions 
of the programming model. Since the 100th was Reagan’s fourth Congress, the 
programming model predicted that he would not have sufficient accountability 
to use State of the Union speeches to influence the agenda. Reagan’s influence, 
however, was generated indirectly through his influence over hearings rather 
than directly on the floor, as the programming model would have predicted.
 In draft legislation referred to the House Commerce Committee, Reagan 
included implementation of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, establish-
ment of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, the amendment of 
federal securities laws to facilitate cooperation between the United States and 
foreign countries in securities law enforcement, and revision of the Clean Air 
Act “to control hazardous pollutants” (H.R. 5556). Reagan was able to use his 
draft legislation for direct influence over both committee leader sponsorship and 
markup, as predicted by the legislative clearance model. He did not experience 
the predicted direct influence on hearings, but his influence on committee leader 
sponsorship of an issue led to an indirect positive influence on the floor. One 
remarkable feature of the 100th Congress is that committee leaders did not expe-
rience any measurable direct influence on the floor agenda. Committee chairs 
with little direct influence over the floor appear again in the highly centralized 
104th Congress under Speaker Gingrich. Speaker Wright, like Gingrich later, 
developed an endogenous House agenda that he tried to guide through the House 
by using more centralized leadership than his predecessors. As in the divided 
government of the 104th, to be considered later, it may be that the centralization 
of agenda setting in the House leadership deprived the floor of some of the valu-
able expertise provided by committees. In the 104th, the centralization of House 
agenda setting ironically may have opened the door for the executive expertise 
in draft legislation to have a direct influence on the floor. I will consider the pos-
sibility of this dynamic in the discussion of the Clinton presidency.
George H. W. Bush
In his economic and State of the Union addresses to the 101st Congress, Bush 
included calls for an increase in funding for the war against drugs, including 
expanded treatment to the poor and young mothers, funding for AIDS educa-
tion and research, “legislation for a new, more effective Clean Air Act” (SOTU 
1989), funding for clean coal technology, penalties for pollution of the ocean, an 
increase of funding for Medicaid, mental health facilities, and cleanup of nuclear 
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weapons plants. Bush experienced the predicted positive direct effect on the floor 
agenda through his State of the Union speeches in his first Congress, as shown 
in figure 6.7.
 Bush also experienced the expected positive influence on early stages of the 
congressional agenda through submission of draft legislative proposals. In draft 
legislation referred to the 101st House Commerce Committee, Bush included 
requests for additional enforcement of securities laws, Food and Drug Adminis-
tration user fees for the review of drugs, deregulation of oil pipelines, a compre-
hensive drug control plan, and further regulation of the stock market.
 In his State of the Union addresses to the 102nd Congress, Bush’s requests 
included drug abuse prevention, elevating the Environmental Protection Agency 
to a Cabinet position, air pollution control, product liability reform, a review of 
the nation’s health care system, a national energy strategy that included energy 
conservation and alternative energy, a program of preventative medicine, imple-
mentation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), reform of 
the health insurance market, and welfare reform. Bush experienced the expected 
pattern of no visible effect on the congressional agenda through these State of the 
Union issues in his second Congress, as shown in figure 6.8.
 Bush also experienced the expected positive influence on early stages of the 
legislative process through the submission of draft legislation in the 102nd Con-
gress, but this was overridden by a direct negative influence on the floor agenda. 
In the drafts submitted to the 102nd Congress, Bush included legislation improv-
ing procedures for allocating assignment to the electromagnetic spectrum, which 
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FIGURE 6.7 Direct effects on the House agenda for 101st House Commerce issues
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I discussed in chapter one, to expand the nation’s drug treatment capacity, to 
reduce medical liability costs, and a comprehensive health care plan. The spec-
trum auction issue received consideration at the hearing stage, where presidential 
expertise is hypothesized to be influential, but did not receive floor consideration 
in the 102nd.
Bill Clinton
Bill Clinton came to office in the 103rd Congress under the first unified govern-
ment since Carter’s 96th. Clinton’s economic and State of the Union addresses to 
the 103rd Congress included requests for health care reform, increased environ-
mental cleanup, children’s vaccinations, welfare reform, an energy conservation 
program, reform of Superfund, connecting classrooms and libraries to the Inter-
net, a revision of the Safe Drinking Water Act and Clean Water Act, investment 
in environmental technologies, and campaign finance reform. Like George H. 
W. Bush in the 101st Congress, Clinton experienced the predicted first-Congress 
direct influence on the floor agenda through his State of the Union addresses. He 
also experienced a negative direct effect on hearings, but this did not cancel his 
total positive effect on the floor agenda.
 After the 107th Congress, Clinton’s 103rd Congress experienced the second 
largest total effect on the congressional agenda from his draft legislation of any 
president in this survey. As indicated in figure 6.9, the direct effect on the floor 
FIGURE 6.8 Direct effects on the House agenda for 102nd House Commerce issues.
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was .183, indicating that submission of draft legislation on an issue was associ-
ated with an 18.3 percentage point increase in the chance that the issue would 
appear on the floor agenda, controlling for other factors. Clinton submitted draft 
legislation for comprehensive health care reform, the prevention of mineral min-
ing in Antarctica, revision of the Safe Drinking Water Act, enhancement of the 
safety of nuclear power facilities, development of the Internet, implementation of 
NAFTA, and regulation of chemical pesticides in food. Like presidential drafts in 
the 104th and 107th Congresses, these drafts had an unexpected direct positive 
effect on the floor. The direct influence in the 103rd and 107th Congresses may 
have occurred because the same party controlled the presidency and the House. 
In the only other case of a House under the control of the president’s party, how-
ever, Carter did not experience a direct influence of his draft legislation on the 
floor in the 96th, his second Congress. Unfortunately, as noted earlier, there is 
not yet sufficient evidence to say anything authoritative about the influence of 
unified government on the president’s agenda-setting power.
 The 104th Congress brought Republican control to the House for the first 
time in 40 years. The whole legislative process changed under Republican 
leadership. Committees were eliminated. The House “Energy and Commerce” 
committee lost jurisdiction over several policy areas and was renamed the 
“Commerce” Committee (King 1997). Speaker Gingrich employed task forces 
to expedite consideration of legislation rather than passing it through the tradi-
tional legislative channels, because he had pledged the House to pass items on 
the Contract with America in the first 100 days. The corrections calendar was 
created to expedite consideration of noncontroversial legislation. The Speaker 
FIGURE 6.9 Direct effects on the House agenda for 103rd House Commerce issues
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was restricted from making joint referrals unless they were either sequential or 
split up parts of a bill to go to different committees. And in both types of joint 
referrals, a primary committee was to be designated. Also, Congress reduced its 
own ability to generate policy expertise by cutting committee staff by one-third, 
eliminating funding for the 23 legislative service caucuses, and abolishing the 
Office of Technology Assessment. In his State of the Union addresses to the 
104th Congress, Clinton included requests for lobbying and campaign reform, 
childhood vaccines, welfare reform, health insurance portability, and the V-Chip 
for televisions. As shown in figure 6.10, Clinton had the predicted absence of 
influence on the House agenda through these State of the Union messages.
 As in the 103rd Congress, Clinton surprisingly exercised both a positive 
direct and total influence on the floor agenda from his draft legislation in the 
104th. Clinton submitted proposals for nuclear waste disposal, welfare reform, 
a juvenile crime measure, pipeline safety, increased penalties for environmental 
crimes, and many others. From the informational perspective of the clearance 
model of chapter 4, it appears that the way Gingrich opened up the floor, circum-
vented the committees, and reduced staff and supporting agencies actually weak-
ened Congress with respect to the expertise of the federal bureaucracy wielded in 
Clinton’s draft legislation because it deprived the floor of the valuable expertise 
traditionally provided by committees. George W. Bush would exercise a similar 
direct effect on the floor in the 107th Congress, but that case was apparently 
brought about by the urgent need to bring the president’s proposals for respond-
ing to the September 11 terrorist attacks to the floor, rather than a weakening of 
committee expertise.
FIGURE 6.10 Direct effects on the House agenda for 104th House Commerce issues.
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 The change in the majority party also brought in new committee chairs who 
were less experienced at pushing their policy proposals to the floor and had less 
policy expertise than their more senior Democratic predecessors. But these new 
committee chairs were also weakened by the structural changes introduced in the 
104th House. With the weakened chairs, hearings played a stronger role in deter-
mining what reached the floor and had almost as much direct influence on the 
floor as committee markups. In this decentralized environment Clinton was able 
to use draft legislation to exert some influence over the agenda, at the same time 
ironically that he found himself having to publicly defend the relevancy of the 
presidency.6 Clinton exercised this influence mostly in the second session after 
Gingrich had lost a public relations battle with Clinton over a budget impasse 
that led to repeated government shutdowns. The Republicans’ strategy changed 
after the government shutdowns, and they started looking for some legislative 
accomplishments to peddle in their reelection battles. “Some of the 104th’s best 
work came in the session’s last months when the committees were more active. 
For instance, the Commerce Committee pushed through two high-profile envi-
ronmental bills—a rewrite of the safe water drinking act (PL104–182) and an 
overhaul of pesticide regulations (PL104–170)” (CQ Almanac 1996). While it 
would be an exaggeration to say that Clinton played a strong agenda-setting role 
in the 104th, it appears that Gingrich’s attempts to make the House legislative 
process less beholden to committee leaders offered a more open process that 
Clinton was able to exploit with the expertise in his draft legislation.
 By the 105th Congress, committee leaders already began to regain some of 
their direct influence on the floor agenda and by the 106th the committee lead-
ers would exercise levels of influence comparable to their Democratic predeces-
sors. Part of this regained influence may be due to the experience and expertise 
the new Republican chairs gradually acquired, but the chairs’ influence over the 
floor continued even in the 107th, when term limits that were initiated in the 
104th brought in a new set of committee leaders. More importantly, it seems the 
party began to return more responsibility to the committee chairs: “After central-
izing power in the 104th by writing legislation in task forces instead of commit-
tee, by the 105th the GOP was ready to return power to the committee chairs. 
. . . There was a feeling that the committees had better expertise” (CQ Almanac 
1998).
 Clinton’s State of the Union addresses to the Republican Congresses contin-
ued to be exercises in futility. In his State of the Union addresses to the 105th 
Congress that impeached him on two articles, Clinton included requests for 
AIDS research, health insurance portability, modernization of Medicare, Super-
fund enhancement, a ban of toxic chemicals, patient’s rights, a plan to buy into 
Medicare before retirement, revision of the Clean Water Act, a ban on cloning of 
humans, and campaign finance reform. As shown in figure 6.11, these issues did 
not have a statistically significant effect on any stage of the agenda.
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 Clinton’s draft proposals in the 105th Congress, however, fit the predictions 
of influence in the early information-gathering stages of the legislative process. 
Clinton found a significant positive direct influence on both hearings and com-
mittee leaders. In draft legislation submitted to the 105th Congress, Clinton 
included requests for stiffer penalties for environmental crimes, a ban on the 
cloning of humans, Medicaid and Medicare reform, and the deregulation of the 
electric power industry. Clinton’s drafts experienced a slight negative direct 
influence on floor consideration, but this was negated by his expected positive 
influence on earlier stages to yield a net positive influence on the floor.
 In his historically lengthy State of the Union addresses to the 106th Congress, 
Clinton included requests for legislation to save Social Security, reform Medi-
care, provide a patient’s bill of rights, insure privacy of medical records, offer 
health insurance portability, reform campaign finance, provide health coverage 
for uninsured children, offer Medicare prescription drug coverage, expand men-
tal health services, develop biomass energy, and much more. As shown in figure 
6.12, these appeals had no significant positive impact on the agenda and actually 
exercised a negative direct influence on hearings.
 In draft legislation submitted to the 106th Congress, Clinton included electric-
ity deregulation, pipeline safety, protection of privacy of medical and financial 
information, health coverage for the uninsured, improvement of nursing home 
care, and consumer protection in Internet sales of prescription drugs. These draft 
issues exercised a negative direct influence on the floor but still exhibited a posi-
tive total influence on the floor due to their positive impact on earlier stages.
FIGURE 6.11 Direct effects on the House agenda for 105th House Commerce issues.
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George W. Bush
George W. Bush’s 107th Congress was unusual because of the historic mid-ses-
sion change of leadership in the Senate from the Republicans to the Democrats, 
after the defection of Senator Jim Jeffords from the Republican Party, but this 
Congress became extraordinary because of the events of September 11, 2001. 
Congress responded in urgent fashion to the president’s requests to deal with 
the crisis. For example, the USA PATRIOT Act was enacted even before Bush’s 
second State of the Union. In his State of the Union addresses to the 107th Con-
gress, Bush included legislative requests for Medicare coverage of prescription 
drugs, a patient’s bill of rights, medical malpractice reform, cleanup of toxic 
brownfields, alternative energy sources, energy conservation, campaign finance 
reform, vaccines against bioterrorism, welfare reform, and national service. As 
predicted for his first Congress, Bush was able to exercise a significant direct 
positive influence on the floor consideration of these issues through his major 
addresses. Bush’s influence on the 107th House agenda is represented in figure 
6.13.
  Bush’s draft proposals exercised an unusual positive direct impact on the 
floor. In draft legislation referred to the House Commerce Committee, Bush’s 
requests included establishing the Department of Homeland Security, preventing 
bioterrorism, combating money laundering, and resolving disputes regarding the 
allocation of the electromagnetic spectrum. But it appears that Bush exercised 
influence on the floor rather than in the committees for a very different reason 
FIGURE 6.12 Direct effects on the House agenda for 106th House Commerce issues.
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than Clinton. Whereas Clinton was able to play on the vulnerability of a floor 
operating without the full resources of its committees, several of Bush’s propos-
als were brought to the floor deliberately because of their urgency. In addition, it 
appears that Congress was not equipped to pull together the kind of comprehen-
sive responses to terrorism that Bush developed through the coordinated efforts 
of the federal bureaucracy in drafting the USA PATRIOT Act, establishing the 
Department of Homeland Security, and developing a bioterrorism protection 
bill. These exceptional measures demonstrate in exaggerated form the kind of 
expertise that has allowed the president to exercise consistent influence on the 
congressional agenda through draft legislation.
Conclusion
The results of this chapter generally support the main theoretical predictions of 
chapters 3 and 4, with some illuminating exceptions. The president is able to use 
State of the Union speeches and draft legislation to influence the issues on the 
congressional agenda. State of the Union speeches exert effective agenda-set-
ting influence on later stages of the agenda process, but these speeches are most 
often effective in a president’s first Congress. Although often celebrated as the 
president’s main agenda-setting tool, e.g., Light (1991) and C. Jones (1994), the 
State of the Union addresses offer the president a very limited means of influ-
FIGURE 6.13 Direct effects on the House agenda for 107th House Commerce issues.
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encing the congressional agenda. The influence the president exercises through 
his State of the Union speeches was generally effective only on the floor stage 
of the legislative process and usually only during a president’s first Congress. 
Surprisingly, Carter was able to use State of the Union speeches to influence the 
congressional agenda in his second Congress, and Reagan was able to use them 
in his last Congress after being uninfluential in his first term. Reagan’s early 
ineffectiveness is, at least partly, a function of very small number of his agenda 
items that were within House Commerce’s jurisdiction. Carter’s influence in 
his second Congress hints that unified government may enhance the president’s 
ability to set the congressional agenda through his State of the Union addresses. 
Presidents are, after all, more likely to share agenda priorities with their fellow 
partisans in Congress than with the opposite party. However, there are only two 
Congresses (96th and 103rd) with fully unified government, so there simply are 
not enough cases here to make a valid inference about the role of unified govern-
ment without further evidence.
 As predicted, the expertise of executive draft legislation from the legisla-
tive clearance process provides a more consistent influence on the congressional 
agenda than the State of the Union addresses, and the influence of drafts tends 
to act more directly on earlier stages of the legislative process, like committee 
leader sponsorship, hearings, and markups. In chapter 4, I developed a model 
that suggested that this influence over the agenda arises from the policy expertise 
that is embodied in such draft legislation. In all twelve Congresses studied, the 
president’s draft legislation exercised a direct influence over the issues consid-
ered in at least one of the three early stages of agenda consideration (committee 
leader sponsorship, hearings, and markup). Draft legislation also exercised a 
positive total influence on the floor in nine of the twelve Congresses. In three 
exceptional cases (103rd, 104th, and 107th Congresses), drafts had a significant 
direct positive influence on floor consideration. Ironically, it may be because of 
centralization of the House agenda process in the 104th Congress that committee 
expertise was used less, thereby providing an opening for the president to exploit 
with his control of executive expertise. This, however, can only remain a conjec-
ture without further analysis.
 The persistent influence of draft legislation and the ephemeral influence of 
presidential speeches beg the question of whether presidents have a larger overall 
impact on public policy through the submission of draft legislation than through 
public speeches. The results of this chapter certainly point in this direction. C. 
Jones (1994) has pointed out that most of the legislative business of Congress 
concerns adjustments to already existing legislation, which he calls the “continu-
ing agenda,” rather than new policy proposals. It is particularly in determining 
where to make adjustments to this less prominent continuing agenda that draft 
legislation may play a more important agenda-setting role than presidential 
speeches. And the cumulative effect of this agenda control over an entire presi-
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dency may leave a more enduring legacy on public policy than the policy agenda 
the president promotes in his public speeches.
 Despite the influence of the president and other actors, by far the most impor-
tant determinant of each House agenda stage is simply the previous agenda stage, 
so that the issues that are subject to hearings are the ones most likely to reach 
markup, and issues that reach markup are the most likely to reach the floor. This 
has important implications for presidential agenda setting because it means that 
the president may be able to exercise a larger effect on the floor consideration of 
an issue by influencing hearings or markup, i.e., indirectly, than he can by direct-
ly influencing the floor. For example, the president’s draft legislation rarely had 
a direct positive influence on floor consideration, but it had a positive total effect 
on the floor agenda in nine of the twelve Congresses because of such indirect 
effects.
 The issue-level data of this chapter have also revealed that committee lead-
ers and the Senate play an important role in determining the House agenda. The 
committee leaders are the most important agenda actors in the House, often hav-
ing effects on each of the stages of the congressional agenda that were several 
times larger than that of other actors like the president and the Senate. This again 
suggests that the president can wield influence on the floor agenda indirectly, i.e., 
by influencing which issues are taken up by committee leaders, as he did in all of 
the Congresses studied. 
 In addition to revealing the complex nature of the president’s influence on 
the congressional agenda, the issue-level data have reaffirmed the conventional 
wisdom that committee leaders play by far the most important role in setting the 
congressional agenda, even in the more open 100th and 104th Congresses, where 
they still exercised a significant indirect effect on the floor. In each Congress the 
data have also supported the less widely acknowledged argument that the Sen-
ate exercises an important influence on the later stages of the House agenda. In 
the next chapter I explore this bicameral link further by turning attention to the 
president’s influence on the Senate agenda and the influence of the House on the 
Senate agenda.
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Because the U.S. Constitution requires that bills be passed by the Senate as well 
as the House before they are presented to the president for signing, analysis of 
the president’s influence on the House agenda alone offers a potentially incom-
plete picture of his influence on the congressional agenda. The modern Senate 
provides a challenging test of the president’s ability to set the congressional 
agenda because many politicians enter the Senate in an attempt to wield their own 
influence on the national agenda (Oleszek 2001; Sinclair 1989). In this chapter I 
analyze whether the president is nevertheless able to influence the Senate agenda 
through his public addresses and draft legislation.
Differences in the House and Senate Legislative Processes
In general, bicameralism adds a layer of redundancy to policy making that may 
reduce the overall efficiency of Congress. Only some special cases of legisla-
tion—e.g., treaties, nominations, revenue-raising bills—receive privileged treat-
ment in one of the chambers. In practice, however, the House and Senate operate 
under an informal division of labor, where issues of high priority to each cham-
ber often receive more serious consideration in that chamber, followed by more 
perfunctory consideration in the other chamber. This can be seen, for instance, in 
figures 5.5 and 5.6, by the different route of consideration given in each cham-
ber to bills and issues from the other chamber. Despite this informal division of 
labor, bills must clear the House in time for Senate consideration before the end 
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TABLE 7.1 House and Senate committee jurisdictions in 97th Congress 
*Except health care supported by payroll deductions
House Energy and Commerce   Senate Commerce, Sci., and  Tech.
 Foreign commerce
 National energy policy
 Exploration, production, regulation of energy
 Conservation of energy
 Commercial application of energy technology
 Energy information
 Generation and transmission of electrical power
 Interstate energy compacts
 DOE and FERC
 Inland waterways Inland waterways
 Railroads Railroads
 Regulation of interstate and foreign communications
 Securities and exchanges
 Consumer protection Consumer protection
 Travel and tourism
 Public health and quarantine
 Health and health facilities∗ 
 Biomedical research
Coast Guard
Coastal zone management
Highway safety
Interstate commerce
Marine and ocean navigation
Marine fisheries
Merchant Marine
Nonmilitary aeronautical and space sci-
ences
Ocean, weather, and atmospheric services
Panama Canal
Science, technology, research
Interstate carriers (buses, trucks, pipe-
lines)
Sports
Standards and measurements
Transportation
Outer Continental Shelf Lands
 
Larocca_final.indb   118 8/8/2006   12:48:44 PM
Chapter 7: Presidential Agenda Setting in the Senate
119
of a Congress and vice versa. This potentially crowds each chamber’s agenda 
with those bills that have already passed in the other chamber. Bicameralism, 
therefore, although allowing some division of labor in the initiation and serious 
consideration of issues, also imposes further time and resource constraints on the 
congressional agenda (Longley and Oleszek 1989).
 I analyze the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
(hereafter Senate Commerce Committee). This committee is in one important 
way the natural Senate counterpart to the House Energy and Commerce Commit-
tee. Although Munger and Torrent (1993) show that there really are not powerful 
committees to the same extent in the Senate, it is the broadest and most active 
of the Senate policy committees (Evans 1991, 29). The Energy and Commerce 
Committee developed the same reputation in the House during the period of this 
analysis (King 1997, 42). Smith and Deering (1990, 82) also report that the House 
Energy and Commerce and Senate Commerce Committees have more minutes of 
news coverage than any other policy committees in their respective chambers.1 
And yet the jurisdictional range of Senate Commerce is much smaller than that of 
House Commerce, because it covers very few of the popular health care, energy, 
and environmental issues. The jurisdictions of the two committees as they stood 
in the 97th Congress are compared in table 7.1, which reveals that there is very 
little overlap in the formal jurisdictions of those committees in spite of their simi-
lar names.
 Table 7.2 shows, however, that there is somewhat more overlap in the “com-
mon law” or informal agendas of House and Senate Commerce because on 
average 29.5% of the total number of issues considered by either committee are 
Congress House Commerce Only
Senate Commerce 
Only
Both House and 
Senate Commerce
Total Number of 
Issues
96 64.1% 13.8% 22.0% 1,815
97 61.9% 17.2% 20.9% 1,400
98 64.1% 15.7% 20.2% 1,620
99 67.7% 12.3% 20.0% 2,135
100 67.3% 10.4% 22.3% 2,706
101 55.2% 18.1% 26.7% 2,230
102 51.5% 18.2% 30.3% 2,611
103 43.3% 17.5% 39.2% 2,856
104 50.6% 14.3% 35.1% 3,170
105 49.0% 14.5% 36.5% 2,922
106 53.4% 14.7% 31.9% 3,127
107 50.9% 16.0% 33.0% 3,235
Average 55.3% 15.2% 29.5% 2,485.6
TABLE 7.2 Overlap in the issues covered by bills referred to House and Senate Commerce   
Committees, 96th–107th Congresses
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referred to both committees in a given Congress. In fact, the percentage of Senate 
Commerce issues that are shared with House Commerce is larger than the per-
centage of Senate Commerce issues that are not shared with House Commerce.
 In table C.2 in Appendix C, I also compare characteristics of the bills and 
issues submitted to Senate Commerce to the characteristics of bills and issues 
submitted to all other standing committees in the 103rd Senate. As was also true 
of House Commerce in table C.1, Senate Commerce seems to receive a mix of 
issues that is representative of the overall set of issues in the chamber.
 Since the House and Senate have about the same number of committees, it is 
not surprising that the House, with more than four times as many representatives 
introducing legislation, has committees that handle a bigger workload. The House 
Energy and Commerce Committee contains about twice as many members as its 
Senate counterpart, and these members have fewer committee assignments than 
Senators, which aids the House committee in processing its bigger workload.
 For a number of reasons, including the smaller size of the Senate, committees 
and subcommittees do not necessarily have the same importance in the Senate 
consideration of legislation as they do in the House (Baker 1989, Sinclair 1989; 
Binder and Smith 1995; Dion 1997). Looser formal rules and the individualistic 
nature of the Senate also make it much easier for a bill sponsor to circumvent 
the committees in bringing a measure before the Senate for consideration. A bill, 
for example, can be offered as a nongermane amendment to another bill under 
consideration since the Senate has few restrictions on germaneness of amend-
ments and rarely uses restrictive rules in considering legislation. Unlike House 
members, Senators can also call ad hoc hearings on an issue when a committee 
refuses to give it consideration, putting public pressure on the committee to act. 
Most importantly, because Senators can block action on legislation with a fili-
buster, controversial issues are considered under unanimous consent agreements. 
Because unanimous consent agreements are often used in the Senate, individual 
Senators have a greater chance to influence legislation. By contrast, the House 
considers only noncontroversial legislation under unanimous consent, is more 
likely to use suspension of the rules that requires only two-thirds approval, and 
often considers major and controversial legislation under restrictive rules that 
place limits on debate and amendments.
 In the next section I consider recent spatial models of supermajoritarian poli-
tics that have been used to capture this unique Senate lawmaking process. I show 
how these models are better suited for explaining policy outcomes on a single 
issue than the agenda-setting problem of which issues the Senate considers in 
committee and on the floor. I then characterize the predictions of the informa-
tional models of public addresses and draft legislation for the president’s agenda 
influence in the Senate, in particular noting how it is likely to differ from his 
influence in the House. Finally, I test the predictions of these models on all legis-
lation referred to the Senate Commerce Committee from 1979 to 2002.
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The Filibuster and Supermajoritarian Politics
The explosive growth of the filibuster in the post-reform Congress and the fail-
ure of the unified government under Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton to break the 
policy gridlock of the divided government that preceded it inspired researchers 
to extend the basic median voter theorem to take into account the supermajoritar-
ian obstacles to legislative action that arise in the Senate.2 With the filibuster, a 
majority’s preferred policy can be assured of victory only when there is no group 
of 41 or more senators who prefer the status quo to the measure being voted on. 
Any group of 41 or more senators can block cloture votes to end debate, which 
requires approval of three-fifths of senators, and thus forestall action on legisla-
tion they find less appealing than the status quo. Whereas the majority often gets 
its way in the House, the Senate is essentially a supermajoritarian institution, 
requiring three-fifths support to overcome the filibuster.
 The models of chapters 3 and 4 assumed a median voter in the legislature 
and thus are not directly designed to model agenda setting in supermajoritarian 
institutions like the Senate. Here I consider the pivotal model (Krehbiel 1998) of 
Senate policy making to examine how supermajoritarian procedures affect the 
president’s agenda-setting influence. I show that supermajoritarian procedures 
have less impact on agenda setting than they have in determining the final bill 
passed by the Senate.
 Consider the general policy issue space represented in figure 7.1, where FL 
represents the 41st senator and FR the 60th senator as they are arranged from left 
to right by ideal policies along an issue dimension. The determinant of whether 
gridlock occurs is the location of the status quo relative to these pivotal senators. 
All of the senators to the left of FL represent a filibuster group that would be 
unwilling to let any status quo policy located at or to the right of FL move further 
to the right, regardless of the preferences of the other senators. Even if the status 
quo were located exactly at FL and all 59 other senators attempted to move it 
slightly to the right, the filibuster group could block such a move.
 Similarly, FR denotes the location of the ideal policy of the 60th senator (from 
right to left) and a filibuster group made up of this senator and the 40 senators to 
the right, who can block any attempt by the Senate to move a status quo located 
FIGURE 7.1 The Senate’s gridlock region
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at or to the left of FR any further to the left. Together these filibuster pivots thus 
prevent policy from changing at all if the status quo is located between the pivots, 
FL and FR. The region between the pivots is thus called the “gridlock” region by 
Brady and Volden (1997). The filibuster groups also place restrictions on what 
happens on issues where the status quo is located outside of the gridlock region; 
legislation can only move the status quo closer to or into the gridlock region. 
Once policy is in the gridlock region, of course, it cannot be altered unless this 
new status quo is subsequently bumped out of the gridlock region through exoge-
nous events or the election of new senators with differing preferences. See Brady 
and Volden (1997) or Krehbiel (1998) for a fuller explanation of the model.
 In agenda-setting models from chapters 3 and 4 with the status quo on each 
issue located at sq = 0 (see figure 7.2), the right filibuster pivot, FR, can be 
ignored because the status quo cannot be moved any further to the left. The left 
filibuster, FL, thus plays the key role in determining policy outcomes. This fili-
buster group, however, can block policy moves only to the right. In particular, the 
left filibuster group will block any policy that moves the status quo further from 
the pivot’s ideal point, FL, than the status quo. All possible policies must therefore 
fall between the status quo and 2FL.
 The filibuster models are designed to counter the policy predictions of legisla-
tive stalemate in divided government that is generated by party-based models of 
legislative decision making. Sundquist (1988) and Ginsburg and Shefter (1990) 
found divided government responsible for gridlock because it provides incentives 
for the president and Congress to undermine each other’s initiatives. Mayhew 
(1991), however, provides a strong case against stalemate in divided govern-
ment theory by showing there is little change in the amount of major legislation 
produced by unified vs. divided governments. Conditional party models (Rohde 
1991; Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rohde 1995) are more subtle models of divided 
government because they claim that the distribution of the majority party’s pref-
erences matters as much as whether the majority party holds the presidency. 
Fragmented parties, like the Democrats in the House with a host of conservative 
southerners in the 1980s, thus are unable to form the coalitions necessary to pass 
their agenda. Dion (1997) finds further that the majority party is actually more 
cohesive when it is smaller.
FIGURE 7.2 Range of possible Senate policy outcomes when status quo = 0
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 Despite the appeal of the conditional party argument, parties are alarmingly 
absent in the supermajoritarian models of gridlock I have been considering (Brady 
and Volden 1997; Krehbiel 1998). But this is by design. The parties holding the 
presidency and controlling Congress are inconsequential for policy outcomes 
because gridlock is determined by the preferences of the filibuster pivotal senators 
on each issue, the president’s veto point, and the median voter in the House. All 
legislative outcomes on a given issue are deducible from this limited amount of 
information about the issue. Because of its sparseness, however, the gridlock mod-
els have more to say about what policies will be blocked than the exact policies 
that will be passed. For example, if the status quo is located outside the gridlock 
region, the Senate can pass any policy between the two filibuster pivots.
 The Senate filibuster pivots have implications for presidential agenda setting 
as well as for gridlock. First, notice that in presidential agenda setting the effects 
of the presidential veto can be ignored in most cases since the president can pro-
pose policies where he and both chambers agree about how to move policy with 
respect to the status quo. Just as the veto was largely inconsequential in the mod-
els of chapter 3 and 4, it plays little significant role here.3
 The supermajoritarian nature of the Senate, however, still places two impor-
tant restrictions on the issue chosen by the House according to the agenda model 
considered in chapters 3 and 4. On the issue the president would like Congress 
to work on, the left Senate filibuster pivot must be to the right of the status quo, 
sq = 0 < FL, and the final policy enacted must be to the left of the right filibuster 
pivot, x < FR. If the House chooses action on an issue where the status quo lies 
in the gridlock region, it is likely to see any policy change blocked in the Senate. 
Thus, the Senate may have a restrictive effect on the issues that are chosen by the 
House. For the purposes of the models developed in chapters 3 and 4, however, 
FIGURE 7.3 Configuration of ideal points on two issues in bicameral agenda setting 
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as long as the left filibuster falls to the right of the status quo, the Senate will not 
block all possible action. Only policies to the right of 2FL are then likely to be 
blocked.
 Consider the two issues represented in figure 7.3. The Senate will reject 
any attempt to move policy to the right of 2FL,i on either issue i = 1,2. If h1, the 
House’s median position on issue 1, or p2, the president’s ideal policy on issue 
2, are greater than 2FL,i on the issue i under consideration, the Senate may thus 
affect House action on that bill. The House has an interest in finding an agenda 
issue acceptable to the president where either h1 is maximized, i.e., the status quo 
is furthest from its ideal policy, and h1 < 2FL,1 or where 2FL,1 is maximized when 
h1 > 2FL,1. Likewise, the president has an interest in choosing an issue acceptable 
to Congress where p2 is maximized and p2 < 2FL,2 or where 2FL,2 is maximized 
subject to p2 > 2FL,2.
 Gridlock theory is agnostic, however, on the question of exactly where policy 
will be moved when the status quo lies outside the gridlock region. If the gridlock 
region is relatively large, many possibilities exist, and the gridlock theories rel-
egate such decisions to bargaining and agenda-setting power. In Congress, cham-
ber differences are often resolved with conference committees, which are likely 
to choose a policy between the House and the Senate medians.4 While gridlock 
theory is agnostic on the question of agenda setting, Brady and Volden (1997) 
suggest that the results of gridlock theory leave agenda setting as the chief role of 
the president: “The final significant role of the president in the theory of legisla-
tive policy making is in bringing the public’s attention to an issue. . . . Whereas 
the revolving gridlock theory argues that legislator preferences and institutions 
affect where policy will end up, the president can help decide which issues will 
be addressed. . . .  From this view, the president becomes more an agenda setter 
than a force influencing policy outcomes” (32).
 Brady and Volden, however, fail to explain exactly how the president exer-
cises this influence over the issues addressed. Whenever the status quo on an 
issue falls between the pivotal members of the Senate on that issue, a filibuster 
coalition will effectively forestall action on that issue. Thus, only issues where 
the status quo lies outside of the gridlock region are amenable to the president’s 
agenda-setting power. A similar but less restrictive condition was imposed in 
chapters 3 and 4, where I modeled Congress by the median voter. In that case, the 
president’s issue had to satisfy the condition that both the president and Congress 
desired to move policy in the same direction relative to the status quo. The Sen-
ate thus adds a possibly more restrictive condition on presidential agenda setting 
but does not necessarily eliminate it. In fact, when considering the Senate instead 
of the House, the same results follow from chapters 3 and 4, as long as issues 
are available to the president that satisfy the gridlock conditions. Still, since the 
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supermajoritarian character of the Senate filibuster may restrict the set of issues 
available for presidential agenda setting, the gridlock theories lead us to predict 
that the president may exercise less overall influence over the Senate agenda than 
over the House agenda. In the next section I join these considerations and other 
Senate differences with the models of chapters 3 and 4 to generate predictions 
about the president’s likely influence on the Senate agenda that I test in the fol-
lowing section.
Model Predictions
To explore the president’s effect on the Senate agenda, all of the issues covered 
by bills referred to the Senate Commerce Committee in the 96th through 107th 
Congresses were coded similarly to House bills in the previous chapter. The 
total of 2,758 bills and 4,229 issues referred to the Senate Commerce Commit-
tee, however, represents only a fraction of the 11,379 bills and 7,906 issues that 
were referred to the House Energy and Commerce Committee during the same 
Congresses.
 In the introduction to this chapter I argued that differences between the vis-
ibility of senators and members of Congress made the senators less vulnerable to 
efforts by the president to set the congressional agenda. The president’s public 
addresses are also less effective in the Senate because only one-third of the Sen-
ate is up for reelection in any given election year. The influence of the president’s 
addresses on members in the legislative programming model from chapter 3 
occurred because the information provided by the president was used by voters to 
decide whether to reelect their representative. The dynamics of declining presiden-
tial accountability and six-year Senate terms may actually shield a portion the Sen-
ate from presidential influence because there is always the possibility that there 
will be a new president before one-third of the Senate comes up for reelection.
 Draft legislation is expected to have a significant impact on the Senate agenda 
because the executive has an even larger advantage in expertise over the Sen-
ate than over the House, which has more manpower and more specialists. I thus 
expect that the president’s draft legislation will have a positive effect on an issue’s 
chance of reaching the floor in the more open floor agenda process of the Senate.
 In summary, the two main differences from the expectations in the House 
in terms of the president’s influence are: (1) the president’s major addresses are 
expected to have a less significant impact on all stages of the Senate agenda pro-
cess; and (2) the president’s draft legislation is expected to exercise a stronger 
direct influence on both the committee and floor agendas in the Senate.
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Overall Presidential Influence on the Senate Agenda
In table 7.3, I present the statistically significant total effects on the Senate floor 
agenda from the president, committee leaders, and the House for all issues cov-
ered by bills referred to the Senate Commerce Committee from the 96th to the 
107th Congresses. The president’s major addresses exercise a positive total influ-
ence on the floor agenda in only three Congresses, and they exercise a negative 
total influence in the same number of Congresses. This influence is weaker and 
less consistent than in the House. This weaker influence was predicted in part 
because senators are better equipped to challenge the president’s dominance of 
the agenda through the media as a result of their greater prominence than House 
members (Sinclair 1989, 214). In the cases where the president exercises a total 
negative influence on the Senate agenda, issues mentioned by the president are 
actually less likely to be considered by the Senate, ceteris paribus. Not surpris-
ingly, two of these Congresses, the 100th and 101st, occur in divided government 
when a Republican controlled the presidency and Democrats controlled the Sen-
ate. In the other case, the 98th Congress, Republicans controlled both the presi-
dency and the Senate.
TABLE 7.3 Statistically significant (p <.10) total effects from president, committee, and   
House on the Senate Commerce floor agenda, 96th–107th 
Note: Statistically significant total effects are approximately calculated by including only direct or indirect effects that are statistically 
significant at the p ≤.10 level.
President Congress MajorAddress
Draft
Legislation
Committee
Leader
House
Bill
Request
for
Executive
Comment
Total 
Number  
of Issues
Carter 96 .04 .17 .40 .29 + .20t .03 651
Reagan 97 .06 .32 .21 + .20t -.03 531
98 -.15 -.02 .51 .28 + .19t -.05 580
99 -.03 .23 .27 − .05t .15 690
100 -.07 .00 .03 .19 + .10t -.08 884
 G. W. H. Bush 101 -.03 .13 .05 .25 + .13t -.05 999
102 .002 -.04 .09 + .22t .00 1,264
Clinton 103 .20 .01 .15 + .08t -.11 1,613
104 .16 .03 .25 − .02t -.06 1,552
105 .05 .12 .15 .10 + .17t .00 1,377
106 .06 .33 .22 + .27t .00 1,353
G. W. Bush 107 .15 N.A. .24 .27 − .00t -.17 1,588
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 As predicted, the president is more successful in using draft legislation than 
public addresses to set the Senate agenda. In the 98th and 99th Congresses, the 
president’s draft legislation had a negative total effect on the floor agenda, but 
in all other Congresses it was positive and significant. Committee leaders are, 
on average, also weaker influences on the agenda than their counterparts in the 
House Commerce Committee. Another significant difference from the House is 
that the other chamber plays a much stronger agenda-setting role in the Senate, 
as can be seen in figure 7.16, which presents the average size of the House and 
Senate agenda influences side-by-side.
 The effect of House bills is broken down into two components, e.g., .29 + 
.20t, where the first term (.29) indicates the influence on the floor agenda of an 
issue being covered by a House bill that is referred to the Senate only after the 
issue has already been introduced by a Senate bill. The second term (.20) indi-
cates the additional influence that comes from an issue appearing in the Senate 
on a House bill before any Senate bills are introduced on the topic. House bills 
have a positive influence on the Senate agenda in all Congresses, and in 9 of the 
12 Congresses House initiation of an issue also exerts an additional positive total 
effect on floor consideration. Breaking down House issues into those that are 
introduced before and after the same issue is introduced by Senate bills allows 
more precise determination of the House’s influence on the Senate agenda. Since 
the House has a larger legislative workload than the Senate, House bills make 
up a much larger portion of the Senate agenda than is the case for Senate bills 
on the House agenda. Many of the issues that are introduced in the Senate are 
Issues on House bills Percentage
House- Senate- Total of Issues
Initiated Initiated House Total Initiated
Congress Issues Issues Issues Issues by House
96 8 143 151 656 1.22%
97 17 104 121 542 3.14%
98 16 196 212 590 2.71%
99 27 166 193 689 3.92%
100 23 305 328 903 2.55%
101 60 375 435 999 6.00%
102 45 549 594 1266 3.55%
103 131 889 1020 1629 8.04%
104 136 741 877 1566 8.68%
105 135 367 502 1489 9.07%
106 132 593 725 1456 9.06%
107 135 351 486 1588 8.50%
TABLE 7.4 Number and origin of Senate issues referred to Senate Commerce, 96th–107th
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introduced through House bills. In table 7.4, I show that anywhere from 1.22% 
to 9.07% of all of the issues introduced in a given Senate were placed there by a 
House-passed bill before any Senate bill was even introduced on the topic.5 By 
contrast, an insignificant number of issues are introduced into the House for the 
first time by Senate-passed bills, so it would have been less informative to break 
down Senate bills in this way when considering the House agenda in chapter 6.
  House issues are particularly fascinating because they might serve as a means 
for the president to exert influence over the Senate agenda in the same way that 
his influence over House Commerce Committee leaders gives him indirect influ-
ence over the House agenda. However, interaction terms multiplying the variable 
for the president’s message or draft legislation by the House bill variables do not 
indicate any significant total influence on the Senate floor. The House is a major 
player in Senate agenda setting―perhaps even more important than Senate com-
mittee leaders as will be shown in figure 7.16―but given that the president’s 
modest control over even the House Commerce agenda, the detection of such an 
effect, if it exists, may require a Congress-wide study.
 I have largely the same expectations for contextual variables in the Senate 
as in the House with some notable exceptions. Theoretical explanations for the 
expectations in the context of the House are presented in table 6.4. In the Senate, 
(1) the average number of cosponsors should have a positive total effect on the 
Senate floor agenda; (2) multiply referred issues should have a negative impact 
on the Senate floor agenda; (3) authorization issues should have a positive effect 
on the Senate floor agenda; (4) the order of introduction should have a negative 
effect on the Senate floor agenda; (5) Democratic sponsors should have a posi-
tive impact in Democrat-controlled Senates and a negative impact in Republican-
controlled Senates; and (6) the average tenure of the main sponsor should have 
a positive impact on an issue’s chance of appearing on the Senate floor agenda. 
Many of these House expectations are borne out in the Senate data but less con-
sistently than in the House.
 I also add a variable in the Senate data that indicates whether the issue is a 
matter of private rather than public legislation. Much of Congress’s legislative 
production is such private legislation, but in the Senate Commerce Committee 
almost all of this private legislation concerns documenting merchant ships, such 
as the following example from the 103rd Congress:
H.R. 2198.  A bill to authorize a certificate of documentation for the vessel 
“Serenity.”
Most private legislation is not controversial and passes easily, but I control for it 
in the analysis to make sure that the agenda effects of public bills are not biased 
by the inclusion of private bills. Almost no private legislation was referred to the 
House Commerce Committee, so I ignored this variable in the consideration of 
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House agenda setting in chapter 6. I expect a private legislative issue to have a 
significantly higher probability of reaching the Senate floor agenda but a lower 
probability of receiving hearings since such matters are noncontroversial and 
involve particular constituents rather than broad public policy issues, which 
might elicit public interest. The statistically significant total effect from these 
control variables are presented in table 7.5.
 The maximum number of cosponsors has the expected positive total influence 
on floor consideration. Multiple referrals have a puzzling positive effect on the 
Senate floor agenda in the 103rd to 107th Congresses as well as the 98th Congress. 
Otherwise, they have the expected negative total influence on the floor. Authori-
zation issues have the expected positive total influence on the floor agenda in 9 
of the 12 Congresses studied. The timing of earliest introduction has the expected 
negative association with floor consideration in 9 of the 12 Congresses. But the 
relation of the proportion of Democratic sponsors to floor consideration does not 
seem to be driven by the party in control of the Senate in the way that it was in 
the House. Oleszek (2001, 181) offers a possible explanation for this difference: 
“Unlike the House, where the majority party led by the Speaker is in charge of 
scheduling, the majority and minority leaders in the Senate together largely shape 
the institution’s program and agenda.” It is not surprising that the Senate thus 
appears less partisan in its agenda setting, but it is surprising that more evidence 
of a party bias does not appear. The same inconsistency afflicts the average Senate 
tenure of bill sponsors for an issue. In the 104th through 107th Congresses, the 
Congress
Max. 
Number of 
Cosponsors
Multiply
Referred
Authorization
Issue
Private 
Legislative 
Issue
Timing of 
Earliest
Introduction
Sponsored 
by
Democrat
Max.
Sponsor
Experi-
ence
Total 
Number of 
Issues
96  0.00 -0.24 0.15 0.24 < 0.01 0.17 651
97  < 0.01 -0.37 0.24 -0.08 -0.33 < 0.01 0.03 531
98 0.01 0.23 < 0.01 -0.28 -0.03 < 0.01 580
99 0.01 -0.03 < 0.01 0.08 -0.35 -0.16 0.01 690
100 0.01 -0.003 < 0.01 0.32 < 0.01 0.32 0.03 884
101 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.34 0.05 0.14 -0.01 999
102 0.01 -0.06 0.12 0.74 -0.31 0.21 0.01 1,264
103 < 0.01 0.21 -0.04 0.11 -0.17 0.36 0.02 1,613
104 0.01 0.57 < 0.01 -0.31 -0.49 -0.16 1,552
105 0.01 0.31 < 0.01 0.13 -0.20 < 0.01 1,377
106 0.01 0.65 -0.01 -0.16 -0.51 -0.07 1,353
107 0.02 0.58 0.39 0.09 -0.12 0.05 1,588
TABLE 7.5 Statistically significant (p < .10) total effects from issue and contextual variables  
on the Senate Commerce floor agenda, 96th–107th  
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effect of main-sponsor experience disappears. The results also show that private 
legislative issues exercise a significant positive influence over the Senate floor 
agenda in 8 of the Congresses considered but a negative significant influence 
over the agenda in four Congresses. Next, I examine in detail the influence of the 
president and the House on the Senate agenda for issues covered by bills referred 
to Senate Commerce in each Congress from the 96th to the 107th.
Jimmy Carter
Carter’s influence over the Senate agenda in his second Congress, the 96th, 
presents an exception to the two patterns that will characterize the most sig-
nificant differences between the president’s House and Senate influence: (1) the 
president’s speeches rarely have any influence on the Senate agenda; and (2) the 
president’s draft legislation exerts most of its influence on hearings in the Senate 
rather than on committee leaders.
 As shown in figure 7.4, Carter’s State of the Union addresses to the 96th 
Congress exhibit a surprising positive influence on committee markups and yield 
a positive total influence on the floor agenda. Carter’s major addresses also exer-
cised influence in the 96th House, but in that case it was due mainly to direct 
influence on the floor.
 Carter’s draft legislation in the 96th Senate exercises a direct positive influ-
ence over committee leaders and over markup and a negative direct influence on 
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FIGURE 7.4 Direct effects on the Senate agenda for 96th Senate Commerce issues
Larocca_final.indb   130 8/8/2006   12:48:47 PM
Chapter 7: Presidential Agenda Setting in the Senate
131
the floor but no direct influence over hearings. In subsequent Congresses, the 
president will typically experience a more robust direct influence on hearings 
than on either committee leaders or markup. Carter’s draft legislation also exerts 
a negative direct influence on the floor in the 96th Senate, but this is counterbal-
anced by the positive indirect effects from committee leaders and markup so that 
the president has a positive total influence on the Senate floor.
 Issues introduced in the Senate on House-passed bills exhibit a slight nega-
tive influence on hearings and markup but a powerful positive direct influence on 
Senate floor consideration. Issues that are first introduced on House-passed bills 
have a direct positive influence on the Senate floor that is slightly larger than the 
combined direct influence of Senate committee leaders and markup. This is a 
strong influence indeed, and the Senate exercised no comparable level of influ-
ence over the House floor in the Congresses studied in chapter 6.
Ronald Reagan
Reagan brought with him into office a Republican majority in the Senate. Many 
of his legislative proposals were introduced first in the Senate in order to gain 
legislative momentum. As figure 7.5 reveals, Reagan’s draft legislation had a 
direct positive influence on committee leaders and hearings but a negative direct 
influence on markup. Even in his first Congress, Reagan was not able to posi-
tively influence the Senate consideration of issues through his State of the Union 
addresses, but this may have been partly because he focused on economic issues 
in his first Congress, as I discussed in the last chapter. Reagan’s issues covered 
FIGURE 7.5 Direct effects on the Senate agenda for 97th Senate Commerce issues
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in addresses to the 97th Congress included government regulation, petroleum 
(with respect to pipelines), and subsidies among issues that fall directly under 
the committee’s official jurisdiction. The Democratic House continued to exer-
cise a very powerful direct positive influence over the Senate floor in the 97th 
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Congress, but the now-Republican Senate’s influence over the House weakens, 
as was shown in figure 6.3.
 In the 98th Congress, Reagan surprisingly exercised negative total influ-
ence over the Republican Senate Commerce agenda from his State of the Union 
speeches, as shown in figure 7.6. Reagan’s draft legislation, however, exhibited 
the typical Senate pattern of direct positive influence on hearings. In the 98th 
Congress, the House exerts a negative direct influence on Senate hearings for 
issues introduced first on Senate bills but a very powerful positive direct influ-
ence for issues first introduced on House-passed bills. The House also exerts a 
positive direct influence on markup and the floor in the 98th Senate.
 As shown in figure 7.7, Reagan’s draft legislation in the 99th Congress exhib-
ited the same pattern as in the 97th Senate: a positive direct influence on commit-
tee leaders and hearings but a negative direct influence on markup. The House 
exerts a positive direct influence on hearings in the 99th only for issues that are 
first introduced by House-passed bills. However, these House-initiated issues 
exert much less influence on the Senate floor than Senate-initiated issues that are 
covered by House bills.
 As shown in figure 7.8, in the 100th Congress after the Senate was taken 
back by the Democrats, Reagan again found that his State of the Union addresses 
exerted a negative direct and total influence on an issue’s likelihood of reaching 
the Senate floor agenda. Reagan’s speeches did exercise a direct positive influ-
ence on committee leaders, but it was not strong enough to fully counterbalance 
the negative direct influence his speeches exerted on the Senate floor. Reagan’s 
draft legislation was able to exercise a positive total influence on the floor 
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through its influence on committee leaders. In the unified Democratic 100th Con-
gress, House passage exerts an unusually strong influence on committee markups 
but mainly for issues first introduced in the Senate by House-passed bills. Other 
than this, there is little influence that the 100th House and Senate were any more 
successful in coordinating their agendas than the 3 preceding divided-party Con-
gresses.
George H. W. Bush
Like Reagan in the 98th Congress, Bush experienced a positive direct influence on 
the Senate floor agenda with his draft legislation in the 101st as shown in figure 
7.9. Bush’s draft legislation also exercised the predicted positive direct influence 
on committee leaders and hearings. Bush’s speeches, however, exercised only a 
negative direct influence on the Senate floor agenda, indicating that the Senate 
and White House were pushing competing agendas. The House exerted a direct 
positive influence on markup and the floor in the 101st Senate, with an additional 
positive influence for House-initiated issues on the Senate markup stage.
 As shown in figure 7.10, the 102nd Senate stands out as the only case in either 
chamber where committee leaders did not exercise a direct positive influence 
on any stage of the agenda-setting process. Bush’s draft legislation still exerted 
the predicted positive direct effect on hearings, but this was nearly nullified by 
a direct negative influence on the Senate floor agenda and by the indirect nega-
tive impact through committee leaders. Bush’s speeches exercise no measurable 
FIGURE 7.9 Direct effects on the Senate agenda for 101st Senate Commerce issues
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influence on any stage of the 102nd Senate agenda. The influence of the House 
was negative on Senate hearings in the 102nd Congress but positive on the Senate 
floor agenda, particularly for House-initiated issues, which also exerted a positive 
influence on Senate markup.
Bill Clinton
Ironically, the 103rd Congress looks much like the 102nd, even though the Dem-
ocrats now controlled the presidency. In contrast to the 103rd House, Clinton’s 
speeches evidenced no measurable influence on the 103rd Senate at any stage of 
the agenda-setting process, as shown in figure 7.11. Furthermore, Clinton’s draft 
legislation experienced a direct negative influence on the Senate floor that some-
what weakened the indirect influence he experienced by way of committee lead-
ers, hearings, and markups. In the 103rd Congress, the House exercised a direct 
positive influence on markup and the floor in the Senate, and House-initiated 
issues exercised a direct positive influence on hearings.
 The 104th Congress brought Republican leadership to the Senate as well as 
the House. Clinton’s State of the Union addresses to the 104th Congress exercised 
no measurable influence on the Senate agenda, as shown in figure 7.12. How-
ever, Clinton was able to exercise considerable influence over the Senate floor 
agenda through the submission of draft legislation, particularly at the hearing 
and markup stages. In the Republican House and Senate of the 104th Congress, 
FIGURE 7.10 Direct effects on the Senate agenda for 102nd Senate Commerce issues
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House-initiated issues exerted a surprisingly strong negative additional impact on 
the Senate floor that negated the positive impact the House exerted on Senate-
initiated issues. This suggests that House passage had a direct positive influence 
on the Senate floor for Senate-initiated issues but a direct positive influence on 
markup and hearing for House-initiated issues.
 It is notable that the House and Senate of the 104th Congress had separate 
FIGURE 7.11  Direct effects on the Senate agenda for 103rd Senate Commerce issues
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uncoordinated agendas, even though the Republicans were in control of the 
House for the first time in 40 years and in control of the Senate for the first time 
since 1986. The new Republican control of both chambers might have led one 
to expect that the House would have played a stronger role in setting the Senate 
agenda in the 104th Congress, but the House actually had one of its weakest total 
impacts on the Senate floor agenda in the 104th Congress. Perhaps signals that 
the House and Senate would not work too closely together were evident in the 
different 1994 campaign pledges signed by House and Senate Republican candi-
dates; House Republicans had pledged to the 10 elements of the “Contract with 
America” while the Senators had embraced only the 7 of these elements in their 
own “Seven More in 94” contract as shown in table 7.6. The disconnect is espe-
cially surprising when considering that Gingrich purposefully avoided controver-
sial issues like abortion and school prayer in defining an agenda all Republicans 
could unite behind. The balanced-budget amendment and the term limit proposal 
were both defeated in the Senate after passing in the House. Furthermore, the 
104th Senate also voted a rule change whereby it would adopt a formal legislative 
agenda at the beginning of each Congress by a three-fourths vote of all Republi-
can senators in an effort to gain more independent control over its agenda.
 Ironically, the measured influence of Clinton’s speeches and draft legislation 
is quite robust in the 105th Congress, in which the House impeached him on two 
articles. Clinton’s drafts and speeches both experienced a direct and total posi-
tive influence on the Senate floor agenda, as shown in figure 7.13. This differs 
markedly from his influence in the House, where his speeches had no measurable 
impact and his draft legislation exercised a direct negative impact on the floor 
Contract With America Seven More in 94
1. Balanced-Budget Amendment 1. Balanced-Budget Amendment
    and Line-Item Veto
2. Crime Legislation 2. Crime Legislation
3. Welfare reform 3. Welfare Reform
4. Family and Child Legislation
5. Middle-Class Tax Cuts 5. Middle-Class Tax Cuts
6. Reduce Defense Cuts 6. Reduce Defense Cuts
7. Social Security 7. Social Security
8. Capital Gains Reductions 8. Capital Gains Reductions
9. Product Liability Reform
10. Term Limits
TABLE 7.6 Republican House and Senate candidate campaign agenda pledges 
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agenda. Clearly, the Senate was not as polarized against Clinton as the House, as 
became clear in the 106th Congress when the Senate voted to acquit the president 
on both impeachment articles. In the 105th Congress, the House exercised a posi-
tive direct influence on hearings and the floor of the Senate for Senate-initiated 
issues. The House exercised a positive direct influence on markups and the floor 
for House-initiated issues.
 In the 106th Congress, Clinton’s speeches had no direct impact on any stage 
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of the Senate agenda, as shown in figure 7.14. The 106th Senate also experienced 
one of the lowest levels of influence from draft legislation. Clinton’s drafts had 
a direct positive influence only on the committee-leader stage of the Senate 
agenda. In terms of House influence on the Senate agenda, the 106th Congress 
looks similar to the 101st. House-passed issues exert a positive direct influence 
on markup and the floor in the Senate, and House-initiated issues exert a strong 
additional influence on Senate markup.
George W. Bush
The 2000 election produced an exact tie in the Senate, which led to a brokered 
compromise regarding leadership and membership of the Senate committees. 
Democrats would hold the chairmanships as long as Gore held the decisive tie-
breaking vote as vice president, i.e., until the January 20 inauguration of Presi-
dent George W. Bush. Afterwards, the Republicans would chair the committees. 
But, as mentioned in chapter 6, the 107th Congress was also marked by the 
historic mid-session change of leadership in the Senate from the Republicans to 
the Democrats, after the defection of Senator Jim Jeffords from the Republican 
Party. This sent the leadership of the committees back to the Democrats on June 
6, 2001.
 As shown in figure 7.15, in the 107th Senate the president’s addresses exer-
cise only a positive direct influence over hearings, which leads to a positive total 
influence on the Senate floor. Unfortunately, the president’s draft legislation sub-
FIGURE 7.15  Direct effects on the Senate agenda for 107th Senate Commerce issues
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mitted to the Senate Commerce Committee is unavailable, so I am able to mea-
sure only the influence of the president’s speeches on the agenda. House issues 
that are initiated by Senate bills in the 107th Congress exert a relatively similar 
level of direct positive influence on hearings, markup, and the floor in the Senate. 
House-initiated issues, however, exert a much stronger influence on the markup 
stage and a much weaker influence on the Senate floor.
Conclusion
Overall, the president exercises little regular influence over the Senate agenda 
through mentions of an issue in his State of the Union addresses, even in the 
president’s first Congress when he often enjoys such influence in the House. The 
House, however, does act as a very strong influence on the Senate agenda, so it 
is possible that the president exerts influence on the Senate indirectly through his 
influence on the House. The evidence I have collected from a single committee 
is inadequate, however, for determining whether the president can actually exer-
cise such influence indirectly on the Senate through his influence on the House. 
Data from multiple committees could offer more insight into this intriguing pos-
sibility.
 The effects of the president’s draft legislation are stronger and look more like 
the results in the House. In the Senate, draft legislation exercised a significant 
positive total effect on the floor agenda in 9 of the 11 Congresses where I mea-
sure the influence of drafts, compared to 9 of 12 Congresses in the House.
 In figure 7.16, I compare the average effects of influences on the House and 
Senate agendas. The overall internal patterns are similar. In both House and 
Senate, the strongest influence on the floor agenda comes from markup, and 
the strongest influence on markup comes from hearings. As would be expected, 
however, committee leaders exercise more influence in the House than in the 
Senate. There are also significant differences in the president’s overall average 
influence in the House and Senate. On average the president’s speeches have no 
influence in the Senate, while they have a slight positive overall average influ-
ence on the House floor. Draft legislation exercises its strongest average influ-
ence on hearings in the Senate, while it has its strongest influence on committee 
leaders in the House. And in the Senate, the effect of draft legislation on early 
stages of the agenda tends to be tempered by an occasional negative direct influ-
ence on the floor. In both House and Senate, the influence of draft legislation is 
mostly on earlier stages of the agenda process, i.e., the consideration of issues in 
committee.
 The House also exerts a stronger influence on the Senate agenda than the 
Senate exerts on the House agenda. For Senate-initiated issues, the Senate looks 
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like the House, with House-passed issues having a direct positive influence on 
markup and the floor. For House-initiated issues, however, there is also evidence 
of a direct positive influence on Senate hearings and stronger influence on Senate 
markup.
 Overall, the results of this chapter indicate that the president is able to wield 
significant positive influence over the Senate floor agenda for bills referred to 
the Senate Commerce Committee but mainly though draft legislation. The model 
of legislative clearance in chapter 4 suggests that this influence over the agenda 
arises because of the expertise incorporated into draft legislation. Sinclair’s 
(1989) characterization of the Senate as a body of media entrepreneurs offers 
an important explanation for the inability of the president to exercise influence 
over the Senate through public appeals in his State of the Union addresses, but 
there are other considerations as well, including the small size of the Senate, 
longer Senate terms of office, and the more open Senate legislative process. A 
question that remains is whether the president can still exercise such influence 
indirectly through his influence over the House agenda because House issues 
make up a large share of the issues in the Senate and because House passage has 
a strong influence on the Senate agenda. While I have found no evidence that 
the president exercises an indirect influence on the Senate, the consideration of a 
single committee in each chamber may be too limited a perspective from which 
to detect this indirect effect. If it exists, however, the president’s overall indirect 
effect on the Senate agenda through the House is probably very slight since I can 
detect no evidence of it in any of the Congresses studied here.
FIGURE 7.16 Comparative average influence of president on agenda stages for issues referred 
to 96th through 107th House and Senate Commerce Committees.
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Although the 1787 Constitution enjoined the president annually to recommend 
to Congress all measures he judges “necessary and expedient,” by 1885 Wood-
row Wilson had found the presidency so ineffective that he condemned the 
American system as “Congressional government.” However, modern presidents, 
particularly through the development of the legislative programming and legis-
lative clearance processes detailed in chapters 3 and 4, have recovered much of 
their constitutionally endowed responsibility. Consequently, today the president 
is often recognized as the chief agenda setter in Congress (e.g., C. Jones 1994; 
Light 1991; Peterson 1990). This modern understanding is, however, somewhat 
misleading. Although the president plays a significant role in setting the congres-
sional agenda, internal congressional forces including committee chairs and the 
other chamber are more important in determining which issues advance from bill 
introduction to committee or floor consideration. Much of the president’s influ-
ence on both the House and the Senate agenda is an indirect result of his influence 
on committee leaders and committee agendas rather than direct influence on the 
floor agenda.
Informative Representation
I have developed two informational models that explain how the president has 
come to exercise agenda-setting influence over Congress, and I have used new 
multidimensional issue-level data to trace the institutional lineaments of that 
Information and Presidential Agenda Setting
■
  8 ■
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power. The president is shown to exercise more direct control over the floor agen-
da through his role in public addresses, yet this influence is short-lived and seems 
to be effective mainly in the House. The president’s control over executive exper-
tise in draft legislation is shown to provide a more consistent influence on the con-
gressional agenda of both chambers, but only for issues which are either relatively 
noncontroversial or highly technical. The persistent application of this legislative 
clearance influence throughout the president’s term, however, may in the end be 
more consequential for public policy than the major policy issues the president is 
able to bring to the congressional agenda through his public addresses.
 In both instances the president is able to exercise informal influence through 
the provision of information. In the case of public addresses the president pro-
vides information to voters that may influence the congressional agenda by 
altering voters’ assessment of the most important problems. In the case of draft 
legislation, the president’s control over policy expertise from executive agencies 
gives him a technical informational advantage over Congress that allows him to 
influence the issues Congress considers.
 I have developed a model of the president’s public addresses where the 
president exercises influence over the congressional agenda and policy outcomes 
because he provides information to voters about the most important issues facing 
Congress. Voters may or may not then use the president’s policy agenda as a stan-
dard for reelecting members of Congress. The president does not directly change 
the voters’ policy preferences in this model but instead uses his policy expertise 
to provide information about issues on which the voters are not well informed. 
 This is a much weaker kind of influence than is suggested by arguments that 
the president can “go public” to force Congress to pass the president’s program 
or arguments that the president possesses a mandate from the electorate because 
it models voters themselves as strategic agents who are not automatically influ-
enced by the president’s message. For example, the president’s public addresses 
are only effective early in his term because voters realize that the president only 
has a strong incentive to communicate policy information faithfully to them 
when reelection still looms in the future as a means of holding the president 
accountable for his leadership.
 The result is a sober picture of the president’s ability to “go over the heads of 
Congress” in order to manipulate the congressional agenda via public opinion. 
Presidents only seem to be able to use public addresses to influence the congres-
sional agenda in their first one or two Congresses in the House and even more 
infrequently in the Senate. And even in these Congresses, the president is con-
siderably weaker than other actors like committee chairs and the other chamber. 
Nevertheless, public addresses are the president’s chief tool for bringing congres-
sional attention to sweeping and controversial issues like Jimmy Carter’s energy 
plan or Bill Clinton’s health care reform. The model bears out the folk wisdom 
that presidents must introduce any large-scale policy changes at the beginning of 
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their first Congress, though for different reasons than are usually advanced. It is 
neither a perceived mandate (Conley 2001) nor a honeymoon (Ragsdale 1988), 
but the president’s accountability to the voters that drives his early influence in 
this model.
 Since the development of the legislative clearance process in 1935 (Neustadt 
1954), the president has also had the ability to control the policy expertise that 
flows from the executive agencies to Congress in the form of draft bills. The 
president is able to influence the agenda through draft legislation because the 
policy expertise contained in a draft bill makes Congress better informed than it 
would otherwise be about how to resolve a policy issue. While technical exper-
tise alone is unlikely to sway the congressional agenda towards issues where 
the president and Congress have fundamental policy disagreements, there are 
likely to be many issues connected with already-existing government programs 
like Medicare, the Clean Air Act, and the Public Health Service Act, where their 
policy preferences are similar. Since this “continuing agenda” accounts for a 
large portion of the policy bills introduced in Congress, the president’s control 
of executive draft legislation offers a potentially important power to influence 
the direction of public policy, though in a much more gradual manner than the 
landmark issues that are more likely to arise in his public addresses.
 For example, in each Congress many bills are introduced to extend Medicare 
coverage to new treatments and diseases. Because of the crowded congressional 
agenda, very few of these amendments to the Social Security Act receive any 
attention. However, the president may submit a draft bill of Medicare amend-
ments prepared by the Department of Health and Human Services, which there-
fore may be more persuasive than any of the bills drawn up by individual mem-
bers or committees covering other Medicare issues. This kind of alteration in 
the “continuing agenda” is more likely to be incremental rather than drastic, but 
because this presidential influence is persistent throughout his term the cumula-
tive effect on public policy may be quite large. A president may, for example, 
shift the focus of new Medicaid coverage areas to preventive rather than cata-
strophic care over the course of several Congresses through the submission of a 
series of draft bills that propose coverage for preventive procedures.
 This suggests that it pays for presidents to be mindful of the possible long-
term policy change that is possible through the legislative clearance process, as 
Gilmour noted in the quote opening chapter 4. But it also serves as a caution that 
a president may be able to use draft legislation to slowly shift national policy 
agenda in ways that are not highly visible to the public. For example, Ronald 
Reagan submitted a series of draft bills proposing the deregulation of the finan-
cial services industry,1 which helped precipitate the Savings and Loan crisis that 
his successor George H. W. Bush inherited. Since the legislative clearance pro-
cess often involves highly technical issues that are not highly salient, like finan-
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cial institution regulation, natural gas regulation, and radio spectrum allocations, 
agenda shifts in these areas are likely to go unnoticed among the general public. 
The resulting changes in policy are more likely to be unnoticed both because 
they are gradual rather than dramatic and because they sometimes concern highly 
technical issues like pollution allowances or spectrum auctions that are not easily 
understood by the public. This caution, however, is mitigated by the observation 
that I discussed earlier in this chapter: the president’s overall influence on the 
agenda remains weaker than internal congressional influences like committee 
chairs and the other chamber. Furthermore, the built-in limitations of this exper-
tise-based agenda setting suggest that the president cannot use draft legislation 
to redirect the congressional agenda to issues where the president and Congress 
have fundamental disagreements. Only the president’s public addresses can offer 
dramatic shifts in the policy agenda, and this process necessarily involves voters 
as well as the president and Congress.
 The analysis of the main pathways of bills and issues through the House 
and Senate in chapter 5 revealed that the agenda-setting process is enormously 
complex, and that there are many ways that issues can advance on the agenda 
other than the textbook process, particularly in the House. This complicates 
the president’s job in trying to influence the agenda. The more direct avenues 
that exist for a bill to go to the floor, the more the president’s influence from 
executive expertise seems to be enhanced because the president’s expertise can 
serve as a substitute for committee expertise for bills that circumvent committee 
consideration. For example, in the 104th House, where the Republican leader-
ship frequently used ad hoc task forces to prepare bills for the floor instead of 
standing committees, Clinton’s draft legislation had a direct positive influence 
on the floor consideration of an issue, whereas draft legislation exercised a direct 
positive influence only on committee consideration in most other Congresses. I 
argue that Clinton’s surprising influence in this case arose because the congres-
sional task forces did not benefit from the same level of technical expertise as 
the standing committees. Ad hoc task forces thus generally yield bills with more 
uncertain policy effects than traditional committee bills. In this environment the 
expertise contained in the president’s draft legislation became more valuable at 
the floor stage of consideration even though the party leadership had centralized 
policy making.
 It is also noteworthy that recent models of supermajoritarian institutions have 
not yet been generalized to acknowledge this informational advantage at the 
heart of the legislative clearance process (e.g., Brady and Volden 1997; Kreh-
biel 1998). Yet, just as legislative committees may use their expertise to secure 
policies closer to their ideal,2 the president can use the expertise of the federal 
bureaucracy to secure policies closer to his own ideal or to place his issue priori-
ties on the congressional agenda.
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The Bicameral Hurdle to Presidential Agenda Setting
As a part of the empirical analyses of chapters 6 and 7, I measured the influence of 
bills passed in one chamber on the issues under consideration in the other cham-
ber. In both the House and the Senate the other chamber proved to be one of the 
most robust influences on the agenda, particularly for late stages of the agenda 
like floor consideration. It is still common, however, for models of presidential-
congressional interaction to portray the Congress as a single actor or as a unicam-
eral body. The “pivotal” models of Krehbiel (1998) and Brady and Volden (1997) 
stand out because they model the House and Senate separately, and my analysis 
suggests further reasons why the unicameral assumption is precarious. The presi-
dent exercises a different kind of influence in the House than he does in the Sen-
ate because of the policymaking differences between the chambers. The picture is 
also complicated by the fact that each chamber is a very powerful agenda setter in 
the other chamber, granting the other chamber’s bills privileged consideration.
 Furthermore, there is little effective formal coordination of the House and 
Senate agendas. Despite a recent increase in informal meetings between the 
House and Senate leadership and their staffers to coordinate their policy agendas 
(Galloway 1994, 288), attempts at such coordination are still rare, even when the 
same party controls both chambers (Baker 1989; Sinclair 1995). One implica-
tion for presidential agenda setting is that the president’s influence is weakened 
because he has to deal with two separate and uncoordinated congressional agen-
das. However, there are other ways in which the president’s influence is actually 
enhanced by the lack of formal coordination.
 The president’s influence due to his public addresses stems partly from the 
advantage the president has over members of Congress in communicating with 
the public. This advantage might be diminished if the House and Senate work 
together to promote a common agenda because the Senate already seems to be 
somewhat immune to this kind of presidential dominance. Since the president’s 
influence due to executive expertise arises from his control of the vast informa-
tion of the federal bureaucracy, the House and Senate could also diminish the 
advantage the president holds in policy expertise if they coordinate their hearings 
and other information gathering actions.3 In these ways, at least, the inability to 
coordinate House and Senate agendas actually seems to strengthen the presi-
dent’s ability to influence the agenda in both chambers.
 The question remains whether the president can wield influence indirectly 
in the Senate through his influence over the House agenda or vice versa. House 
bills, in particular, make up a considerable portion of the legislation and issues 
introduced in the Senate. While I have found no evidence that the president can 
influence the one chamber’s agenda by setting the agenda in the other chamber, 
the consideration of a single committee in each chamber may be too limited a 
perspective from which to detect this indirect effect.
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Issues vs. Bills
One of the innovative aspects of this project is the use of issue-level rather than 
bill-level data for the analysis of the president’s influence on the agenda. I ana-
lyze issues instead of bills because issues are the fundamental units of agenda 
setting. Knowing what bills are on the agenda does not necessarily tell us what 
the agenda is unless we observe the issues covered by those bills as well. This 
was strikingly evident in the difference between the flow of bills and issues 
through the legislative process as portrayed in the figures of chapter 5.
 The issue-level data were analyzed to explore the influence of the president 
and other factors on each level of the congressional agenda. The results are 
largely supportive of the predictions of the agenda-setting models of chapters 3 
and 4. The president’s public addresses tend to influence the floor stage of the 
legislative process, and this influence is exercised mainly in the House and in 
the president’s first Congress. The draft bills of the legislative clearance process 
generally influence earlier stages of the legislative process in both chambers, and 
they tend to have a more persistent influence throughout the president’s term. 
Yet, it must also be reiterated that other influences on the congressional agenda 
loom even larger than these presidential mechanisms. For example, committee 
leaders and the other chamber generally play a more robust role in determining 
the congressional agenda than the president at most stages.
 It is sometimes argued that issues that are not salient go through an incuba-
tion period whereby they may become readied for future consideration (Kingdon 
1984). It is possible, by this argument, that hearings, markups, and other forms of 
consideration in one Congress may lead to expedited consideration of an issue in 
the following Congress. At the bill level, however, it is difficult to identify cor-
responding bills from Congress to Congress. Here, issue-level data would seem 
to provide a natural advantage to bill-level analysis because the same issue can 
easily be identified in each Congress. Unfortunately, however, the Congressio-
nal Research Service’s Legislative Indexing Vocabulary (CRS-LIV) issues have 
changed from Congress to Congress, making such cross-Congress analysis diffi-
cult. Only 349 (out of 7,906) issues in the CRS-LIV are common across the House 
Commerce Committee jurisdiction in all twelve Congresses from the 96th through 
the 107th. Measurement of similar issues across Congresses would also permit 
easier identification of Jones’s “continuing agenda,” but such work must await the 
development of a means of tracking CRS-LIV issues across Congresses.
Agenda Setting and Law Making
Despite the complexity of the legislative process, one can identify a trajectory 
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for the majority of issues that largely reflects the textbook understanding of law 
making. By dissecting the common pathways of issues, I break the agenda-set-
ting process within either chamber into three main stages: (1) hearings, (2) mark-
up, and (3) floor consideration. I have analyzed the president’s influence on com-
mittee markups and hearings as well as floor consideration, but I have stopped 
short of analyzing the president’s influence on the passage of bills or issues. Yet, 
agenda setting is important ultimately because it does in fact have consequences 
for what is enacted. The president’s main influence on policy outcomes may even 
come from his agenda-setting powers. A long tradition of research explaining the 
ability of the president to influence the final policy outcome of roll-call votes has 
yielded mixed results (e.g., Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989). Meanwhile, 
previous empirical studies also have found in different ways that the president 
is able to influence the congressional agenda (e.g., Edwards and Barrett 2000; 
C. Jones 1994; Taylor 1998). These results and the models I have presented here 
suggest that while the president may not always be able to get Congress to vote 
the way he would like on a particular measure, he has been often able to play a 
significant hand in determining what kind of measure Congress is considering, 
which determines in no small degree the final policy outcome.
 Because agenda setting can be as important as the president’s ability to secure 
passage of particular measures for public policy outcomes, my findings raise new 
questions. First, the president’s ability to affect the congressional agenda through 
public addresses is very short-lived, and the admonition by Paul Light and oth-
ers for the president to “hit the ground running” has all the more urgency. But 
the findings of the legislative clearance model suggest another path. The presi-
dent has a more persistent influence on the congressional agenda through the 
expertise he is able to employ in draft legislation. Although many of these bills 
involve technical amendments to previously enacted law, the cumulative effect 
the president can exercise on public policy through the control over this agenda 
throughout his entire tenure may outpace the effect he is able to wield from his 
public addresses. It is worth questioning whether presidents interested in having 
a policy impact should direct more of their attention to the potential influence of 
the vast expertise of the federal bureaucracy, channeled through the legislative 
clearance process, particularly in later years of their presidency when their public 
address agenda-setting influence seems to falter. 
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Definition of Equilibrium Solution Concept
I simplify the analysis of the infinitely repeated legislative programming game 
by restricting attention to stationary strategies, i.e., strategies that require each 
actor to choose the same action when he faces structurally identical conditions. 
Since I assume that presidents can serve only two terms, the first Congress of 
a presidential administration presents the president, Congress, and voter with 
choices that are structurally identical to the choices they face in the first Congress 
of other presidential administrations. I restrict attention to equilibria in which 
the president, Congress, and voter will make identical decisions in each of these 
structurally identical conditions. In a similar way, the conditions in the second, 
third, and fourth Congresses of a president’s tenure yield structurally identical 
choices in Congresses of other presidents. I restrict attention to equilibria in 
which actors in the second, third, and fourth Congresses of a president’s tenure 
are also restricted to stationary strategies. Without this restriction, strategies can 
become enormously complicated and perhaps less realistic because they can 
depend on all previous actions in the game. One way of thinking about stationar-
ity in this game is that Congress and the voter forget everything that happened 
before the current presidential administration began.
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 I find a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in stationary strategies, which requires 
that the stationary strategies are “sequentially rational” given the voter’s beliefs 
and given that the voter’s beliefs that are updated rationally (by Bayes’s rule). A 
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the legislative programming game satisfies the 
following conditions for some specified common discount factor 0 < δ < 1 and 
wage k ≥ 0:
1.  The president chooses a strategy, specifying a sequence of signals 
{mt}t = 1, . . . , 4 that maximizes the president’s utility Eup given the 
equilibrium strategies of Congress and the voter and the voter’s equi-
librium beliefs.
2.  Congress chooses a strategy, specifying a sequence of pairs of legisla-
tive policies {b1,t, b2,t}t = 1, . . . that maximizes Congress’s utility Euc 
given the equilibrium strategies of the president and the voter and the 
voter’s equilibrium beliefs.
3.  The voter chooses a strategy, specifying a sequence of pairs of reelec-
tion decisions {rm,t, rp,t}t = 1, . . . that maximizes the voter’s utility 
Euv given the equilibrium strategies of the president and Congress 
and the voter’s equilibrium beliefs.
4.  The voter’s prior beliefs about the value of v2,t in each period t are 
rational and updated using Bayes’s rule whenever possible, i.e.,
 Prob(v2,t = 2v  | mt) = [Prob(v2,t = 2v )Prob(mt | v2,t = 2v )] / [Prob(v2,t 
= 2v )Prob(mt | v2,t = 2v ) + Prob(v2,t = 0)Prob(mt | v2,t = 0)]
 
 The voter observes neither the value of her ideal point, v2,t, chosen by nature 
in each period t nor the exact policies bt = {b1,t, b2,t} chosen by Congress in each 
period. The voter does observe the policy issue signaled by the president and 
the policy issue chosen by Congress. The voter also directly observes the utility 
accruing from the policy enacted by Congress, but she observes this information 
one period after the policy is enacted. The voter can use information about the 
utility observed from a policy to partially determine whether Congress has cho-
sen policies that benefit the voter, but only with hindsight. Messages from the 
president, however, may help the voter determine whether Congress has pursued 
the voter’s policy interests before she decides whether to reelect Congress.
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Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of Legislative Programming Game
The following strategies and beliefs constitute a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in 
stationary strategies of the legislative programming game:
•  President:
 First Congress: mt = v2,t 
 Later Congresses: mt = p2
• Congress:
 First Congress of a president:
 bt = {v1, 0} for mt = 0; and v2,t = 0;
 bt = {v1, 0} for mt = 0; and v2,t = 2v ;
 bt = {0, 2v } for mt = 2v  and v2,t = 2v ;
 bt = {0, c2} for mt = 2v  and v2,t  = 0;
 bt = {c1, 0} otherwise
 Later Congresses:
 bt = {v1, 0}
•  Voter Reelection of Congress:
 First Congress:
 rm,t = 1 for b1,t ≠ 0 if mt = 0 or b2,t ≠ 0 if mt = 2v ;
 rm,t = 0 otherwise
 Later Congresses:
 rm,t = 1 for uv,t−1 in {0, −
2
1v };
 rm,t = 0 otherwise
•  Voter Reelection of President:
 rp,t = 1 for uv,t−1 in {0, −
2
1v };
 rp,t = 0 otherwise
•  Voter’s Prior Beliefs:
 Prob(v2,t = 2v ) = ½
 Prob(v2,t = 0) = ½
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•  Voter’s Posterior Beliefs:
 Prob(v2,t = 2v  | mt = 2v ) = 1
 Prob(v2,t = 0 | mt = 2v ) = 0
 Prob(v2,t = 2v  | mt = 0) = 0
 Prob(v2,t = 0 | mt = 0) = 1
under the following conditions:
ICp: p2 > (1/δ3)( 2v (δ3 + δ2 + δ + 1) − (−
2
1p δ6 + 
2
2v  + 2
2
2v δ + 3
2
2v
δ2 + δ5( 22v  + 
2
1v  − 2p1v1) + (2
2
2v  + 
2
1v  − 2p1v1)δ4 + (3
2
2v  + 
2
1v  − 
2p1v1)δ3)½).
When ICp fails, the president prefers to send message mt = 0 when v2,t = 2v .
ICp2: p2 > 1/(2(1 + δ + 3δ2 + δ3))(2c2 + 2c2δ2 + 2v δ2 + ½(4(2c2(1 + 
δ2) + 2v δ2)2 − 8(1 + δ + 3δ2 + δ3)(2
2
1c (1 + δ2) + 2
2
2c (1 + δ2) + 2kδ2 + 
2kδ3 + 2kδ4 + 2kδ5 − 4c1(1 + δ2)p1 + 2
2
1p  − 2
2
1p δ + 2
2
1p δ2 − 2
2
1p δ3 
+ 4p1v1 + 4p1v1δ + 6p1v1δ2 + 4p1v1δ3 − 2
2
1v  − 2
2
1v δ − 3
2
1v δ2 − 2
2
1v δ3 
+ 22v δ2))½)).
When ICp2 fails, the president prefers to send message mt = 2v  when v2,t = 0.
IC1: c1 < (1/(2δ4 − 2))(−2v1 − δ2v1 + δ3v1 + 2δ4v1 (− (δ − 1)δ2(4(1 + d)(1 
+ δ2)2k + (2 + δ2 − δ3 − 2δ4) 21v  + 2(δ4 − 1)(2c2 − 2v ) 2v )))½).
When IC1 fails, Congress prefers to pass policy bt = {c1, 0} when v2,t = 0 and 
mt = 0.
IC2:* c1 < (δv1 + (
2
2c  − 
2
2c δ + kδ − kδ2 + 
2
1v δ)½)/(δ − 1).
When IC2 fails, Congress prefers to pass policy bt = {c1, 0} when v2,t = 0 and 
mt = 2v .
IC3:* c1 < (1/(2δ4 − 2))(−2v1 − δ2v1 + δ3v1 + 2δ4v1 (−(δ − 1)δ2(4(1 + 
d)(1 + δ2)2k + (2 + δ2 − δ3 − 2δ4) 21v  + 2(δ4 − 1)(2c2 − 2v ) 2v )))½).
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When IC3 fails, Congress prefers to pass policy bt = {c1, 0} when v2,t = 2v  and 
mt = 0.
IC4: c1 < (1/(2(δ − δ2 + δ3 − 1)))(v1δ3 − v1δ2 + (½)(4
2
1v (δ − 1)2δ4 − 
8(2(c2 − 2v ) 2v  + (2k + 
2
1v  − 2c2 2v  + 
2
2v )δ3 + 2(k + 2v ( 2v  − 2c2))δ 
− ( 21v  + 
2
2v ( 2v —2c2))δ2)(−1 + δ − δ2 + δ3))(½)).
When IC4 fails, Congress prefers to pass policy bt = {c1, 0} when v2,t = 2v  and 
mt = 2v .
IC5: c1 < ((2)½(–δ2(1 + δ)2(–2 − δ − δ2 − δ3 + 3δ4 + 2δ6)k)½ + 2(–1 − δ + 
δ4 + δ5)v1)/(2(δ4 + δ5 − 1 − δ).
When IC5 fails, Congress prefers to pass policy bt = {c1, 0} in later periods when 
v2,t = 0.
*Denotes a constraint on an off-the-equilibrium-path strategy.
Proof of Legislative Programming Equilibrium
1. President maximizes his utility:
 President’s message in his first Congress: m1* = v2.
Case 1: v2,1 = 2v . In response to the president’s equilibrium message m1* = 2v , 
Congress chooses equilibrium policy bt* = {0, 2v }, and the voter’s equilibrium 
strategy reelects the president, which yields the president expected utility1 Eup = 
− 21p  − (p2 − 2v )2 + [½(−(p1 − v1)2 − 
2
2p ) + ½(−
2
1p  − (p2 − 2v )2)](δ4/(1 − δ4)) 
+ [−(p1 − v1)2 − 
2
2p ]((δ + δ2 + δ3)/(1 − δ4)) + k(1 + δ + δ2 + δ3).
 Suppose instead the president sends message m1 = 0. According to its equi-
librium strategy, Congress will pass bt* = {v1, 0}. In this case, according to the 
voter’s equilibrium strategy, Congress will be reelected in the midterm because 
it follows the president’s agenda, and the voter will reelect the president and 
Congress in the next presidential election because the utility she observes from 
this policy meets her expectation, i.e., uv,t−1 in {0, −
2
1v }. In this case, the presi-
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dent and Congress essentially collude in order to avoid working on issue 2, the 
voter’s preferred issue. This yields the president expected utility Eup = −(p1 − 
v1)2 − 
2
2p  − [(p1 − c1)2 − 
2
2p ]δ + [½(−(p1 − v1)2 − 
2
2p ) + ½(−
2
1p  − (p2 − 2v
)2)](δ4/(1 − δ4)) + [−(p1 − v1)2 − 
2
2p ]((δ + δ2 + δ3)/(1 − δ4)) + k(1 + δ + δ2 + δ3), 
which offers the president strictly greater utility whenever the president’s par-
ticipation constraint ICp fails: p2 > (1/δ3)( 2v (δ3 + δ2 + δ + 1) − (−
2
1p δ6 + 
2
2v  + 
2 22v δ + 3
2
2v δ2 + δ5(
2
2v  + 
2
1v  − 2p1v1) + (2
2
2v  + 
2
1v  − 2p1v1)δ4 + (3
2
2v  + 
2
1v  
− 2p1v1)δ3)½). When this constraint is satisfied, Congress and the president have 
sufficiently different interests that they do not have an interest in colluding to 
hide information from the voter. By contrast, in the next chapter, the presidential 
agenda influence arising from legislative clearance will be shown to depend on 
the president and Congress having similar preferences.
Case 2: v2,1 = 0. In response to the president’s equilibrium message m1* = 0, 
Congress chooses equilibrium policy bt* = {v1, 0}, and the voter’s equilibrium 
strategy reelects the president, which yields the president expected utility Eup = 
−(p1 − v1)2 − 
2
2p  + [½(−(p1 − v1)2 − 
2
2p ) + ½(−
2
1p  − (p2 − 2v )2)](δ4/(1 − δ4)) 
+ [−(p1 − v1)2 − 
2
2p ]((δ + δ2 + δ3)/(1 − δ4)) + k(1 + δ + δ2 + δ3).
 Suppose instead that the president sends message m1 = 2v . According to its 
equilibrium strategy, Congress would then deliver policy bt* = {0, c2}. In this 
case, according to the voter’s equilibrium strategy, Congress would be reelected 
in the midterm, but Congress and the president would be thrown out in the fol-
lowing election for failing to meet the voter’s utility expectations. This yields the 
president expected utility Eup = −
2
1p  − (p2 − c2)2 − [(p1 − c1)2 − 
2
2p ]δ + [½(−(p1 
− v1)2 − 
2
2p ) + ½(−
2
1p  − (p2 − 2v )2)](δ2/(1 − δ4) + [−(p1 − v1)2 − 
2
2p ]((δ3 + δ4 + 
δ5)/(1 − δ4)) + k(1 + δ). The president will prefer his equilibrium strategy when-
ever ICp2 fails, i.e., p2 > 1/(2(1 + δ + 3δ2 + δ3))(2c2 + 2c2δ2 + 2v δ2 + ½(4(2c2(1 
+ δ2) + 2v δ2)2 − 8(1 + δ + 3δ2 + δ3)(2
2
1c (1 + δ2) + 2
2
2c (1 + δ2) + 2kδ2 + 2kδ3 + 
2kδ4 + 2kδ5 − 4c1(1 + δ2)p1 + 2
2
1p − 2
2
1p δ + 2
2
1p δ2 − 2
2
1p δ3 + 4p1v1 + 4p1v1δ 
+ 6p1v1δ2 + 4p1v1δ3 − 2
2
1v  − 2
2
1v δ − 3
2
1v δ2 − 2
2
1v δ3 + 
2
2v δ2))½)).
President’s message in his later Congresses: m1 = p2. In equilibrium, Congress 
and the voter ignore the president’s message to later Congresses, so his message 
can have no impact on his utility.
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2.  Congress maximizes its utility:
 Congress’s strategy in a president’s first Congress:
Case 1: v2,1 = 0; m1 = 0. Congress’s equilibrium strategy is b1* = {v1, 0}, which 
leads to reelection by the voter. This yields Congress expected utility Euc = −(c1 
− v1)2 − 
2
2c  + k + [½(−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c  + k) + ½(−
2
1c  − (c2 − 2v )2 + k)](δ4/(1 − 
δ4)) + [−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c  + k]((δ + δ2 + δ3)/(1 − δ4)).
 Suppose Congress chooses policy b1 = {c1, 0}. The voter’s equilibrium strat-
egy does not throw Congress out in the midterm election because it works on 
issues indicated by president, but Congress is thrown out in the following elec-
tion for failing to deliver the voter’s expected utility. If Congress also passes its 
optimal policy b2 = {c1, 0} after the midterm, this yields expected utility Euc = 
(− 22c  + k)(1 + δ) + [½(−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c ) + ½(−
2
1c  − (c2 − 2v )2)](δ2/(1 − δ4)) + 
[−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c ]((δ3 + δ4 + δ5)/(1 − δ4)). This is strictly less than its equilibrium 
utility, Euc(b*), whenever the incentive constraint IC1 is satisfied: c1 < (1/(2δ4 − 
2))(−2v1 − δ2v1 + δ3v1 + 2δ4v1 (− (δ − 1)δ2(4(1 + d)(1 + δ2)2k + (2 + δ2 − δ3 − 2δ4)
2
1v  + 2(δ4 − 1)(2c2 − 2v ) 2v )))1/2).
 Suppose Congress chooses b1 = {0, c2}. Since the voter’s equilibrium strat-
egy throws Congress out at the midterm for not following the president’s agenda, 
this yields expected utility Euc = −
2
1c  + k + [½(−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c ) + ½(−
2
1c  − (c2 
− 2v )2)](δ2/(1 − δ4)) + [−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c ]((δ3 + δ4 + δ5)/(1 − δ4)), which is strictly 
less than its expected utility for b1 = {c1, 0} by definition of the agenda setting 
problem.
 Suppose Congress chooses bt = {0, 2v }. Since the voter’s equilibrium strat-
egy throws Congress out at the midterm for not following the president’s agenda, 
this yields Congress strictly less expected utility than b1 = {0, c2}.
Case 2: v2,1 = 0; m1 = 2v . Congress’s equilibrium strategy in this case is b1* = 
{0, c2}. The voter’s equilibrium strategy then dictates that Congress be reelected 
in the midterm election for following the president’s agenda, but thrown out of 
office in the following election for not achieving the voter’s utility expectation. 
This yields Congress Euc = −
2
1c  + k + (−
2
2c  + k)δ + [½(−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c ) + ½(−
2
1c  − (c2 − 2v )2)](δ2/(1 − δ4)) + [− (c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c ]((δ3 + δ4 + δ5)/(1 − δ4)).
 If Congress instead delivers b1 = {c1, 0}, it gets thrown out at the midterm 
election for ignoring the president’s agenda. This yields Congress expected util-
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ity Euc = −
2
2c  + k + [½(−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c ) + ½(−
2
1c  − (c2 − 2v )2)](δ2/(1 − δ4)) 
+ [−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c ]((δ + δ3 + δ4)/(1 − δ4)), which is strictly less than the equilib-
rium policy whenever incentive constraint IC2 is satisfied: c1 < (δv1 + (
2
2c  − 
2
2c
δ + kδ − kδ2 + 21v δ)½)/(δ − 1).
 If Congress instead delivers the policy b1 = {v1, 0}, the voter’s equilibrium 
strategy throws it out in the midterm because the policy does not match the presi-
dent’s message. Thus this policy offers Congress strictly less utility than b1 = {c1, 
0}.
 If Congress instead delivers b1 = {0, 2v }, the voter’s equilibrium strategy 
reelects in the midterm and throws it out in the second election for not meeting 
the voter’s utility expectations. This is the same electoral result as the equilibrium 
policy b1 = {0, c1}, but it yields strictly less utility to Congress.
Case 3: v2,1 = 2v ; m1 = 0. Congress’s equilibrium strategy in this case is b1* = 
{v1, 0}, which allows Congress to be reelected in both the midterm and following 
elections by following the president’s agenda and satisfying the voter’s expected 
utility. This yields Congress expected utility Euc = (−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c  + k) + [½(− 
(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c  + k) + ½(−
2
1c  − (c2 − 2v )2 + k)](δ4/(1 − δ4)) + [−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c  
+ k]((δ + δ2 + δ3)/(1 − δ4)).
 If Congress instead delivers policy b1 = {c1, 0}, its optimum single-period 
policy, it is reelected in the midterm but not in the second election. Suppose that 
Congress chooses policy b2 = {c1, 0} in the second period as well. This yields 
expected utility Euc = (−
2
2c  + k)(1 + δ) + [½(−(c1 − v1)2  − 
2
2c ) + ½(−
2
1c  − (c2 − 
2v )2)](δ2/(1 − δ4)) + [− (c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c ]((δ3 + δ4 + δ5)/(1 − δ4)), which is strictly 
less than the equilibrium policy whenever constraint IC3 holds: c1 < (1/(2δ4 − 
2))(−2v1 − δ2v1 + δ3v1 + 2δ4v1 (−(δ − 1)δ2(4(1 + d)(1 + δ2)2k + (2 + δ2—δ3 − 2δ4)
2
1v  + 2(δ4 − 1)(2c2 − 2v ) 2v )))1/2), which is the same as constraint IC1.
 If Congress delivers policy b1 = {0, c2} or b1 = {0, 2v }, it will be thrown out 
of office in the midterm election according to the voter’s equilibrium strategy. 
These policies yield strictly less utility than the policy b1 = {c1, 0}.
Case 4: v2,1 = 2v ; m1 = 2v . Congress’s equilibrium strategy is b1* = {0, 2v }, 
which yields expected utility Euc = −
2
1c  − (c2 − 2v )2 + k + [½(−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c  
+ k) + ½(− 21c  − (c2 − 2v )2 + k)](δ4/(1 − δ4)) + [−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c  + k]((δ + δ2 + 
δ3)/(1 − δ4)).
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 Suppose Congress chooses b1 = {c1, 0}. Since the voter’s equilibrium strat-
egy throws out Congress at the midterm for not following the president’s agenda, 
this yields expected utility Euc = −
2
2c  + k + [½(−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c ) + ½(−
2
1c  − (c2 
− 2v )2)](δ2/(1 − δ4)) + [−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c ]((δ + δ3 + δ4)/(1 − δ4)). This is strictly 
less than her equilibrium utility, b1* = {0, 2v }, whenever incentive constraint 
IC4 is satisfied: c1 < (1/(2(δ − δ2 + δ3 − 1)))(v1δ3 − v1δ2 + (½)(4
2
1v (δ − 1)2δ4 − 
8(2(c2 − 2v ) 2v  + (2k + 
2
1v  − 2c2 2v  + 
2
2v )δ3 + 2(k + 2v ( 2v  − 2c2))δ − (
2
1v  + 
2
2v ( 2v —2c2))δ2)(−1 + δ − δ2 + δ3))(1/2)).
 Suppose Congress chooses b1 = {0, c2}. This yields expected utility Euc = 
(− 21c  + k)(1 + δ) + [½(−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c ) + ½(−
2
1c  − c2 − 2v )2)](δ2/(1 − δ4)) + 
[−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c ]((δ + δ3 + δ4)/(1 − δ4)), which is strictly less that its expected 
utility for b1 = {c1, 0} under the agenda-setting assumption c1 > c2.
 Suppose Congress chooses bt = {v1, 0}. Since this does not match the presi-
dent’s message, the voter will throw out Congress at the midterm election. This 
yields Congress expected utility Euc = −(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c  + k + [½(−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c ) + ½(−
2
1c  − (c2 − 2v )2)](δ2/(1 − δ4)) + [−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c ]((δ + δ3 + δ4)/(1 − 
δ4)), which is strictly less that its expected utility from the policy bt = {c1, 0}.
Congress’s strategy in a president’s second Congress: bt* = {v1, 0}:
Since the president’s message is ignored by the voter’s equilibrium strategy in a 
president’s second Congress, we need only consider two cases: v2,t = 0 and v2.t 
= 2v .
Case 1: v2,t = 0. Congress’s equilibrium strategy is bt* = {v1, 0}. This yields 
Congress expected utility Euc = [½(−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c  + k) + ½(−
2
1c  − (c2 − 2v )2 
+ k)](δ3/(1 − δ4)) + [−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c  + k]((1 + δ + δ2)/(1 − δ4)).
 Suppose Congress chooses bt = {c1, 0}. According to the voter’s equilibrium 
strategy, Congress will be thrown out of office after another period for failing 
to satisfy the voter’s utility expectation for the second Congress. If Congress 
chooses its optimal policy bt = {c1, 0} in both periods it holds office, this yields 
expected utility Euc = (−
2
2c  + k)(1 + δ) + [½(−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c ) + ½(−
2
1c  − (c2 − 
2v )2)](δ3/(1 − δ4)) + [−(c1 − v1)2 − 
2
2c ]((δ2 + δ4 + δ5)/(1 − δ4)). This is strictly less 
than her equilibrium utility, Euc(b*), in the second Congress whenever incentive 
constraint IC5 is satisfied: c1 < ((2)½(–δ2(1 + δ)2(–2 − δ − δ2 − δ3 + 3δ4 + 2δ6)k)½ 
+ 2(–1 − δ + δ4 + δ5)v1)/(2(δ4 + δ5 − 1 − δ).
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 Suppose Congress chooses bt = {0, c2} in the second period. Congress is 
thrown out after the second period by the voter’s equilibrium strategy, and this 
policy yields utility that is strictly less than that expected from Congress’s equi-
librium policy bt* = {c1, 0}.
 Suppose Congress chooses bt* = {0, 2v } in the second Congress. Congress 
is thrown out after the next period by the voter’s equilibrium strategy, and this 
also yields strictly less utility than its expected utility for bt* = {c1, 0}.
Case 2: v2,t = 2v . Congress’s equilibrium strategy is bt* = {v1, 0}. Since the 
value of v2,t does not directly affect Congress’s utility function and Congress’s 
equilibrium policy remains the same as in Case 1, most of the arguments from 
Case 1 apply in this case as well. There is one exception. Congress will be 
reelected in this case if it chooses policy bt = {0, 2v } instead of the equilibrium 
policy bt* = {v1, 0}, but this always offers Congress less utility under the agenda-
setting preference structure I assume.
Congress’s strategy in a president’s third and fourth Congresses: bt* = {v1, 0}:
Similar arguments hold in the third and fourth Congresses of a presidency. In 
general, if there is an incentive for Congress to defect from the equilibrium pol-
icy in a late round, there will be an even stronger incentive to defect in the first 
or second Congress.
3. Voter maximizes her utility:
As long as the president and Congress always deliver their equilibrium policies, 
the voter is indifferent between reelecting them and replacing them with a new 
president and Congress who also follow the equilibrium strategies. Since she 
is indifferent, we can assume that she picks a reelection strategy that offers the 
president and Congress the proper incentives to provide informative representa-
tion. That is, she can condition the president’s reelection on his sending correct 
policy information in the first Congress and condition Congress’s reelection on 
its following the president’s cue in the first Congress and fulfilling her expected 
utility in all Congresses. Since the voter will be indifferent between this strategy 
and any other reelection strategy, we can assume that this strategy maximizes her 
utility given the equilibrium strategies of the president and Congress.
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4. Voter updates her beliefs using Bayes’s rule:
The voter updates her initial beliefs that v2 is uniformly distributed in {0, 2v } 
according to Bayes’s Rule, whenever possible.
Case 1: m = 0. Bayes’s rule dictates that the voter’s belief about the value of v2 
after observing the message m = 0 is given by Prob(v2 = 2v  | m = 0) = Prob(v2 
= 2v )Prob(m = 0 | v2 = 2v )/[Prob(v2 = 2v )Prob(m = 0 | v2 = 2v ) + Prob(v2 = 
0)Prob(m = 0 | v2 = 0)] = 0/1 = 0. Thus, after receiving message m = 0, the voter 
believes that v2 = 0.
Case 2: m = 2v . Bayes’s rule dictates that the voter’s belief about the value of 
v2 after observing the message m = 2v  is given by Prob(v2 = 2v  | m = 2v ) = 
Prob(v2 = 2v )Prob(m = 2v  | v2 = 2v )/[Prob(v2 = 2v )Prob(m = 2v  | v2 = 2v ) + 
Prob(v2 = 0)Prob(m = 2v  | v2 = 0)] = 1/1 = 0. Thus, after receiving message m = 
2v , the voter believes that v2 = 2v .
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Congress’s utility uc and the president’s utility up are calculated as the sum 
of the negative quadratic distances between their ideal points and the policy 
outcomes on each issue, where x
−i = sq = 0 if i is the issue chosen by Con-
gress and −i represents all other issues:
uc = −Σi(ci − xi)2
up = −Σi(pi − xi)2
Structure of the Game
1.  Nature chooses and reveals the value of the exogenous random variable 
ω2 from {0, 1} to the president.
2.  For each possible value of ω2, the president sends a message m(ω2) from 
{0, 1} to Congress. This message may or may not reveal some of his 
private information about ω2 to Congress. The most informative strategy 
the president can choose would reveal the exact value of the exogenous 
random variable ω2 to Congress in each state of the world, but nothing 
about ω1. The president’s message can use a mixed strategy.
3.  Congress observes the president’s message, m(ω2), but not the underlying 
state of the world, ω2, and updates its initial belief that ω2 is uniformly 
Appendix B
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distributed in {0, 1} according to Bayes’s rule whenever possible. Con-
gress then chooses the optimal location of a bill bi on each issue i subject 
to the time and resource constraint that at most one bill can be nonzero. 
On all other issues, the status quo prevails. Congress is restricted to 
choosing bills and issues in pure strategies.
Strategies and Equilibrium
A strategy for the president specifies a message m for each possible state of 
the world ω2. A strategy for Congress specifies a bill bi on each issue for each 
possible presidential message m. No more than one of Congress’s bills can be 
nonzero. The number of contingencies specified by a congressional strategy will 
vary depending on the number of partitions in the president’s signaling strategy. 
That is, the number of policy decisions Congress has to make will depend on the 
number of different signals the president sends in equilibrium. A strategy must 
specify a pair of bills for each different signal.
 The solution concept used is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, which requires 
that the players always choose optimal strategies and that Congress’s beliefs be 
consistent and rational.
 An equilibrium solution of the legislative clearance game consists of (1) a 
messaging strategy for the president, m*; (2) a policy strategy for Congress, b*; 
and (3) Congress’s beliefs μ* about the value of ω2, given the president’s mes-
sage. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a set of strategies that are “sequentially 
rational” given the beliefs and a set of beliefs that are updated rationally (by 
Bayes’s rule) given the strategies. Such a set of strategies and beliefs satisfies the 
following conditions.
1.  The president’s equilibrium message m* offers him more expected utility 
than any other possible message m, given Congress’s equilibrium strat-
egy b*( ), i.e., Eup(m*(ω2) | b*) ≥ Eup(m(ω2) | b*) for all messages m ≠ 
m* and all possible ω2.
2.  Congress’s equilibrium policy b* offers it more expected utility than 
any other possible policy b, given the president’s equilibrium strategy 
m*( ) and Congress’s equilibrium beliefs μ*, i.e., Euc(b*(m*) | μ*(m)) ≥ 
(b(m*) | μ*(m)) for all policies b ≠ b* and all possible messages m.
3.  Congress updates its initial beliefs that ω2 is uniformly distributed in {0, 
1} according to Bayes’s Rule, whenever possible, e.g. Prob(ω2 = ϖ2 | m) 
= Prob(ω2 = ϖ2)Prob(m | ω2 = ϖ2)/[Prob(ω2 = ϖ2)Prob(m | ω2 = ϖ2) + 
Prob(ω2 = 0)Prob(m | ω2 = 0)]
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Proof of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Table 4.1
I prove that each of the three conditions of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium holds 
whenever ICL, ICH, and PC are satisfied.
1.  The president’s optimal strategy:
CASE 1: ω2 = 0. The president sends message m* = 0 in equilibrium. 
Congress’s equilibrium policy given that m = 0 is b* = {c1 + ϖ1/2, 0}. 
This yields the president expected disutility Eup(m*) = (½)[−(c1 + ϖ1 
/2)2 − (p2)2] + (½)[−(c1 − ϖ1/2)2 − (p2)2]. Suppose instead, the president 
sends message m = ϖ2. Congress’s equilibrium policy given that m = 
ϖ2 is b* = {c1 + 0, ϖ2}. Under ω2 = 0, this yields the president expected 
disutility Eup = −(p2 − ϖ2)2. The president will weakly prefer the equi-
librium message whenever Eup(m*) ≥ Eup(m = ϖ2), or when −(c1 + 
ϖ1/2)2 − (p2)2 ≥ − (p2 − ϖ2)2. Solving for ϖ2 yields the constraint ϖ2 ≤ 
p2 + (½)[4(p2)2 + 4(c1)2 − ϖ1 2]½, which is always satisfied when con-
straint ICL is satisfied.
CASE 2: ω2 = ϖ2. The president sends message m = ϖ2 in equilib-
rium. Congress’s equilibrium policy given that m = ϖ2 is b* = {0, ϖ2}. 
This yields the president expected disutility Eup(m*) = (½)[−(p2)2] + 
(½)[−(ϖ1)2 − (p2)2]. Suppose instead, the president sends message m = 
0. Congress’s equilibrium policy given that m = 0 is b* = {c1+ ϖ1/2, 
0}. Under ω2 = ϖ2, this yields the president expected disutility (½)[−(c1 
+ ϖ1/2)2 − (p2 + ϖ2)2] + (½)[−(c1 − ϖ1/2)2
 − (p2 + ϖ2)2]. The presi-
dent will weakly prefer the equilibrium message whenever Eup(m*) 
≥ Eup(m = 0), or when (½)[−(p2)2] + (½)[−(ϖ1)2 − (p2)2] ≥ (½)[−(c1 + 
ϖ1/2)2 − (p2 + ϖ2)2] + (½)[−(c1 − ϖ1/2)2 − (p2 + ϖ2)2]. Solving for ϖ2 
yields the constraint ϖ2 ≤ −p2 + (½)[4(p2)2 − 4(c1)2 − ϖ12]
½, which is 
always satisfied when constraint ICH is satisfied.
2. Congress’s optimal strategy:
CASE 1: m = 0. Since the president sends message m = 0 according to 
its equilibrium strategy when the state of the world is either {0, 0} or 
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{ϖ1, 0}, Congress must choose a policy on either issue 1 or issue 2 that 
maximizes its utility given an equal likelihood that either of the values 
of ω2 occurs. I consider the optimal policy for Congress on each issue 
and then determine which issue offers Congress the greatest expected 
utility.
 Policy change on issue 1: Given that Congress believes that ω1 = 0 or 
ω1 = ϖ1 with equal probability, and that Congress is risk averse (utility is 
measured in squared distance from ideal policy), its ideal policy on issue 
1 is c1 + ϖ1/2, which yields it expected disutility − (ϖ1/2)2.
 Policy change on issue 2: Given that Congress believes that ω2 = 
0, its ideal policy on issue 2 is 0, which yields it expected disutility 
(½)[−(c1)2] + (½)[−(c1 + ϖ1)2].
 Congress will thus weakly prefer its equilibrium policy, b*(m = 0) 
= {c1 + ϖ1/2, 0} whenever − (ϖ1/2)2 ≥ (½)[−(c1)2] + (½)[−(c1 + ϖ1)2]. 
This holds for all positive values of c1 and ϖ1, so this case does not 
constrain the conditions under which the equilibrium exists.
CASE 2: m = ϖ2. Since the president sends message m = ϖ2  according 
to its equilibrium strategy when the state of the world is either {0, ϖ2} 
or {ϖ1, ϖ2}, Congress must choose a policy on either issue 1 or issue 
2 that maximizes its utility given an equal likelihood that either of the 
states of the world obtains. I consider the optimal policy for Congress 
on each issue and then determine which issue offers Congress the great-
est expected utility.
 Policy change on issue 1: Given that Congress believes that ω1= 0 or 
ω1 = ϖ1 with equal probability, and that Congress is risk averse (utility 
is measured in squared distance from ideal policy), its ideal policy on 
issue 1 is c1 + ϖ1/2, which yields it expected disutility − (ϖ1/2)2 − ω22.
Policy change on issue 2: Given that Congress believes that ω2 = ϖ2, 
its ideal policy on issue 2 is ϖ2, which yields it expected disutility 
(½)[−(c1)2] + (½)[−(c1 + ϖ1)2].
 Congress will thus weakly prefer its equilibrium policy, b*(m = ϖ2) = {0, 
ϖ2} whenever (½)[−(c1)2] + (½)[−(c1 + ϖ1)2] ≥ −(ϖ1/2)2 − ϖ2 2. Solving 
for ϖ2, this holds when ϖ2 ≥ (½)(2c1 + ϖ1), which is always satisfied 
when the Congress’s participation constraint (PC) is satisfied.
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3. Congress’s beliefs updated using Bayes’s Rule when possible: Congress 
updates its initial beliefs that ω2 is uniformly distributed in {0, 1} accord-
ing to Bayes’s Rule, whenever possible.
CASE 1: m = 0. Prob(ω2 = ϖ2 | m = 0) = Prob(ω2 = ϖ2) Prob(m | ω2 = 
ϖ2) / [Prob(ω2 = ϖ2)Prob(m | ω2 = ϖ2) + Prob(ω2 = 0) Prob(m | ω2 = 
0)] = 0/1 = 0. Thus, after receiving message m = 0, Congress believes 
that ω2 = ϖ2.
CASE 2: m = ϖ2. Prob(ω2 = ϖ2 | m) = Prob(ω2 = ϖ2)Prob(m | ω2 = 
ϖ2)/[Prob(ω2 = ϖ2)Prob(m | ω2 = ϖ2) + Prob(ω2 = 0 )Prob(m | ω2 = 
0)] = 1/1 = 1. Thus, after receiving message m = ϖ2, Congress believes 
with certainty that ω2 = ϖ2.
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continued next page
Committee MCs
Chair’s 
Ideology
(DW 
Nominate)
Public 
Bills
(H.R. 
and S.)
Average
Bill
Complexity
Issues
Average 
Issue
Scope
Percent 
of Bills 
Multiply
Referred
Percent 
of Bills 
Sponsored 
by 
Democrat
Agriculture 37 −0.26 249 28.6 1744 69.9 46.6 67.9
Appropriations 60 −0.36 67 121.4 2572 48.2 16.4 74.6
Armed Services 55 −0.68 263 34.5 2322 56.9 46.8 63.5
Banking, Finance, and 
Urban Affairs 51 −0.51 348 33.3 2224 59.3 36.8 65.5
Budget 43 −0.59 2 331.5 630 121.6 100.0 50.0
District of Columbia 10 −0.70 37 14.5 317 146.7 40.5 32.4
Education and Labor 42 −0.54 496 37.6 2431 55.1 44.2 71.6
Energy and Commerce 44 −0.44 835 28.3 2827 49.3 50.9 69.5
Foreign Affairs 43 −0.16 229 36.0 2314 55.1 50.2 69.0
TABLE C.1 Comparative characteristics of House committees in the 103rd Congress
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Committee MCs
Chair’s 
Ideology
(DW 
Nomi-
nate)
Public 
Bills
(H.R. 
and S.)
Average
Bill
Complexity
Issues
Average 
Issue
Scope
Percent 
of Bills 
Multiply
Referred
Percent 
of Bills 
Sponsored 
by 
Democrat
TABLE C.1 (cont’d.) Comparative characteristics of House committees in the 103rd Congress
Government 
Operations 42 −0.76 250 32.3 1858 68.5 66.0 45.6
Administration 18 −0.32 197 22.3 1142 89.1 54.8 43.1
Intelligence (Permanent 
Select) 19 −0.20 16 87.1 864 98.9 68.8 68.8
Judiciary 32 −0.42 820 29.0 3265 44.0 30.7 60.4
Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries
37 −0.52 339 17.6 1513 71.2 31.3 65.2
Natural Resources 42 −0.64 429 20.9 2056 60.7 30.3 63.9
Post Office and Civil 
Service
24 −0.67 265 22.1 1609 73.2 47.9 59.2
Public Works and 
Transportation
63 −0.52 369 22.7 2126 58.1 42.0 67.2
Rules 13 −0.43 153 34.7 1347 85.0 90.8 37.3
Science, Space, and 
Technology
55 −0.51 133 40.7 1587 72.9 63.2 72.9
Small Business 44 −0.39 53 28.4 690 122.2 32.1 71.7
Standards of Official 
Conduct
14 −0.66 2 20.5 28 265.6 100.0 100.0
Veterans’ Affairs 35 −0.03 152 26.8 1273 84.3 19.7 75.7
Ways and Means 38 −0.37 1424 18.8 2875 48.8 30.4 57.7
House committee 
average  
House overall average 
(H.R. bills only)  
37.4
NA
−0.46
−0.15*
310
5310
28.6
18.9
1722
6875
82.8
22.7
46.6
20.6
65.5
64.3
* indicates House median rather than average.
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TABLE C.2 Comparative characteristics of Senate committees in the 103rd Congress
Committee MCs
Chair’s 
Ideology
(DW 
Nominate)
Public 
Bills
(H.R. 
and S.)
Average
Bill
Complexity
Issues
Average
Issue 
Scope
Percent of 
Bills 
Multiply
Referred
Percent of 
Bills 
Sponsored 
by Democrat
Agriculture, Nutrition, 
and Forestry 18 −0.46 99 22.4 1276 109.4 3.0 74.7
Appropriations 29 −0.26 14 37.1 304 136.7 14.3 78.6
Armed Services 20 −0.12 78 63.3 1228 78.9 3.8 80.8
Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs 19 −0.44 129 25.4 873 99.9 1.6 68.2
Budget 21 −0.36 31 31.3 553 132.9 96.8 38.7
Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation 19 −0.21 190 23.8 1441 72.6 3.2 66.3
Energy and Natural 
Resources 19 −0.17 224 15.8 1093 83.6 2.2 62.9
Environment and 
Public Works 17 −0.24 184 23.3 1165 83.5 2.7 76.1
Finance 20 −0.42 610 16.7 1751 70.1 0.7 56.2
Foreign Relations 19 −0.48 77 33.9 1132 78.8 2.6 71.4
Governmental Affairs 13 −0.36 199 22.2 1413 79.3 18.1 61.3
Indian Affairs 19 −0.37 50 18.6 399 154.7 10.0 56.0
Intelligence (Select) −0.22 14 39.5 203 193.3 14.3 64.3
Judiciary 18 −0.36 266 20.0 1178 86.6 1.9 58.3
Labor and Human 
Resources 17 −0.58 251 22.9 1448 75.3 2.0 70.9
Rules and 
Administration 16 −0.22 37 18.8 293 147.7 0.0 70.3
Small Business 21 −0.38 17 34.1 392 157.9 11.8 70.6
Veterans’ Affairs 12 −0.37 72 15.7 353 154.5 1.4 88.9
 
Senate committee 
average  
Senate overall 
average (S. bills 
only)
18.7
NA
−0.33
−0.19*
141
2569
26.9
21.9
916
5011
110.9
30.5
10.6
2.1
67.5
64.6
* indicates Senate median rather than average.
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The application of ordinary least squares to models with dichotmous dependent 
variables has been termed the linear probability model (LPM) because the regres-
sion coefficients for such models can be interpreted as indicating the increase in 
the probability of occurrence of the dependent variable that is associated with a 
one-unit increase in the corresponding independent variable, ceteris paribus. It is 
well known, however, that the LPM fails to meet the Gauss-Markov assumption 
of homoskedasticity and the further assumption of normally distributed errors 
required for statistical inference. When regression is performed on a dichotomous 
dependent variable, it has become standard practice in the social sciences to fit 
such regression models using nonlinear logit or probit models. Although ordinary 
least squares estimators are still unbiased with dichotomous dependent variables, 
the standard errors used in significance testing are biased because of noncon-
stant error variance. This makes standard statistical tests invalid. Furthermore, 
OLS sometimes will produce predictions for the probability of occurrence of the 
dependent variable that are less than 0 or greater than 1. And since the errors of 
the LPM are nonnormal, the standard errors of the regression slopes will not gen-
erally follow the students-t distribution unless the sample size is large, in which 
case the central limit theorem can be invoked again. The most serious problems 
with the LPM are heteroskedasticity, the possibility of predicted probabilities less 
than 0 or greater than 1, and the assumption that the independent variable has a 
constant effect on the occurrence of the dependent variable. For instance, if an 
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FIGURE D.1. LPM and logit regression slopes for dummy independent variables.
increase of one unit in a dependent variable is associated with a .1 increase in the 
probability of the dependent variable occurring, this holds at both y = .5 and y = 
.95, where it is nonsensical, because it would lead to a probability of 1.05. Logit 
and probit resolve the problems of predicted probabilities outside of the {0, 1} 
interval and the problem of constant effects across this interval by positing a non-
linear relationship between x and y as shown in figure D.1.
 The advantages of logit and probit come at a price. Anderson (1987) has 
shown that observation-specific dummy variables cannot be estimated by either 
logit or probit. For example, private bills play a large role in the Senate data 
that I consider in Appendix E. If I control for these private bills by introducing 
a dummy variable for the single CRS-LIV topic “private legislation,” then the 
model will either fail or drop this variable under logit or probit. Thus, there is no 
direct way to measure the effect of private legislation on the agenda using logit 
or probit. Observation-specific dummy variables, however, pose no problems 
for the LPM, and I calculate the influence of private legislation on the agenda in 
this way in Appendix E. Caudill (1988) extended Anderson’s result to show that 
group variables will also drop out of logit and probit if all members of the group 
have the same value of the dependent variable. For instance, if all issues that 
receive markup reach the floor, then the influence of markup on the floor cannot 
be gauged. This is also a condition that occurs occasionally in the Senate data of 
chapter 7. The LPM can still provide estimates in this case.
 The greatest disadvantage of logit and probit models, however, is that the 
estimated coefficients have no useful interpretation on their own. The logit 
model comes closest, offering the increase in the log-odds ratio associated with 
1
{0,1} {1,1}
LPM
{0,0} {1.0}
Logit
0
10
y
x
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a one-unit increase in a given independent variable. Researchers sometimes just 
discuss the sign and statistical significance of these estimates because there is 
not a standard way to interpret the meaning of the coefficients. Not only is it not 
possible to estimate a single constant slope for each independent variable, but it 
is not even possible to “hold other variables constant” in determining the effect 
of a single variable. For example, the president’s effect on the agenda will not be 
constant across levels of the other variables I include in the model. It necessarily 
changes depending on the levels of all other variables, in this case not because 
of some specified interaction term between these variables, but because of the 
curvilinear relationship imposed by logit and probit models. If the values of these 
other variables are such that they lead to a very high probability of agenda con-
sideration, then the president’s influence will necessarily be diminished because 
the logit and probit curves flatten as y approaches 1.
  As shown in firgure D.1, when an LPM model has only a single dichoto-
mous independent variable, we do not need to be concerned with whether the 
relationship between x and y changes as y approaches 1 because there are only 
two possible values for x. Thus, the only predictions of importance are the pre-
dicted y when x = 0 and when x = 1, and the only change of relevance is the 
change from x = 0 to x = 1, which is taken in one step. This means that there 
can be one constant slope for the dichotomous independent variable. Recall that 
the logit and probit curves flatten as y Æ 1, because otherwise a constant slope 
would sometimes yield predicted probabilities to be greater than 1 as the values 
of the other variables pushed the probability close to 1. When additional dichot-
omous independent variables are added, logit and probit will guard against pre-
dicted values outside of the unit internal, but the curvilinear slope will add little 
to the interpretation of the influence of each individual variable.
 The greatest advantages of the LPM over logit and probit are the easily 
interpreted slope coefficients and the ceteris paribus nature of these slopes. If 
all independent variables are dichotomous, then the main disadvantages of using 
the LPM are that the errors do not have constant variance and they are not nor-
mally distributed. This means that the Gauss-Markov theorem does not apply and 
statistical inference is invalid.1 Nonconstant error variance can be remedied by 
using a weighted-least squares approach introduced by Goldberger (1964) or by 
using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors introduced by Huber and White 
(1984). Neither of these techniques recovers the Gauss-Markov conditions, but 
asymptotic inference (for very large samples) does become valid. Logit and pro-
bit are also only valid asymptotically, and so they offer few advantages when 
all independent variables are dichotomous. When most, but not all, indepen-
dent variables are dichomtous, the LPM’s advantages in interpretation can still 
overshadow the problems of invalid predicted y values (Woodridge 2003, 456). 
When most of the variables are continuous, then the advantages of the logit and 
probit models become more persuasive. In my models of the House and Senate 
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agendas, all of the main independent variables are dichotomous (presidential 
speech, presidential draft, markup, hearing, committee chair, and Senate/House), 
and most of the control independent variables are dichotomous. In these mod-
els, the advantages of the LPM outweigh those of logit and probit. Furthermore, 
an additional penalty of losing the ceteris paribus interpretation of slopes in the 
logit and probit models is that it is no longer possible to calculate indirect and 
total effects in path models, which play a crucial role in my attempt to untangle 
to exact mechanisms by which the president influences that agenda. I discuss the 
importance of measuring these direct and indirect effects in Appendix E on path 
analysis.
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The multiple-equation technique of path analysis presents an elegant solution to 
the countervailing problems of “controlling for too much” and “omitted variable 
bias.” The more general technique of structural-equation modeling allows for 
nonrecursive causal conditions as well, but it presents other technical complica-
tions. In path analysis, first the president’s influence on the committee chair, α1, 
is estimated using ordinary multiple regression. Then the direct influences of 
both the president, β1, and the committee chair, β2, on the agenda are assessed by 
ordinary multiple regression, holding the influences of each other constant. The 
president’s total effect on the agenda is then a simple sum, β1 + α1β2, of his direct 
effect, β1, and his indirect effect, α1β2, which is calculated as the product of his 
influence on the committee chair multiplied by the chair’s effect on the agenda. 
Furthermore, the president’s direct and indirect effects on each subsequent stage 
of the legislative process can be considered in the same way. For instance, to mea-
sure the president’s influence on the floor agenda, while controlling for whether 
issues reach markup, may underestimate the president’s total influence on the 
floor because he may exercise influence on the floor indirectly by influencing the 
prior markup stage. Again using path analysis, separate regressions can sort out 
the president’s direct and indirect effects on the markup and floor stages and can 
thereby be used to calculate his total effect on the floor.1
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 There is some debate about how the statistical significance should be deter-
mined for indirect and total effects in path models (e.g., Kline 1998, 150). Here, 
I use the simple technique of identifying only those indirect effects as statisti-
cally significant where all of the links in the path are statistically significant. By 
this standard, the president’s speeches exercise a statistically significant indirect 
influence over markup through the committee leader if and only if the president’s 
speeches have a statistically significant influence on the committee leaders and 
the committee leaders have a statistically significant influence on markups. To 
calculate the total effect of a variable on the floor agenda, I add up the statistically 
significant, indirect and direct effects that exist between the variable and the floor 
agenda.
 The role of Senate-initiated legislation in the House (and likewise House-
initiated legislation in the Senate) presents a potential endogeneity problem for 
the attempt to create a causal model of the House agenda process. Most of the 
explanatory or exogenous variables I consider are determined prior to the agenda 
process. For instance, each bill has a primary sponsor who introduced the mea-
sure in the House. The main characteristics of a bill’s primary sponsor—such as 
the sponsor’s party, ideology, and years of experience—do not change much in a 
given Congress. But the answer to the question of whether the Senate has passed 
a bill covering an issue is subject to change throughout the course of a given Con-
gress. For some issues that are introduced in the House via Senate-passed bills, 
Senate passage may occur before any House action takes place—and that is the 
presumption of the model in this appendix—but for other issues a Senate-passed 
bill may not arrive in the House until after the House has already begun active 
consideration of it. In the latter case, it is not easy to assess whether Senate pas-
sage had an effect on House stages that have already taken place. The problem of 
the mutual influence of the House and Senate on each other’s agenda would seem 
to call for nonrecursive simultaneous-equation modeling; but since evidence of 
House-Senate coordination is almost nonexistent (Joint Committee 1993), the 
Senate is unlikely to be significantly influenced by prefloor actions in the House. 
In other words, there does not seem to be a problem of circularity where House 
hearings or markup influence Senate passage, which then further influences 
House hearings, markup, and floor consideration, because the only House action 
that seems to have measurable influence on Senate consideration is House pas-
sage, at which point consideration of resulting Senate influence on earlier stages 
for the same issue is usually moot. Only a small percentage of House-passed bills 
will be resubmitted in the House in the form of Senate-passed substitutes. Here, 
I assume that the influence of the House hearings and markup on Senate passage 
is negligible because House issues seem to make an impact only after they are 
passed and then introduced in the Senate. I take up the question of House influ-
ence on the Senate in more detail in chapter 7.
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TABLE F.1. LPM Regression slopes (and t-statistics for White-Huber robust standard errors)   
for determinants of floor consideration of House Commerce Committee issues in the House
CONGRESS
VARIABLE 96th 97th 98th 99th 100th 101st 102nd 103rd 104th 105th 106th 107th
Markup .44
(10.0)
.32
(7.9)
.64
(21.0)
.56
(22.6)
.55
(27.2)
.54
(19.9)
.58
(24.6)
.31
(13.2)
.24
(9.6)
.58
(23.6)
.25
(9.3)
.25
(12.9)
Hearing .19
(5.9)
−.02
(−0.5)
−.03
(−1.4)
.03
(1.5)
−.06
(−3.1)
−.07
(−2.7)
>  −.01
(−.04)
.15
(5.8)
.23
(10.4)
.05
(1.9)
.18
(6.4)
−.19
(−7.0)
Committee 
leader
−.06
(−5.1)
.33
(9.5)
.18
(6.2)
.08
(3.3)
.02
(1.1)
.07
(2.6)
.11
(4.9)
.05
(2.0)
.04
(1.7)
.07
(3.4)
.25
(12.4)
.35
(16.9)
Senate bill .18
(6.7)
.09
(2.1)
.14
(4.3)
.07
(2.4)
.17
(7.7)
.12
(5.2)
−.01
(−0.7)
.04
(1.8)
.03
(1.6)
.06
(2.7)
.06
(2.7)
.10
(4.4)
President’s 
speech
.08
(2.2)
.05
(0.6)
.09
(2.4)
>  −.01
(−0.1)
.03
(0.6)
.08
(1.9)
< .01
(< .01)
.06
(1.9)
−.02
(−0.6)
.02
(0.6)
−.01
(−0.8)
.12
(2.3)
President’s
draft
.02
(0.7)
.03
(0.6)
−.03
(−0.7)
−.12
(−4.1)
.02
(0.8)
.02
(0.6)
−.13
(−6.9)
.18
(12.2)
.11
(6.9)
−.07
(−2.9)
−.05
(−2.0)
.20
(10.0)
Maximum 
cosponsors
< .01
(−0.8)
< .01
(1.7)
> −.01
(−4.8)
>  −.01
(−9.9)
< .01
(−1.2)
>  −.01
(−1.3)
< .01
(2.6)
< .01
(1.7)
< .01
(4.9)
< .01
(3.5)
< .01
(10.7)
< .01
(6.3)
Scope of 
issue
< .01
(0.8)
< .01
(2.4)
< .01
(2.2)
< .01
(0.7)
 > −.01
(−3.0)
>  −.01
(−2.4)
< .01
(−2.1)
>  −.01
(−4.8)
>  −.01
(−6.9)
>  −.01
(−4.4)
>  −.01
(−6.3)
> −.01
(−6.6)
Minimum
complexity
< .01
(0.4)
< .01
(1.3)
< .01
(4.0)
< .01
(15.2)
< .01
(14.2)
< .01
(0.3)
< .01
(10.3)
< .01
(8.2)
< .01
(−13.4)
< .01
(−1.0)
< .01
(−3.9)
< .01
(7.0)
Multiply
referred
.02
(1.1)
.08
(3.4)
−.07
(−3.3)
−.01
(−0.3)
.04
(2.5)
−.05
(−2.5)
−.18
(−12.7)
< .01
(.03)
.04
(2.3)
.01
(0.8)
.06
(3.4)
.03
(1.9)
Authorization
issue
−.07
(−1.6)
.04
(0.4)
.01
(0.2)
−.01
(−0.3)
−.03
(−0.5)
.14
(2.1)
.01
(0.1)
< .01
(.07)
.09
(1.2)
−.08
(−1.3)
−.09
(−1.2)
.15
(1.5)
Timing of 
introduction
.08
(4.6)
.29
(6.4)
−.02
(−0.6)
−.11
(−3.0)
.11
(3.6)
.19
(6.0)
.06
(1.9)
.13
(4.3)
−.38
(−12.8)
−.13
(−4.6)
−.23
(−8.8)
−.12
(−4.1)
Democratic 
sponsor  
.01
(1.4)
.13
(6.4)
.09
(4.6)
.04
(1.5)
.33
(17.2)
.10
(4.4)
.18
(11.4)
.32
(18.3)
−.14
(−8.6)
−.18
(−10.8)
−.10
(−6.0)
−.20
(−10.6)
Max. sponsor 
experience
< .01
(2.3)
.02
(5.51)
.01
(2.9)
.04
(19.7)
.03
(14.1)
.03
(19.0)
.02
(11.0)
.02
(17.5)
.01
(6.7)
.02
(9.7)
< .01
(2.3)
−.20
(12.6  )
Constant −.06(−4.4)
−.30
(−7.9)
−.02
(−0.5)
−.09
(−2.6)
−.29
(−10.1)
−.24
(−8.7)
−.09
(−3.7)
−.30
(−12.3)
.34
(11.6)
.25
(10.1)
.30
(12.5)
.19
(6.9)
N 1556 1145 1362 1871 2410 2236 2597 2858 3261 2853 3176 3207
R2 .572 .363 .286 .574 .558 .529 .637 .490 .520 .349 .343 .364
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176
CONGRESS
VARIABLE 96th 97th 98th 99th 100th 101st 102nd 103rd 104th 105th 106th 107th
Hearing .57(18.9)
.39
(12.3)
.28
(10.5)
.23
(8.9)
.35
(14.5)
.43
(16.0)
.44
(19.0)
.49
(20.8)
.29
(15.5)
.63
(31.1)
.61
(31.0)
.50
(17.8)
Committee 
leader
.10
(6.9)
.21
(6.9)
.44
(15.1)
.39
(14.9)
.17
(7.4)
.24
(9.3)
.34
(15.4)
.26
(11.5)
.51
(24.5)
.06
(2.6)
.19
(10.2)
.17
(10.3)
Senate bill .07(3.1)
.17
(4.8)
.04
(1.1)
.23
(6.2)
−.01
(−.05)
.04
(1.6)
.10
(4.7)
.11
(4.5)
.12
(6.3)
.08
(4.0)
.07
(4.2)
−.01
(−0.5)
President’s 
speech
.07
(2.7)
−.08
(−1.5)
−.07
(−1.8)
−.04
(−1.0)
.02
(0.4)
−.01
(−.4)
.02
(0.4)
.01
(0.2)
−.05
(−1.5)
−.02
(−0.6)
−.01
(−0.7)
−.04
(−1.0)
President’s
draft
−.04
(−1.5)
.09
(1.8)
−.05
(−1.0)
.07
(2.0)
.08
(2.8)
.12
(3.7)
< .01
(0.2)
.07
(4.8)
−.02
(−1.5)
.04
(1.5)
.08
(3.1)
.02
(1.2)
Request
executive
comment
< .01
(0.1)
.07
(3.0)
.02
(1.0)
−.05
(−2.2)
−.07
(−4.2)
−.06
(−4.2)
−.02
(−1.1)
−.06
(−5.0)
−.06
(−5.6)
−.01
(−0.4)
.04
(2.7)
.06
(4.8)
Maximum 
cosponsors
> −.01
(−1.4)
>  −.01
(−3.2)
< .01
(2.2)
< .01
(1.4)
< .01
(2.7)
< .01
(7.6)
< .01
(2.2)
< .01
(0.2)
< .01
(1.5)
< .01
(.01)
< .01
(3.0)
>  −.01
(−3.4)
Scope of 
issue
< .01
(4.3)
.01
(4.3)
< .01
(1.8)
>  −.01
(−0.8)
< .01
(2.1)
< .01
(1.6)
< .01
(0.6)
< .01
(2.1)
< .01
(1.5)
< .01
(.41)
> −.01
(−0.6)
< .01
(4.6)
Minimum
complexity
.001
(2.9)
< .01
(1.5)
< .01
(11.6)
>  −.01
(−0.2)
< .01
(8.0)
< .01
(0.3)
< .01
(5.7)
> −.01
(−0.3)
> −.01
(−0.3)
< .01
(0.3)
< .01
(0.5)
>  −.01
(−2.3)
Multiply
referred
−.03
(−1.2)
< .01
(0.2)
−.07
(−2.1)
−.02
(−1.3)
−.01
(−0.6)
−.01
(−1.1)
−.02
(−1.3)
−.03
(−2.0)
−.03
(−2.1)
−.02
(−1.7)
.02
(2.0)
−.06
(−5.1)
Authorization .02(0.5)
.07
(1.0)
.15
(2.1)
.14
(2.0)
.12
(1.7)
.15
(2.1)
.13
(1.8)
.04
(1.1)
.02
(0.6)
.01
(0.2)
−.01
(−0.2)
.23
(2.3)
Timing of 
introduction
−.01
(−0.7)
.06
(1.7)
−.08
(−2.1)
−.26
(−7.8)
−.42
(−13)
> −.01
(−0.1)
−.17
(−6.1)
.02
(1.0)
−.15
(−6.9)
−.11
(−6.3)
−.08
(−4.3)
−.06
(−3.7)
Democratic 
sponsor
−.03
(−2.8)
.06
(4.2)
.05
(2.0)
−.02
(−0.9)
.26
(11.4)
−.01
(−0.6)
.03
(1.8)
.04
(3.8)
−.04
(−3.0)
−.10
(−7.3)
−.01
(−1.1)
−.02
(−1.2)
Avg. sponsor 
experience
> −.01
(−2.1)
< .01
(0.7)
.01
(3.6)
.01
(2.6)
> −.01
(−0.4)
< .01
(0.2)
> −.01
(−1.1)
−.01
(−4.8)
> −.01
(−2.0)
< .01
(1.7)
> −.01
(−3.1)
< .01
(4.8)
Constant .01(0.6)
−.12
(.03)
−.08
(−2.0)
.20
(5.5)
.18
(5.4)
>  −.01
(−0.5)
.09
(3.8)
.06
(3.4)
.14
(6.2)
.12
(6.5)
.04
(2.7)
.06
(3.1)
N 1556 1145 1362 1871 2410 2236 2597 2858 3261 2853 3176 3207
R2 .59 .44 .53 .49 .49 .58 .61 .59 .65 .60 .68 .44
TABLE F.2. LPM Regression slopes (and t-statistics for White-Huber robust standard
errors) for determinants of subcommittee markup of House Commerce Committee issues in 
the House
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CONGRESS
VARIABLE 96th 97th 98th 99th 100th 101st 102nd 103rd 104th 105th 106th 107th
Committee 
leader
.11
(4.7)
.34
(10.4)
.26
(8.8)
.25
(9.4)
.16
(6.6)
.49
(21.5)
.47
(23.2)
.40
(17.5)
.37
(17.7)
.40
(17.5)
.20
(9.5)
.142
(11.5)
Senate bill .29(8.5)
.03
(0.7)
−.01
(−0.3)
.12
(3.0)
−.03
(−1.3)
−.01
(−0.4)
.04
(1.7)
.03
(1.2)
.01
(0.5)
−.04
(−1.8)
.06
(2.6)
.08
(3.5)
President’s 
speech
.02
(0.4)
−.01
(−0.2)
−.01
(−0.3)
−.02
(−0.3)
.21
(3.4)
.06
(1.5)
< .01
(0.1)
−.07
(−2.1)
−.04
(−0.8)
.01
(0.3)
−.05
(−1.8)
−.04
(1.0)
President’s
draft
−.06
(−1.7)
.13
(2.2)
.05
(1.0)
.10
(2.4)
.04
(1.2)
.01
(0.4)
.11
(4.2)
>  −.01
(−0.1)
.05
(2.7)
.10
(4.1)
.10
(3.4)
−.02
(−1.3)
Request
executive
comment
.04
(1.8)
−1.0
(−3.7)
−.07
(−2.4)
−.04
(−1.8)
>  −.01
(>  −0.1)
.02
(1.3)
.02
(1.0)
.10
(7.4)
.03
(2.1)
−.02
(−1.4)
.06
(3.2)
.08
(6.1)
Maximum 
cosponsors
< .01
(4.4)
< .01
(8.8)
< .01
(8.6)
< .01
(1.9)
< .01
(3.1)
< .01
(11.5)
< .01
(5.8)
< .01
(10.8)
< .01
(18.6)
< .01
(12.9)
< .01
(21.5)
< .01
(1.62)
Scope of 
issue
.01
(3.9)
< .01
(1.9)
< .01
(3.2)
.01
(4.5)
< .01
(2.6)
< .01
(1.1)
< .01
(1.9)
>  −.01
(−1.3)
>  −.01
(−7.7)
>  −.01
(−0.3)
>  −.01
(−1.7)
< .01
(7.3)
Minimum
complexity
>  −.01
(−2.6)
>  −.01
(−3.7)
>  −.01
(−6.0)
>  −.01
(−10.3)
< .01
(5.0)
>  −.01
(−4.1)
>  −.01
(−2.2)
>  −.01
(−3.1)
>  −.01
(−8.3)
>  −.01
(−1.2)
>  −.01
(−3.6)
>  −.01
(−8.4)
Multiply 
referred
.15
(3.4)
−.06
(−2.3)
.03
(0.9)
.02
(1.1)
−.25
(−11)
−.14
(7.9)
.05
(2.9)
−.11
(−5.2)
< .01
(0.1)
−.16
(−8.6)
−.05
(−3.1)
.01
(1.0)
Authorization .07(1.1)
−.001
(−0.1)
−.22
(−3.1)
−.10
(−1.4)
−.10
(−1.1)
−.08
(−1.3)
−.12
(−1.4)
−.03
(−1.1)
−.05
(−0.8)
.11
(1.5)
.07
(0.9)
.02
(0.3)
Democratic 
sponsor
.05
(2.5)
.11
(4.4)
.10
(2.9)
.09
(3.3)
.08
(2.8)
.09
(7.0)
.11
(6.8)
.04
(2.6)
−.04
(−2.7)
−.14
(−7.8)
−.09
(−5.4)
−.03
(−2.8)
Avg. sponsor 
experience
< .01
(1.0)
.01
(3.5)
.01
(2.5)
.01
(2.1)
.03
(11.6)
>  −.01
(−1.7)
< .01
(0.7)
.01
(6.6)
.02
(11.31)
< .01
(2.4)
>  −.01
(−2.0)
< .01
(2.3)
Constant −.03(−1.7)
.03
(1.0)
.09
(2.5)
.05
(1.8)
.10
(3.3)
.06
(4.0)
−.03
(−1.8)
< .01
(0.1)
−.02
(−0.8)
.28
(12.6)
.18
(9.3)
−.01
(−.06)
N 1556 1145 1362 1871 2410 2236 2597 2858 3261 2853 3176 3207
R2 .25 .34 .26 .26 .29 .52 .37 .52 .49 .38 .40 .28
TABLE F.3.  LPM Regression slopes (and t-statistics for White-Huber robust standard errors) 
for determinants of hearings of House Commerce Committee issues in the House
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Appendix F
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CONGRESS
VARIABLE 96th 97th 98th 99th 100th 101st 102nd 103rd 104th 105th 106th 107th
President’s 
speech
−.09
(−1.5)
−.08
(−1.2)
−.12
(−2.4)
−.05
(−1.0)
−.13
(−2.1)
−.04
(−0.9)
>  −.01
(−0.1)
.01
(0.4)
> −.01
(−.01)
.05
(1.2)
> −.01
(−0.1)
.02
(0.4)
President’s
draft
.45
(16.0)
.09
(1.8)
.11
(2.3)
.16
(3.7)
.07
(1.8)
.18
(5.3)
.06
(2.6)
.15
(8.4)
.05
(2.8)
.14
(5.1)
.33
(13.3)
.24
(12.1)
Maximum 
cosponsors
< .01
(0.1)
< .01
(3.4)
< .01
(6.1)
> −.01
(−4.2)
< .01
(1.0)
< .01
(6.4)
< .01
(2.7)
< .001
(2.0)
< .01
(8.8)
< .01
(7.3)
< .01
(10.0)
< .01
(5.2)
Scope of 
issue
.01
(2.8)
.01
(4.2)
.01
(3.7)
.01
(5.6)
.01
(4.0)
< .01
(2.7)
< .01
(3.3)
< .001
(4.1)
< .01
(6.6)
< .01
(5.7)
< .01
(3.8)
< .01
(3.5)
Minimum
complexity
< .01
(0.6)
> −.01
(−0.1)
< .01
(7.3)
> −.01
(−9.6)
> −.01
(−13)
> −.01
(−4.3)
< .01
(1.5)
< .01
(1.4)
> −.01
(−2.9)
> −.01
(−4.0)
> −.01
(−2.0)
< .01
(4.2)
Multiply 
referred
−.42 
(−17)
−.36 
(−14)
−.39 
(−14)
−.23
(−10)
−.28
(−16)
−.39
(−22)
−.35
(−19)
−.50
(−27)
−28
(−17)
−.26
(−16)
−.25
(−15)
−.20
(−11)
Authorization .14(2.1)
.27
(4.1)
.19
(2.3)
.07
(0.9)
.32
(4.2)
−.02
(−0.2)
.11
(1.1)
.07
(2.7)
.13
(2.1)
.20
(2.0)
.10
(1.5)
.22
(2.3)
Timing of 
introduction
−.27
(−5.4)
.02
(0.4)
−.10
(−2.3)
−.33
(−8.5)
−.03
(−1.4)
−.11
(−3.2)
−.45
(−12)
−.22
(−7.7)
−.11
(−4.2)
−.04
(−1.5)
−.17
(−6.5)
−.66
(−24)
Constant .45(14.0)
.39
(11.5)
.50
(16.9)
.56
(19.9)
.39
(18.0)
.49
(20.9)
.67
(30.4)
.62
(33.9)
.35
(17.3)
.30
(16.8)
.35
(20.0)
.53
(30.1)
N 1556 1145 1362 1871 2410 2236 2597 2858 3261 2853 3176 3207
         R2 .24 .25 .27 .27 .27 .31 .30 .46 .32 .28 .35 .35
TABLE F.4.  LPM Regression slopes (and t-statistics for White-Huber robust standard errors) 
for determinants of committee leader sponsorship of House Commerce Committee issues in 
the House
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Tables of Regression Coefficients for 
Direct Effects on Senate Agenda
179
CONGRESS
VARIABLE 96th 97th 98th 99th 100th 101st 102nd 103rd 104th 105th 106th 107th
Markup .28
(7.1)
.38
(10.5)
.77
(20.2)
.88
(44.4)
.82
(35.0)
.79
(29.9)
.78
(32.6)
.81
(35.0)
.77
(41.1)
.87
(45.1)
.78
(41.3)
.90
(59.3)
Hearing .15
(4.0)
.15
(3.7)
.05
(2.3)
−.03
(−3.0)
−.05
(−2.9)
.09
(3.7)
−.02
(−0.8)
.05
(2.2)
−.07
(−3.7)
−.07
(−3.9)
−.08
(−5.0)
−.01
(−0.5)
Committee 
chair
.31
(7.2)
.23
(6.3)
.02
(1.5)
−.01
(−0.5)
−.07
(−5.3)
−.03
(−1.5)
.02
(0.9)
−.03
(−3.8)
−.01
(−0.5)
−.05
(−3.4)
> −.01
(−0.1)
> −.01
(−0.2)
House bill .34
(8.8)
.23
(4.3)
.16
(5.2)
.18
(5.8)
.16
(7.6)
.12
(5.3)
.18
(9.7)
.07
(6.8)
.26
(16.3)
.09
(5.0)
.18
(9.6)
.13
(6.3)
President’s 
speech
.03
(0.4)
−.08
(−0.8)
−.15
(−2.0)
−.07
(−1.2)
−.08
(−3.0)
−.03
(−2.8)
−.01
(−0.5)
−.01
(−0.9)
.05
(1.0)
.03
(2.3)
.01
(0.5)
.02
(0.8)
President’s
draft
−.09
(−2.6)
< .01
(0.1)
.07
(2.2)
−.02
(−1.0)
−.01
(−0.8)
.06
(3.4)
−.13
(−6.4)
.02
(−2.2)
−.05
(−2.4)
.05
(3.5)
−.01
(−0.3) N.A.
Maximum 
cosponsors
−.01
(−3.4)
< .01
(0.9)
< .01
(2.5)
< .01
(2.4)
< .01
(0.9)
< .01
(2.2)
< .01
(1.4)
> −.01
(−5.2)
> −.01
(−0.5)
< .01
(3.8)
> −.01
(−5.2)
< .01
(3.3)
Scope of 
issue
< .01
(1.0)
−.01
(−1.8)
> −.01
(−0.9)
> −.01
(−0.3)
> −.01
(−2.5)
> −.01
(−3.4)
< .01
(1.1)
< .01
(1.3)
< .02
(3.4)
> −.01
(−1.2)
< .01
(2.6)
> −.01
(−5.4)
Minimum
complexity
.01
(3.8)
.02
(11.4)
< .01
(5.2)
< .01
(2.5)
< .01
(4.2)
< .01
(1.6
< .01
(8.9)
< .01
(4.1)
> −.01
(−13.9)
< .01
(4.5)
< .01
(5.3)
< .01
(2.6)
Joint referral −.13(−2.7)
−.44
(−10.8)
.08
(3.8)
.10
(2.2)
< .01
(.04)
.05
(1.3)
−.06
(−3.2)
.05
(2.6)
.27
(11.0)
−.01
(−0.4)
.16
(6.6)
.02
(0.8)
Authorization
 issue
.15
(2.1)
.24
(2.6)
−.02
(−0.9)
−.02
(−0.6)
.06
(1.3)
−.06
(−2.3)
.03
(0.3)
−.04
(−2.4)
.13
(1.5)
.05
(1.6)
> −.01
(−.01)
.01
(0.3)
Timing of 
introduction
.11
(1.9)
−.24
(−3.6)
.07
(2.2)
.02
(0.7)
.04
(1.4)
.06
(2.3)
−.22
(−6.0)
−.17
(−7.1)
−.18
(−5.2)
−.18
(−4.0)
−.22
(−6.1)
.05
(2.4)
Democratic 
sponsor 
.14
(2.4)
−.06
(−1.5)
−.01
(−0.5)
−.04
(−2.0)
.15
(5.6)
.01
(0.6)
.07
(5.9)
.08
(4.6)
−.16
(−9.7)
< .01
(0.3)
−.07
(−3.8)
−.04
(−2.3)
Avg. sponsor 
experience
−.01
(−1.2)
> −.01
(−0.3)
> −.01
(−1.6)
.01
(2.9)
.01
(5.9)
< .01
(1.1)
> −.01
(−2.0)
> −.01
(−0.6)
−.02
(−8.7)
> −.01
(−0.5)
.01
(3.1)
< .01
(1.7)
Private legislation .08(1.4)
.43
(6.6)
.02
(1.0)
−.09
(−3.7)
−.07
(−4.0)
.30
(5.6)
.13
(3.7)
−.05
(−5.0)
.04
(1.1)
.07
(3.3)
−.10
(−4.5)
−.07
(−3.8)
House X Earlier 
introduction
.20
(2.2)
.20
(2.8)
.06
(0.8)
−.13
(−5.4)
−.14
(−5.9)
.02
(0.5)
.13
(2.5)
−.01
(−0.8)
−.27
(−6.9)
−.04
(−1.5)
−.03
(−1.0)
−.09
(−5.1)
Constant .14(2.2)
.31
(5.5)
.04
(1.5)
.01
(0.2)
−.12
(−4.2)
−.03
(−1.1)
.09
(3.3)
.10
(4.8)
.58
(13.2)
.12
(4.2)
.16
(5.3)
> −.01
(−.01)
N 651 531 580 690 884 999 1264 1613 1552 1377 1353 1588
R2 .44 .53 .79 .83 .80 .83 .76 .85 .68 .74 .77 .90
TABLE G.1. LPM Regression slopes (and t-statistics for White-Huber robust standard
errors) for determinants of floor consideration of Senate Commerce Committee issues 
in the Senate
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CONGRESS
VARIABLE 96th 97th 98th 99th 100th 101st 102nd 103rd 104th 105th 106th 107th
Hearing .23
(6.6)
.35
(7.71)
.48
(11.8)
.41
(12.3)
.57
(17.4)
.55
(17.6)
.72
(30.9)
.49
(15.6)
.27
(9.4)
.16
(6.5)
.17
(5.2)
.28
(8.1)
Committee chair .12(2.6)
.23
(4.7)
.21
(6.4)
.17
(5.4)
.07
(2.7)
.06
(1.8)
−.06
(−1.7)
.04
(1.5)
.05
(1.5)
.21
(9.7)
.38
(11.9)
.18
(5.4)
House bill −.09
(−2.3)
−.06
(−1.0)
.20
(4.3)
.10
(2.6)
.08
(2.6)
.17
(5.3)
.03
(1.5)
.10
(4.3)
−.04
(−1.4)
.03
(1.1)
.05
(1.8)
.11
(3.6)
Executive 
comment 
requested
−.03
(−0.5)
−.03
(−0.5)
−.01
(−0.2)
.17
(5.3)
−.04
(−1.1)
−.11
(−3.8)
.01
(0.3)
−.06
(−2.5)
−.10
(−4.3)
.05
(1.4)
.04
(1.1)
−.19
(−4.9)
President’s 
speech
.13
(1.7)
−.08
(−0.9)
−.03
(−0.5)
.02
(0.4)
−.07
(−1.2)
−.04
(−0.8)
.03
(0.7)
−.01
(−0.5)
−.09
(−1.5)
.04
(0.8)
.01
(0.1)
.14
(2.0)
President’s
draft
.10
(2.3)
−.17
(−3.4)
.08
(1.2)
−.13
(−2.9)
> −.01
(−0.1)
.03
(1.0)
.02
(0.7)
.11
(5.9)
.24
(8.7)
.08
(2.9)
.04
(1.2) N.A.
Maximum 
cosponsors
.03
(9.3)
.01
(4.1)
< .01
(4.0)
.01
(5.7)
< .01
(7.5)
.01
(7.8)
< .01
(4.0)
< .01
(2.1)
.01
(3.0)
.01
(11.1)
.01
(10.7)
.01
(6.6)
Scope of 
issue
.02
(3.1)
.02
(2.0)
> −.01
(−0.9)
> −.01
(−0.4)
< .01
(0.5)
< .01
(1.8)
< .01
(2.0)
< .01
(0.2)
> −.01
(−1.2)
> −.01
(−4.8)
> −.01
(−4.5)
< .01
(0.2)
Minimum
complexity
.02
(15.0)
.01
(3.5)
.01
(8.0)
.01
(8.0)
.01
(7.9)
< .01
(1.6)
< .01
(4.1)
< .01
(4.1)
> −.01
(−5.4)
> −.01
(−0.4)
< .01
(1.2)
< .01
(1.7)
Joint referral −.14(−4.1)
.05
(0.6)
.19
(5.0)
.06
(0.9)
.04
(0.8)
.07
(1.6)
.14
(4.0)
.16
(5.8)
.36
(10.0)
.36
(10.6)
.65
(16.2)
.76
(18.3)
Authorization 
issue
−.11
(−1.5)
−.04
(−0.5)
−.01
(−0.2)
.03
(0.3)
.12
(1.3)
.11
(1.3)
.06
(1.0)
−.01
(−0.1)
.02
(0.3)
.01
(0.11)
.10
(0.8)
.43
(3.8)
Timing of 
introduction
−.22
(−4.1)
.01
(0.2)
−.04
(−0.6)
−.33
(−6.1)
−.04
(−0.8)
−.05
(−0.8)
−.12
(−2.8)
.03
(0.8)
−.40
(−8.1)
−.04
(−0.5)
−.19
(−3.4)
−.08
(−1.9)
Democratic 
sponsor 
.11
(2.3)
.02
(0.3)
−.06
(−1.5)
−.09
(−2.6)
.14
(3.3)
.02
(0.6)
.08
(2.8)
.14
(3.4)
−.03
(−1.3)
−.03
(−1.1)
−.01
(−.03)
.08
(2.7)
Avg. sponsor 
experience
< .01
(0.2)
.02
(4.3)
> −.01
(−0.1)
.01
(1.4)
.01
(2.1)
−.01
(−1.9)
.01
(3.8)
.02
(6.2)
.01
(3.5)
> −.01
(−0.5)
−.01
(−3.4)
< .01
(1.0)
Private legislation .93(18.3)
−.46
(−5.1)
.22
(4.7)
.55
(11.9)
.72
(21.2)
.79
(8.6)
.93
(26.8)
.07
(2.5)
−.11
(−1.9)
.61
(15.0)
.80
(24.0)
.11
(3.6)
House X Earlier 
introduction
.07
(0.7)
.20
(1.5)
−.07
(−.06)
.08
(1.2)
.42
(5.8)
.17
(3.0)
.12
(3.1)
−.01
(−0.2)
.13
(4.6)
.20
(6.0)
.34
(9.2)
.10
(2.8)
Constant −.07(−1.3)
−.18
(−2.8)
.20
(3.1)
.26
(4.6)
−.06
(1.3)
.13
(2.2)
−.11
(−2.5)
−.20
(−3.8)
.46
(8.7)
.49
(10.2)
.34
(7.0)
.08
(1.9)
N 651 531 580 690 884 999 1264 1613 1552 1377 1353 1588
R2 .54 .39 .50 .52 .56 .45 .66 .54 .44 .30 .47 .44
TABLE G.2.  LPM Regression slopes (and t-statistics for White-Huber robust standard 
errors) for determinants of committee markup of Senate Commerce Committee issues in 
the Senate
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TABLE G.3. LPM Regression slopes (and t-statistics for White-Huber robust standard 
errors) for determinants of committee hearings of Senate Commerce Committee issues in 
the Senate
CONGRESS
VARIABLE 96th 97th 98th 99th 100th 101st 102nd 103rd 104th 105th 106th 107th
Committee 
chair
.24
(5.0)
.06
(1.24)
.25
(5.87)
.24
(6.71)
.11
(3.1)
−.05
(−1.3)
.03
(1.0)
.10
(4.6)
.18
(6.2)
.10
(3.9)
.51
(19.0)
.32
(11.0)
House bill −.09
(−2.2)
−.09
(−1.4)
−.09
(−1.7)
.01
(0.3)
−.08
(−2.1)
.05
(1.4)
−.15
(−4.8)
−.04
(−1.6)
−.08
(−2.4)
.09
(2.7)
.04
(1.4)
.15
(5.5)
Executive com-
ment requested
.12
(3.3)
−.10
(−1.8)
−.11
(−2.2)
−.02
(−0.4)
−.19
(−4.1)
.08
(2.3)
−.03
(−0.8)
−.12
(−4.9)
.15
(5.0)
.06
(1.1)
−.01
(−0.4)
−.05
(−1.0)
President’s 
speech
.04
(0.5)
−.08
(−.70)
−.10
(−1.1)
.04
(0.4)
.07
(.08)
−.06
(−1.0)
.08
(1.3)
.02
(0.6)
.02
(0.3)
−.03
(−0.6)
.04
(0.9)
.12
(1.8)
President’s
draft
.02
(.05)
.15
(3.2)
−.05
(−0.6)
.16
(3.5)
.05
(1.5)
.11
(3.6)
.24
(7.6)
.29
(17.5)
.14
(4.3)
.38
(10.33)
−.05
(−1.3) N.A.
Maximum 
cosponsors
.04
(15.5)
.02
(6.4)
.01
(7.4)
< .01
(0.5)
.01
(10.76)
.01
(11.2)
.01
(10.4)
.01
(11.1)
.01
(7.3)
.01
(14.1)
.01
(7.0)
.01
(14.2)
Scope of 
issue
> −.01
(−0.5)
.03
(2.4)
.03
(3.0)
.04
(5.3)
.02
(3.3)
< .01
(1.5)
.01
(1.8)
> −.01
(−0.6)
> −.01
(−1.3)
> −.01
(−3.8)
< .01
(0.2)
> −.01
(−0.4)
Minimum
complexity
> −.01
(−1.2)
.01
(3.7)
< .01
(2.1)
.01
(3.6)
.01
(9.1)
> −.01
(−0.2)
< .01
(0.7)
< .01
(4.7)
< .01
(6.2)
> −.01
(−14.2)
> −.01
(−1.9)
< .01
(8.2)
Joint referral −.01(−.03)
.25
(3.3)
.39
(7.2)
−.30
(−4.6)
−.09
(−1.5)
.10
(1.4)
−.20
(−3.6)
.07
(2.4)
.22
(5.5)
.33
(7.8)
.93
(37.2)
−.17
(−4.7)
Authorization 
issue
.12
(1.6)
−.14
(−1.6)
.14
(1.5)
.14
(1.4)
.05
(0.4)
−.11
(−0.8)
.22
(2.1)
.05
(0.6)
−.02
(−0.1)
.01
(0.1)
−.26
(−3.4)
.11
(0.8)
Democratic 
sponsor 
−.07
(−1.2)
−.08
(−1.4)
.02
(0.5)
−.14
(−3.3)
.14
(2.6)
.27
(5.7)
.12
(3.2)
.37
(6.9)
−.05
(−1.6)
.04
(1.2)
−.04
(−1.7)
.05
(2.0)
Avg. sponsor 
experience
.01
(1.1)
.02
(3.0)
.01
(1.9)
−.01
(−1.4)
.02
(4.8)
> −.01
(−0.2)
.01
(3.7)
.01
(2.0)
.04
(10.2)
.01
(1.9)
.01
(5.8)
< .01
(1.0)
Private legislation −.36(−6.7)
.34
(4.27)
.32
(3.1)
−40
(−7.6)
−.56
(−12.4)
−.72
(−6.0)
−.66
(−13)
.21
(8.5)
.20
(2.3)
−.33
(−8.2)
−.18
(−5.8)
.35
(11.9)
House X Earlier 
introduction
.17
(1.4)
.17
(1.5)
.45
(5.6)
.26
(3.0)
−.26
(−2.6)
.04
(0.7)
.08
(1.2)
.18
(6.2)
.15
(4.7)
−.10
(−2.0)
−.04
(−0.9)
.06
(1.5)
Constant .37(5.8)
.21
(4.0)
.30
(5.2)
.48
(9.6)
.17
(3.1)
.28
(5.5)
.22
(4.7)
.10
(6.2)
.02
(0.4)
.24
(7.9)
−.03
(−0.9)
−.14
(−5.2)
N 651 531 580 690 884 999 1264 1613 1552 1377 1353 1588
R2 .32 .28 .26 .24 .29 .19 .28 .38 .29 .34 .47 .51
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CONGRESS
VARIABLE 96th 97th 98th 99th 100th 101st 102nd 103rd 104th 105th 106th 107th
President’s 
speech
.04
(0.5)
−.11
(−1.6)
−.07
(−0.7)
−.10
(−1.04)
.25
(2.3)
.12
(1.6)
.03
(0.4)
.08
(1.5)
.05
(0.7)
.16
(2.3)
.03
(0.6)
−.02
(−0.2)
President’s
draft
.58
(16.5)
.27
(4.7)
−.16
(−2.0)
.17
(2.7)
.11
(2.4)
.10
(2.6)
.14
(4.4)
.26
(10.8)
< .01
(0.2)
−.22
(−4.3)
.18
(4.8) N.A
Maximum 
cosponsors
−.01
(−1.7)
−.01
(5.0)
> −.01
(−1.1)
> −.01
(−1.2)
< .01
(0.5)
< .01
(4.0)
< .01
(1.3)
.01
(8.1)
> −.001
(−1.4)
< .01
(2.3)
< .01
(2.7)
.01
(17.3)
Scope of 
issue
.02
(3.6)
.04
(6.3)
.06
(5.6)
.04
(5.7)
.03
(5.6)
.02
(6.6)
.02
(9.2)
< .01
(3.0)
.02
(7.4)
.01
(5.9)
< .01
(4.0)
< .01
(1.1)
Minimum
complexity
.01
(4.1)
< .01
(0.5)
.01
(3.6)
.01
(6.8)
< .01
(2.2)
< .01
(3.2)
> −.01
(−3.8)
< .01
(4.8)
> −.01
(−8.5)
< .01
(8.2)
> −.01
(−3.4)
< .01
(6.0)
Joint 
referral
−.17
(−4.8)
−.04
(−0.6)
−.33
(−10.4)
−.14
(−3.1)
−.11
(−3.0)
−.24
(−8.5)
−.06
(−3.4)
−.27
(−6.3)
.04
(2.1)
−.17
(−3.5)
−.22
(−11.6)
−.27
(−9.9)
Authorization
issue
.07
(0.9)
.05
(0.5)
.05
(0.5)
.01
(0.1)
.04
(0.4)
−.04
(−0.3)
−.04
(−0.7)
.12
(1.7)
.01
(.01)
.08
(0.5)
−.02
(−0.1)
.04
(0.3)
Timing of 
introduction
−.15
(−2.4)
−.29
(−4.1)
−.19
(−2.9)
−.24
(−4.3)
−.10
(−2.3)
−.27
(−6.2)
−.10
(−2.6)
−.36
(−8.3)
−.07
(−2.2)
−.10
(−1.6)
−.46
(−8.1)
−.40
(−9.2)
Constant .25(5.9)
.35
(7.6)
.27
(4.9)
.15
(3.2)
.14
(4.5)
.15
(5.1)
.12
(4.2)
.23
(7.1)
.14
(5.8)
.35
(10.1)
.50
(15.9)
.44
(16.2)
N 651 531 580 690 884 999 1264 1613 1552 1377 1353 1588
         R2 .43 .21 .17 .20 .15 .21 .26 .40 .22 .47 .43 .42
TABLE G.4. LPM Regression slopes (and t-statistics for White-Huber robust standard 
errors) for determinants of committee leader sponsorship of Senate Commerce Committee 
issues in the Senate
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Notes to Chapter 1
1. Since 1981, the use of radio frequencies had been offered for a nominal license fee 
and allocated through a lottery. In return for nearly free use of the spectrum, broadcasters 
were expected to provide emergency broadcasting and other public services.
2. Although Bush’s spectrum auctions did not pass in the 102nd Congress, they were 
enacted in the 103rd Congress under Clinton.
3. Spectrum auctions were first proposed by economists Herzel (1951) and Coase 
(1959).
4. Reagan’s 1988–90 budget proposals included revenue from spectrum auctions, 
although Reagan did not submit separate draft legislation on the issue (Hazlett 1998). In 
the last months of Reagan’s last Congress (100th), Phil Gramm had introduced S. 2807 
in the Senate and Don Ritter introduced H.R. 5166 in the House to implement spectrum 
auctions. Gramm reintroduced his Senate bill at the beginning of the 101st Congress as S. 
170, but not in the 102nd.
5. See Canes-Wrone (2001a); Edwards and Barrett (2000); Edwards, Barrett, and 
Peake (1997); C. Jones (1994); Light (1991); Peterson (1990); Taylor (1998); and Theri-
ault (2002).
6. For example, Fishel (1985); Huntington (1973); B. Jones (1994); Light (1991); 
Rohde (1991); Sinclair (1995); Sundquist (1981); Wayne (1978).
7. In his critique of Kingdon’s model, Gary Mucciaroni (1992) provides further 
evidence in the case of the 1986 tax reform that solutions can be linked more closely to 
problems than Kingdon suggests.
8. Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991), Popkin (1994), and Lupia and McCubbins 
(1998), among others, argue that poorly informed voters may still be able to make reason-
able vote choices through the use of heuristics, and I argue that the president may provide 
one of the most powerful heuristics in their voting calculus, since he is the most visible 
actor in national politics.
61
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Notes to Chapter 2
1. If there is a monopoly agenda setter, it will be able to achieve policies other than 
the median legislator’s by making take-it-or-leave-it policy choices to the floor that do not 
include the median’s position. In such cases, it is inappropriate to use the median voter 
theorem. In the House, although the Rules Committee can report closed rules prohibiting 
amendments, these rules must be adopted by majority vote, so it is still appropriate to use 
the median voter theorem to model the House.
2. Lacy (2001) considers nonseparable preferences in the context of survey analysis.
3. In repeated interaction, however, it may be rational for the president to veto bills 
in order to build a reputation or in order to force Congress to rewrite a bill in a way 
that is more favorable to the president (Cameron 2000). Unfortunately, I must ignore 
such repeated-game concerns in the simple model I construct in this chapter. Neverthe-
less, veto threats offer very little agenda influence even in the repeated-game models of 
chapter 3.
Notes to Chapter 3
1. Technically, the ability of House committee and subcommittee chairs to schedule 
hearings and markups is subject to being overruled by a majority of the panel, but this 
rarely occurs.
2. Riker (1993) goes one step further and claims that an issue is salient if the voter 
uses it in her decision making. This suggests that another precondition of salience is that 
it orders preferences. An issue cannot be salient if the voter is indifferent between all 
outcomes. But by claiming that salient issues are those that voters use in their decision 
calculus, Riker assumes away the problem I would like to ask: how does salience affect 
vote choice?
3. Coherent preferences are defined to be both complete and transitive, as explained 
in chapter 2.
4. A discount factor less than 1 also helps represent the fact that the voter and her 
representatives do not expect to live forever in the infinitely repeated game.
Notes to Chapter 4
1. Further deregulation of natural gas was later enacted under President George H. W. 
Bush in the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989 (Public Law No: 101–60).
2. Congress’s ability to invite or subpoena experts from the federal bureaucracy to its 
hearings and to require special reports are less direct mechanisms for such access than the 
president’s control over all draft legislation written by the federal agencies, and modern 
presidents have maintained some control over these mechanisms, as I discuss in the next 
section.
3. Requests for executive comment are formal congressional requests for executive 
agency expertise and recommendations on a pending legislative bill.
4. Congress does have its own institutional sources of expertise, such as the Congres-
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sional Budget Office and the General Accounting Office as well as lobbyists and interest 
groups, but with more than one million civilian employees in the federal bureaucracy 
(Light 1999) the executive generally holds an informational advantage.
5. “Cheap-talk” models involve signals that impose no direct cost or benefit to the 
sender or receiver of such signals. The only way such signals can affect the welfare of 
the agents who send and receive them is if the information conveyed in them leads to a 
change in behavior that influences their welfare.
6. Another way to characterize agenda setting is as an ordering problem where Con-
gress may take more than one action, i.e., send more than one bill to the president for 
approval, but it may not take all possible actions at once (Cox and McCubbins 1993). This 
ordering decision becomes an agenda problem with the introduction of time discounting 
in repeated play so that actions chosen later will result in lower payoffs than they would 
if chosen in the present period, thus forcing the scheduler to prioritize actions.
7. Another way for the president to affect the outcome is through the use of the veto 
or the threat of the veto. The president would only veto Congress’s ideal policy if it were 
further from the president’s ideal policy than the status quo is. The veto plays a very 
limited role in restricting the conditions under which legislative clearance can influence 
the congressional agenda, as shown in the proof of the legislative clearance equilibrium 
in Appendix B.
Notes to Chapter 5
1. The other key House committee, Energy and Commerce, however, failed to even 
bring a bill to markup, because chair John Dingell could not get enough supporters to 
agree to report a bill from committee that would be acceptable to the president (CQ Alma-
nac 1995, 335–36).
2. However, the size of the discretionary budget, which is the subject of Canes-
Wrone’s studies, is a small fraction of the total federal budget, which is dominated by non-
discretionary items like entitlements and interest on the national debt (Schick 1995).
3. I can then also measure to some degree whether the scope exercises a moderating 
influence on the president’s agenda power by introducing an interaction effect (Jaccard 
and Turrisi 2003). Such tests show that there is no support for the idea that the president’s 
effect on the agenda differs by the level of scope, once scope is controlled for. 
4. The following analysis is of the House; I briefly look at the House and Senate 
together at the end of this chapter. Unlike the House, the Senate has almost no restrictions 
on nongermane amendments.
5. If committee markup adds nongermane amendments to a bill, these nongermane 
amendments can be incorporated into a new “clean bill” in order to take advantage of the 
fact that the original provisions of a bill are immune to the germaneness rule. But such 
a clean bill must then be introduced in the House and referred back to the committee 
(Oleszek 2001). This is not so in the more informal environment of the Senate, as I will 
discuss in the chapter 7.
6. In figures 5.3 and 5.4, I exclude bills already passed in the Senate, which elicit a 
different pattern to be shown in figures 5.5 and 5.6.
7. I consider committee and subcommittee actions that occur exclusively in House 
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Commerce. If a jointly referred bill reaches the floor after being reported from another 
committee, it is not available for floor consideration unless House Commerce also reports 
or discharges the bill.
8. What I call the textbook legislative process is that usually portrayed in introductory 
American politics textbooks and includes bill introduction, hearing, markup, floor consid-
eration under a special rule, floor vote, consideration by the other chamber, and signing or 
vetoing by the president.
9. Oleszek does, however, consider requests for executive comment in his co-authored 
study of joint referrals (Davidson, Oleszek, and Kephart 1988).
 10. I argue that the preferences of the administration rather than the agency matter 
here, since the administration controls to some degree the information provided by the 
agency in its comment, even if only indirectly as described by Neustadt (1954).
 11.  In investigative hearings, the committee may have to rely on executive officials as 
the only source of information, but it may request testimony under sworn oath, so that it 
can use sanctions to elicit more truthful testimony.
 12. The Corrections Calendar was added in the 104th Congress, when an earlier 
calendar was eliminated. Neither of these calendars has played an important role in the 
congressional agenda.
Notes to Chapter 6
1. Exogenous or explanatory variables in figure 6.1 are those that have no causal 
arrows pointing to them. The levels of these variables are assumed to be set by forces 
other than those represented in the model. Variables that have causal arrows pointing to 
them are called endogenous because they are influenced by variables within the model.
2. The committee was called “Interstate and Foreign Commerce” in the 96th, “Energy 
and Commerce” from the 97th through the 103rd and from the 107th on, and “Commerce” 
from the 104th through the 106th, but I shall almost always refer to it as just the “House 
Commerce” Committee in order to avoid confusion.
3. In this case, statistical significance means that if we were able to take repeated 
independent and identically distributed samples of the same size in the hypothetical case 
where there is no associaton between the variables, then we would expect less than 10% 
of these samples to have effects (association) as large as they are in our actual sample.
4. Many of the Public Health Service bills that the House Commerce Committee deals 
with also have an educational dimension.
5. Before the 96th Congress, no bill could have more than 25 sponsors, so additional 
sponsors were added by introducing duplicate bills. This makes analysis of the agenda 
at the bill level misleading, but it also complicates analysis at the issue level because it 
changes the way that important control variables, like the party of the chief sponsor or the 
maximum number of sponsors, are measured.
6. “The Constitution gives me relevance. The power of our ideas gives me relevance. 
The record we have built up over the last two years and the things we’re trying to do 
to implement it, give it relevance. The President is relevant here, especially an activist 
President. And the fact that I am willing to work with the Republicans. The question is, 
are they willing to work with me?” (William J. Clinton, Presidential Press Conference, 
April 18, 1995).
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Notes to Chapter 7
1. Only each chamber’s Foreign Affairs and Judiciary Committees received more 
television coverage.
2. Most notably, Brady and Volden (1997) and Krehbiel (1998).
3. The danger still exists that Congress could act on the issue the president indicates 
but offer legislation that is unacceptable to the president compared to the status quo. 
It is undeniable that sometimes Congress presents legislation to the president that it is 
confident he will veto. This was a conscious strategy of the Democratic leadership under 
Speaker James Wright in the 100th Congress. Similarly, the president also often requests 
action on policy issues, such as the line-item veto under Reagan and Bush, which he is 
confident that the Congress will not deliver. Such position taking can serve strategic pur-
poses for both the president and Congress. The role of such “blame-game” legislation is 
ignored here for the purpose of analyzing the president’s influence on the congressional 
agenda. See Groseclose and McCarty (2001).
4. The role of conference committees in policy making is considered at length in 
Longley and Oleszek (1989) and treated formally in Tsebelis and Money (1997).
5. In figure 5.6, I plot all issues that were covered by all House bills referred to Senate 
Commerce rather than just those issues initiated by House bills.
Notes to Chapter 8
1. In particular, Reagan submitted H.R. 6720, “[a] bill to authorize the formation of 
a bank securities affiliate to deal in, underwrite and purchase government and municipal 
securities, to sponsor and manage investment companies and underwrite the securities 
thereof” in the 97th Congress; H.R. 3537, “[a] bill to authorize depository institution 
holding companies to engage in activities of a financial nature, insurance underwriting 
and brokerage, real estate development and brokerage, and certain securities activities,” in 
the 98th Congress; and H.R. 1603, “[a] bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
to authorize the Securities and Exchange Commission to subject banks, associations, and 
other entities that exercise fiduciary powers, to the same regulations as broker-dealers” in 
the 99th Congress.
2. The model of draft legislation in chapter 4 also suggests that the informational 
advantage of the executive branch offers the president a more permanent influence over 
the congressional agenda than public addresses. While public addresses are only effective 
in a president’s early Congresses, the influence he exercises through draft legislation can 
persist through his last Congress.
3. Legislative organizations, such as the General Accounting Office and the Congressio-
nal Research Service, are essentially bicameral organizations that provide common resourc-
es to the House and Senate, offering some counterpoint to executive policy expertise.
Note to Appendix A
1. The payoff for each action is calculated to include all of the actions in the remain-
ing periods of the infinite game, assuming the other actors play their equilibrium strate-
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gies. I take advantage of a property of infinite sequences to simplify these infinite-period 
payoffs. The sum of an infinite sequence of terms like the discount factor δk, where 0 < δ < 
1 and k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ∞, is simply 1 /(1 − δ) and the sum from k = 1, 2, . . . ∞ is δ /(1 − δ). 
For sequences of numbers that occur only periodically, like presidents’ first Congresses, 
we can summarize for k = 0, 4, . . . ∞ in the case where all presidents serve two terms, 
yielding 1/(1 − δ4), or for k = 4, . . . ∞ the sum is δ4/(1 − δ4). Non-presidential election 
years can be summarized simply by subtracting the sum for presidential election years 
from the sum for all years, e.g., [δ /(1 − δ)] − [δ4/(1 − δ4)] = (δ + δ2δ3)/(1 − δ4).  There 
will be variations on these sums depending on whether the president is reelected after two 
Congresses.
Note to Appendix D
1. Amundsen (1973) and Amemiya (1977) have also shown that if the LPM includes 
only dichotomous variables and all possible interactions among the independent variables, 
then it is the same as the maximum likelihood estimator, which means that it is guaranteed 
to be an ideal estimator for large samples.
Note to Appendix E
1. One may also calculate the direct effect of the president on the agenda in the previ-
ous example simply by omitting the committee leader control variable. The president’s 
total effect , β1 + α1β2 is equal to the slope of a bivariate regression that does not “hold 
constant” the committee chair’s influence. This does indeed produce an unbiased estimate 
of the president’s total (direct + indirect) effect, but because the committee leader’s influ-
ence is absorbed in the error term (unexplained causes), this model has errors that are cor-
related with presidential agenda independent variables, a condition called “endogeneity,” 
which leads to invalid standard errors and statistical tests.
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